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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
GENOCIDE IN THE MODERN AGE:  
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE MAKING OF MASS POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE, 1900-2015 
by 
Zachary A. Karazsia 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida  
Professor John F. Clark, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Harry D. Gould, Co-Major Professor 
This dissertation presents a new conceptual framework for understanding genocide and 
mass political violence. I build upon existing theories of mass violence that take into 
account motivations for committing mass atrocities, combine these with the task of 
counting civilian casualties, and propose a new framework based on the perpetrators’ 
socio-political standing in society. This model develops a four-part typology of 
perpetrators by examining the level of government participation and societal participation 
in the process of violence. Four patterns of perpetrators emerge from this deductive 
assessment of large-scale violence. These mass political violence perpetrator categories 
are: a) state perpetrators; b) state-society coalitions; c) state-sponsored groups; and d) 
non-state actors. Based on the evidence and analysis in this dissertation I found four 
central conclusions. First, perpetrator type implicitly limits the scope of violence and 
target group(s). Second, when assessing the severity and destructive power of each 
perpetrator category, we must use both absolute and relative thresholds. Neither on its 
vii 
 
own is sufficient for understanding why and how perpetrators target and eliminate vast 
segments of society. Third, based on this typological framework, there are variations 
between perpetrator categories (i.e., state perpetrators and state-society coalitions) and 
there is variation within each perpetrator category. The final conclusion is that scholars 
must question the so-called unitary role of the state when theorizing about genocide and 
mass political violence perpetrators. The role of state and society is not unitary nor as 
parsimonious as previous theories of mass violence suggest.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem 
In March 2016, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that a non-state 
armed group calling itself the “Islamic State” (IS) committed genocide against religious 
and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria.1 This acknowledgement came more than 65 years 
after the international community ratified a Convention whose aim was to prevent and 
punish such crimes.2 The twentieth century has seen an extraordinarily large degree of 
mass murder, which culminated in between 60 and 360 million deaths as a result of 
genocide and mass killing episodes.3 This trend of extreme violence, qualitatively, shows 
little sign of abatement in the 21st century. Perhaps, now more than ever, the central 
question of this dissertation needs asking: why do different kinds of genocide and mass 
political violence emerge in different social and political contexts? 
Why is there a large range in the number of civilians killed? One reason estimates 
of civilian casualties vary stems from the plethora of terms describing intentional killing 
of civilians and non-combatants. Since the 1940s there have been two categories of 
terms. First, legal terms, which hold tangible consequences for individuals when they are 
violated; and second, political terms, which were developed by those in academia and 
policy circles but have not been codified into domestic or international law. Raphael 
                                                 
1 Elise Labott and Tal Kopan. March 18, 2016. “John Kerry: ISIS responsible for genocide,” CNN. URL: 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/17/politics/us-iraq-syria-genocide/.  
 
2 In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, codifying into international law this crime. The Convention entered into force in 
January 1951.  
 
3 Rudolph Rummel. 1997. Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900. Piscatawy, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, Rutgers University, p. 355. 
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Lemkin initiated this conceptual debate in 1944 by introducing the term “genocide,” to 
characterize a coordinated campaign of mass murder under Hitler’s Third Reich.4 
Lemkin’s concept was adopted by the United Nations and incorporated into the Genocide 
Convention by designating such acts as an international crime. The Convention states that 
genocide is “[the] intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group,”5 
Near the conclusion of the 20th century the term “ethnic cleansing” emerged out of the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s to describe genocidal acts that occur within a geographically 
defined territory. Ethnic cleansing was adopted as a crime against humanity by the United 
Nations in 1993.6 
 Nearly concurrent to these debates under international law was an explosion of 
conceptual terms in academia. Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr advanced the term 
“politicide,” which is “the murder of any person or people by a government because of 
                                                 
4 Raphael Lemkin. 1944. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  
 
5 Leo Kuper. 1981. Genocide. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
 
6 Ruti Teitel. 1996. “Judgment at The Hague.” East European Constitutional Review 5(4) (Fall): 80-85.  
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their politics or for political purposes.”7 Harff and Gurr sought to capture episodes of 
mass violence that were not covered under the Genocide Convention, specifically peoples 
targeted for their political beliefs. Rudolph Rummel argued his concept of “democide” 
was most suitable for examining this level of violence. Defined as, “The murder of any 
person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.”8 
Benjamin Valentino examined major episodes of political violence in the twentieth 
century and introduced “mass killing” into our lexicon, defined as, “the intentional killing 
of a massive number of noncombatants.”9  
Valentino’s introduction of the term mass killing to our debate revolutionized the 
way we think of major episodes of political violence (see footnote 11). Christian Gerlach 
developed “extreme violence” to describe mass violence and murder within society that is 
characteristically fluid.10 Despite the notoriety of these terms and their wide usage, others 
remains to define similar episodes of violence, including: mass political murder, 
massacres, pogroms, and political violence to describe types of conflicts civilians 
confront. Figure 1 maps the highly complex and subjective nature of these terms. The line 
thickness, color, and shape serve to distinguish their overlapping qualities in a manner 
that makes them easily seen. The size of the circle indicates each term’s analytical ability 
to classify cases of extreme violence.   
                                                 
7 Rudolph Rummel. 1994. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 31.  
 
8 Ibid.  
 
9 Benjamin Valentino. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 10-15.  
 
10 Christian Gerlach. 2010. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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 As displayed in Figure 1, many of these dominant concepts in genocide studies 
(i.e., genocide, democide, mass murder, mass political murder / politicide, mass killing, 
ethnic cleansing, and the author’s term, “mass political violence” overlap a great deal. 
There are two good reasons to study the overlapping nature of these concepts. First, the 
reader can visually comprehend the highly complex and overlapping nature of, for 
example, ethnic cleansing with all other terms except mass murder. Second, scholars 
have been perpetually confronted by the continual development of such terms and when 
asked to classify cases by these categories, they are faced with near insurmountable 
decisions. This dissertation, in part, aims to address this debate by introducing a new 
concept, “mass political violence,” which covers a much broader range of violent cases in 
human history, thereby lending itself too greater scholarly, academic, political, and 
policymaking relevance.  
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Figure 1.1: 
Major Concepts of Extreme Violence with Overlapping Characteristics11 
 
 Part of the problem in the sub-field of genocide studies is the seemingly 
exponential growth of concepts to define large-scale loss of life. In the perspective of the 
author, Benjamin Valentino’s characteristics of mass killing capture a large number of 
                                                 
11 Here is a list of concepts with their definitions included in Figure 1. Mass killing is “the intentional killing 
of a massive number of noncombatants,” with three associated characteristics. First, the killing is intentional, 
second, there must be a minimum of 50,000 victims within a period of five or fewer years, and third the 
victims must be civilians or noncombatants, see Valentino, 2004, Final Solutions, p. 9-15; Mass political 
murder is “Politically motivated violence that directly or indirectly kills a substantial proportion of a targeted 
population, combatants and noncombatants alike, regardless of their age or gender” in Chirot and McCauley, 
2006, Why Not Kill Them All?, p. 19; Politicide is “the murder of any person or people by a government 
because of their politics or for political purposes,” Rummel, 1994, Death by Government; Mass murder is 
“the indiscriminate killing of any person or people by a government,” Rummel, 1994, Death by Government; 
For genocide definition see text above; Ethnic cleansing is “focused on geography and on forced removal 
of ethnic or related groups from particular areas (related to genocide)” by Benjamin Lieberman; Democide 
is “the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder” 
Rummel, 1994; Mass political violence is “Mass political violence is the intentional killing, in whole or part, 
of a discernible group, by a government, its agents, or an organized social unit,” with four associated 
characteristics described in the “Theoretical Framework” section of this dissertation. 
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these episodes, but with one significant drawback: The threshold requirement of at least 
fifty thousand victim deaths within a five-year period or less presents a high bar for 
scholars. It is with this shortcoming in mind that I introduce the concept of study for this 
dissertation, mass political violence.  Rather than introducing a new concept that is 
narrowly defined, this dissertation introduces and defines mass political violence in such 
a way as to lend itself for greater comparison of episodes of violence and murder directed 
against civilian populations. In Part II, I will define mass political violence and its four 
characteristics for the reader.  
This dissertation addresses the issue of generalizability. Since the Holocaust, the 
sub-field of genocide studies has based our understanding of this phenomenon on the 
Holocaust as prototypical of all genocides.12 The Nazi campaign of extermination against 
Jews, Roma, homosexuals, political dissenters, handicapped, and other religious 
minorities has established a benchmark to which all other cases have been compared, 
either directly or indirectly. This dissertation challenges, however, this implicit 
assumption within the field that all genocides are directly comparable to one another. It is 
true that the Holocaust and Rwanda are comparable at a high level of abstraction. 
However, to gain greater analytical leverage, we must begin to disaggregate episodes of 
mass political violence into comparable categories that exhibit similar causal 
mechanisms. In doing this, we can better unpack the problem of why perpetrators of 
genocide and mass political violence emerge, and how they accomplish these goals. 
Understanding these two complexities will be the focus of this dissertation.  
                                                 
12 Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas La Pointe, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, eds. 2014. Hidden Genocides: 
Power, Knowledge, Memory. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 5-9.  
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Thematic Literature Review   
 As an interdisciplinary field, the study of genocide and mass atrocities has 
substantially grown over the past two decades. This line of inquiry has grown in both size 
and sophistication since the seminal works of Raphael Lemkin, Hannah Arendt, Irving 
Louis Horowitz, Helen Fein, Leo Kuper, and Israel Charny between the mid-1940s and 
early 1980s.13 Most scholarship emanated from the study of the Holocaust until the early 
1990s, when scholars began to examine more episodes from Africa and Eastern Europe.14 
In the decades since, there have been six primary analytical research programs: (1) 
intergroup relations, (2) regime type, (3) hardship and upheaval, (4) ideology, (5) leaders’ 
strategies and (6) modernity and development.15 This literature review categorizes the 
bulk of scholarship in the field along these lines, identifying competing theories of state 
and society involvement as a crucial issue across the literature.  It concludes by 
discussing existing risk factors that contribute to the onset of genocide and mass political 
violence, another key problem in the literature.  
 Research Domain 1: Intergroup relations. Scholars operating within this research 
paradigm emphasize the role intergroup relations play in fomenting conflict in society. 
                                                 
13 Raphael Lemkin. 1944. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace; Hannah Arendt. 1951. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World; Hannah Arendt. 1970. On Violence. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers; Irving Louis 
Horowitz. 1976. Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction; Helen Fein. 
1979. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust.  New 
York: Free Press; Leo Kuper. 1981. Genocide. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Israel Charny. 1982. 
How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide, the Human Cancer. Boulder, CO: Westview.  
 
14 Finkel and Straus. 2012. “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, and 
Future Areas of Inquiry.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7(1) pp. 56-67.  
 
15 Ibid.  
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For these individuals, lack of positive intergroup relations bears a central role in the 
development of conflict and extreme violence. Leo Kuper argued that it is this division 
between groups that must be present for the evolution of genocide to emerge.16 Kuper’s 
analysis of societal divisions helped generate this domain of inquiry. Building upon 
Kuper’s assessment of social cleavages, Helen Fein expanded the analysis beyond 
intergroup (or lack thereof) relations and introduced the role of power.17 Fein contends 
when the dominant group determines a subordinate group to be “outside the universe of 
obligation,” extreme violence may emerge as a result of this elite determination. In recent 
years Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley have stressed two factors in the onset of 
genocide: group power imbalances and a lack of interdependence and social interactions 
between groups. Chirot and McCauley claim these two factors enables elites and groups 
to capitalize on four drivers of violence: convenience, revenge, simple fear, and fear of 
polluting the quality of one’s socio-cultural group.18 Similarly, Daniel Goldhagen argues 
that “widespread eliminationist hatred” is the cause of the Nazi Holocaust.19 These 
scholars often rely on the work of Philip Zimbardo, a psychologist who, among many 
other things, contributed to political science’s understanding of the role dehumanization 
and deindividuation play in enabling perpetrators to commit heinous crimes.20  
                                                 
16 Kuper, 1981, Genocide.  
 
17 Fein, 1979, Accounting for Genocide. 
 
18 Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley. 2006. Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass 
Political Murder. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
19 Daniel Goldhagen. 2009. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: 
Knopf.; Daniel J. Goldhagen, 2009. Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault 
on Humanity. New York: Public Affairs. 
 
20 Philip Zimbardo. 2007. The Lucifer Effect. New York: The Random House. 
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 Research Domain 2: Regime type. Analyzing the role regime type plays in 
instigating violence has always been a central line of inquiry within political science 
broadly and this particular sub-field. Rudolph Rummel’s seminal works on 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism’s links to democide (genocide and mass murder by 
the state) catapulted this research program into relevancy. Rummel asserted totalitarian 
states are more likely to commit mass murder than authoritarian regimes, and both are 
significantly more likely to engage in this policy than democracies.21 Likewise, Irving 
Horowitz, a sociologist by training, links regime type, in the aggregate sense to enhanced 
likelihoods of state-directed mass murder.22 Both Rummel and Horowitz’s work initiated 
this research domain by making broad, generalizations about the correlations between 
regime type and extreme violence. In the years since their seminal works, other scholars 
have provided increased nuance. Barbara Harff asserts regime type matters alongside 
supporting other supporting factors, including: ethno-cultural minority elites for 
instance.23 However, unlike the former research domain, there is less consensus on the 
impact of regime type with the onset of extreme violence. Benjamin Valentino, Jay 
Ulfelder, and Matthew Krain do not find evidence that greater autocracy leads to greater 
mass murder.24  
                                                 
 
21 Rudolph J. Rummel. 1994. Death by Government. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Publishers; Rudolph 
Rummel. 1998. Statistics on Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900. Wissenschaftliche 
Paperbacks.  
 
22 Horowitz, 1976, Genocide. 
 
23 Barbara Harff. 2003. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955.” American Political Science Review 97(1), pp. 57-73.  
 
24 Valentino, 2004, Final Solutions; Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino. 2008. “Assessing Risks of State- 
Sponsored Mass Killing,” Political Instability Task Force, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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 Research Domain 3: Hardship and upheaval. The chief concern for researchers 
who stress the role of hardship and upheaval in society focus lies in deep-seated structural 
problems or tipping points that trigger extreme violence. As Freek Colombijn and J. 
Thomas Lindblad assert the roots of (mass?) violence in Indonesia lie in hardships of 
specific actors (e.g., youth organizations or economic disenfranchisement) as factors 
supporting violence after triggering events (i.e., the coup d’état).25 David Gibbs argues, 
counterfactually, absent economic downturns in Yugoslavia and Rwanda the onset of 
extreme violence in these respective states could have been less severe or minimized 
during the conflict.26 Fundamentally, at the core of this research program, lies the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis, that is, the idea that these tensions and resentments 
enable actors to capitalize on structural factors or immediate triggering events that shift 
society from “normal” levels of violence into extreme violence.27 Ervin Staub and Peter 
Uvin explored this hypothesis in their respective works on political violence.28 Harff 
makes similar claims that political upheaval can significantly increase the onset of 
geno/politicide in states.29 She contends, that dramatic political shifts can make 
                                                 
abstract_id=1703426; Matthew Krain. 1997. “State Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of 
Genocides and Politicides,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(3): 331–60. 
 
25 Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds. 2002. Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary 
violence in historical perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV Press.  
 
26 David N. Gibbs. 2009. First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. 
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.  
 
27 Finkel and Straus, 2012, “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide.” 
 
28 Ervin Staub. 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Peter Uvin. 1998. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. 
West Hartford: Kumarian. 
 
29 Harff, 2003, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust.” 
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(statistically) significant shifts in the likelihood in onset of extreme violence, particularly, 
if actors act upon existing social, political, cultural, and economic or otherwise determine 
cleavages in society.  
 Research Domain 4: Ideology. Perhaps the most researched field inside political 
science on genocide is based in unpacking the role ideology plays. Examining ideological 
frameworks of elites and the masses has clued scholars into deep-rooted belief systems 
and cued us into understanding motivators of violence. To the layperson, ideology is the 
sine qua non of genocide studies. Scott Straus asserts ideology played a critical role in the 
development of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Straus 
stresses the role race, as an ideology of “ethnic group categorization,” played in grouping 
an opposing ethny’s30 civilians with opposing ethny enemy combatants.31 This 
eliminationist ideology based on racial grouping of civilians and elites is arguably one of 
the main drivers of extreme violence after the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Ben 
Kiernan contends race, agrarianism, and territorial expansion are key factors in the 
development of genocide.32 Timothy Snyder writes that the Holocaust was conceived, in 
part, for the Nazi ideological goal of racial purity alongside the establishment of 
territorial expansion and in that development of “living space” for the ethnic German 
                                                 
30 According to Darnell Felix Hawkins, an ethny, or its plural ethnies, is, “…a group of people who claim 
common descent and share a common language and culture…” in Hawkins. 1995. Ethnicity, Race, and 
Crime: Perspectives Across Time and Place. Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, p. 4.  
 
31 Scott Straus. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.  
 
32 Ben Kiernan. 2007. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to 
Darfur. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
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populations.33 Those who subscribe to this line of research, tend to argue in top-down or 
elite-centric modes of violence emanating from perpetrators who espouse an ideological 
viewpoint with the aim of violence.  
 Research Domain 5: Leaders’ strategy. This dissertation falls squarely within this 
realm of genocide studies traditions, insofar as we can study the strategies, motivations, 
and tactics of perpetrators. This research claims that genocide and mass atrocities are 
implemented by elites (predominantly political and military, but also including ethnic, 
cultural, and other elites as context deems influential) instrumental in achieving desired 
goals and objectives.34 Benjamin Valentino is perhaps most influential in this sub-sub-
field. Taylor Seybolt argues mass killing is instrumentally chosen by elites during times 
of crisis (i.e., at specific “tipping points”).35 Manus Midlarsky argues that state 
imprudence and realpolitik measures coupled with the fear of loss have led to genocide 
and mass murder in the twentieth century.36 Other emerging scholars assert that ethnicity, 
race and cultural differences are by-products of competition for state supremacy and the 
maintenance of power in post-colonial settings.37 For the most part, these scholars, 
spearheaded by Valentino, Dylan Balch-Lyndsay, Ulfelder, and Paul Huth, contend 
                                                 
33 Timothy Snyder. 2015. Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning. London: The Bodley Head.  
 
34 Benjamin Valentino, 2004, Final Solutions.  
 
35 Seybolt, Taylor B. with Shena L. Cavallo, Stephen Coulthart, Zachary A. Karazsia, Aurora Matthews, and 
Farhod Yuldashev (2011) “Unpacking the Process of Mass Killing: Motives, Means, and Opportunities,” 
presented by Dr. Taylor B. Seybolt, at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Seattle, Washington, September 1-2, 2011. 
 
36 Manus Midlarsky. 2005. The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
37 Noah R. Bassil. 2013. The Post-Colonial State and Civil War in Sudan: The Origins of Conflict in Darfur. 
London: I.B. Tauris.  
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context matters in shaping politico-military elite strategies. Valentino, Balch-Lyndsay 
and Huth assert that governments are more likely to engage in mass killing during 
guerrilla wars than other military contexts.38 This dissertation will engage with this sub-
scholarship of literature on comparative genocide studies, while accounting for 
competing risk factors and correlated research programs as discussed herein.  
 Research Domain 6: Modernity and development. To a lesser extent, scholars 
have linked the process of modernization and development to the systematic mass murder 
of civilians and non-combatants. This area of inquiry is less developed and 
comprehensive than the previous research domains, though Zygmunt Bauman has written 
on the Holocaust and its correlation to modernity.39 Bauman’s work tracing the evolution 
of state formation and its impact on the Holocaust. He asserts  
“Medieval societies were more like preserves overseen by gamekeepers–do little and the 
species will reproduce themselves. But modern society is more like one sculpted by a 
gardener. Each plant must have a reason to be there, or it may be deemed a weed and 
deserved extermination.”40  
The argument Bauman makes is against the traditional notion that Nazism was 
evil because it was composed of Nazis, and Nazis were evil because they tended to attract 
evil people.41 Bauman contends this traditional, individual level explanation of the 
                                                 
38 Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lyndsay. 2004. “Draining the Sea: Mass Killing, 
Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization 58(2): 375–407. 
 
39 Finkel and Straus. 2012. “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide Studies”, pp. 58.  
  
40 Zygmunt Bauman. 1989. Modernity and The Holocaust. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 57.  
 
41 Bauman, 1989, p. 157.  
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Holocaust is inadequate and illogical. He argues we need to examine the process of 
modernization, that is, the development of bureaucracies, state-capacity, and formation as 
an integral part of the explanation. If this line of inquiry bear fruit, we should reconsider 
the role of modernity in the development of mass political violence.  
 In addition to the sixth research streams of macro-level genocide research, as 
discussed by Finkel and Straus so eloquently, there are four, non-mutually exclusive 
theories worth noting in some detail. These paradigmatic viewpoints help shed light on 
the debate surrounding the process of violence and mass atrocities. Specifically, it is 
worth mentioning four paradigms: (1) state-centric views of atrocities, (2) genocide as 
social practice, (3) a revisionary attempt to bring the former and latter together, and not 
directly related to the above debates but important in its own right is the debate over (4) 
intentionalist versus functionalist scholarship of genocide and extreme violence. This 
dissertation grapples with these competing perspectives and ultimately take a position 
within this conceptual and theoretical debate.  
  Beginning with Hannah Arendt, who is not exclusively a genocide scholar but a 
political theorist first and foremost, and continuing with Leo Kuper, Frank Chalk and 
Kurt Jonassohn, Rudolph Rummel to more recent contributors, the sub-field has been 
dominated by those who argue genocide and mass atrocities driven from above, in a top-
down manner.42 These state-centric approaches capture many of the causes, motivations, 
                                                 
42 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case 
Studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chalk and Jonassohn provide more than regime centered 
discussions of this phenomenon, but in part because of the time periods they examine, deal with regimes and 
elites to a greater extent, as well as intergroup conflict and other motivators.  
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and connective tissue that enables governmental elites to organize, mobilize and 
implement one-sided violence directed against civilians.  
 In recent decades, on the other hand, academics like Christian Gerlach, Yang Su, 
and Evelina Bonnier et al. have forced the sub-field to reassess the role community level 
actors play in not only the implementation of violence but in its genesis.43 Daniel 
Feierstein juxtaposes, in varying ways, these approaches by examining the Holocaust and 
Argentina’s military juntas as remaking society through genocide. In many aspects, both 
conceptually and theoretically, these dialectal positions are difficult to reconcile. 
Scholarship along this area is developing, and this dissertation aims to close part of this 
gap.   
 Finally, scholars of the Holocaust disagree on the role and importance of Hitler.44 
Largely speaking, this disagreement among scholars falls into two divergent camps. First, 
intentionalists, who assert Hitler (and since other central figures of genocide, such as, 
Mao, Pol Pot, Stalin etc.) are critically important for the development of the Holocaust. 
The phrase “no Hitler, no genocide” is a brief caricature of this camp’s perspective. 
Intentionalists argue, the mass extermination of Jews, homosexuals, handicapped 
persons, political opponents, and other religious minorities were a direct result of Hitler’s 
long-term planning and strategic framework. Contrary to this viewpoint, functionalists 
assert the Holocaust was a “function” of concurrent events during the war. Hitler’s role as 
                                                 
43 Evelina Bonnier, Jonas Poulsen, Thorsten Rogall, and Miri Stryjan. May 2015. “Preparing for Genocide: 
Community Work in Rwanda.” Presented at: ASWEDE Conference on Development Economics, SSE, and 
Columbia Development Colloquium.  
 
44 Doris L. Bergen. 2009. War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust, second edition. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 30.  
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national puppet master is not in contention, but it is debatable whether he conceived of 
these events in a long-term pre-planned fashion a priori to contingent events. I will return 
to this debate in the concluding section of Part II and extrapolate on my proposed 
contributions to this discussion. This dissertation, in part, brackets this debate by 
addressing a more fundamental question, that is, the actual process of mass political 
violence which can resemble both intentionalist and functionalist perpetrators.  
 
The Structure of this Dissertation  
 The remainder of this dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 traces the 
evolution of Raphael Lemkin and the creation of the term “genocide.” It then explains six 
common problems and pitfalls to understanding and prosecuting the crime of genocide. 
Following this section is a comprehensive analysis of most – if not all – terms and 
categories conceptualized within the field of Genocide Studies during the post-Lemkin 
era. Each term and category is discussed in relation to three waves of research: a) first 
wave which saw limited changes in the definition of genocide; b) second wave which saw 
the creation of sub-categories and caveats; and c) third wave which includes the creation 
of alternative concepts for genocide. The chapter concludes by defining the dependent 
variable of this research project – mass political violence.  
 Chapter 3 addresses the causes and consequences of mass political violence. This 
chapter begins with a discussion of contemporary approaches to theorizing genocide and 
mass political violence episodes. Then it provides information on common assumptions 
and debates in theory building – within this field of study. The bulk of this chapter is 
dedicated to a discussion of perpetrators, the presentation of my theory of mass political 
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violence and its four conceptually and empirically distinct categories of perpetrators, and 
a note on how we should define “severity” in analyzing and comparing mass political 
violence episodes.  
 With this theoretical framework in mind, Chapters 4-6 address the question of 
why and how mass political violence perpetrators emerge and enact large-scale violence 
target populations. Chapter 4 examines the dynamic-structural approach to state-led mass 
political violence in the Soviet Union and Cambodia. Chapter 5 unpacks the dynamic-
structural approach to state-society coalitions in the Holocaust and Rwandan mass 
political violence episodes. Chapter 6 addresses historically hidden trends in mass 
political violence studies by analyzing both state-sponsored groups and non-state actors. 
The first part of this chapter analyzing a dynamic-structural approach to state-sponsored 
groups with case studies in the Ottoman Empire, Congo-Kinshasa, and Darfur. The 
second half of the chapter applies the same dynamic-structural approach to non-state 
actor case studies: 1920s-1940s China, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and the Islamic 
State.  
 The concluding chapter summarizes the major findings and discusses implications 
for future research into Genocide Studies and Mass Political Violence. The dissertation 
ends with a discussion of its potential utility and limitations as they pertain to the wider 
field of study. The aim of this dissertation is to explore a new theoretical lens by which 
policymakers, academics, and public intellectuals can understand and compare episodes 
of mass political violence in our modern society.  
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CHAPTER II:  
A CRIME BY MANY NAMES: MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND 
GENOCIDE 
“One look is worth a thousand words.” 
– Frederick R. Barnard, 192145 
 
 “Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the Sixteenth Century, there has never been 
methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale, or approaching such a scale. And this is 
but the beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts of Hitler's 
tanks. We are in the presence of a crime without a name.” 
   – Winston Churchill, 194146 
 
“The failure of the international community to tackle the problem of genocide is reflected 
by the failure of the academic community to contribute much to our understanding of the 
problem.” 
– Michael Freeman, 199147 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45Frederick R. Barnard, Printers’ Ink Monthly. Vol. 4, December 1921-May 1922, 96.  
 
46 Winston Churchill, “The Atlantic Charter” Speech, July 29, 1941, The International Churchill Society, 
Accessed on February 3, 2017. URL: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1941-1945-war-
leader?start=10.  
 
47 Michael Freeman, “The Theory and Prevention of Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 6. 
(1991) 185. 
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Introduction 
No single word has emerged to capture the totality of human suffering brought 
about by the hands of governments and societies, who have “systematically” murdered 
disfavored groups throughout history. The closest we have come, is the term “genocide,” 
although, even this relatively new concept falls short in some regards. The twentieth 
century has brought us death and destruction of unimaginable proportions. From the killing 
of the Herero and Nama populations in present day Namibia48, to mass deportations and 
massacres of Slavs and Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during World War I,49 to the 
systematic extermination of European Jews, Roma, homosexuals, and others marginalized 
groups by Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany;50 or be it the tens of millions of victims killed at 
the hands of radical communist regimes, the last twelve decades have brought about a 
diversity of devastation unparalleled in the modern world.51 So much so that some have 
                                                 
48 The German conquest of present day Namibia, formerly known as “German Southwest Africa,” was the 
training ground for German use of the concentration camp. The Herero, Nama and Damara indigenous 
communities faced the brunt of German colonial violence. Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of 
Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007) 380-390; 
Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2011) 122-124.  
 
49 Hannibal Travis, Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan. Durham, (NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2010) 173-235; Richard G. Hovannisan, “Etiology and Sequence of the Armenian 
Genocide,” in George J. Andreopoulos, eds. Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 111-140; Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and 
Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, Montreal Institute 
for Genocide Studies, 1990) 249-289; Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam, Judgment at Istanbul: The 
Armenian Genocide Trials (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011). 
 
50 Nazi propaganda and ideology portrayed Jews as the root of all social-political problems in Germany. This 
propaganda also extended to Roma (or gypsies), homosexuals, Communists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Afro-
Germans, Slavic peoples, criminals or any political discontent. Doris L. Bergen, War & Genocide: A Concise 
History of the Holocaust, Second Edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009); Timothy 
Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (London: The Bodley Head, 2015). 
 
51 Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); Yang Su, Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, 
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called this the “century of genocide.”52 Chapter four provides a more detailed description 
of the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities. It is worth commenting here, that, 
though Nazi propaganda may have extended to groups other than European Jews this does 
not mean that these secondary groups were targets of a “systematic” extermination 
campaign. European Jewry was specifically and systematically targeted by Nazi 
propaganda and policy for complete destruction, while other groups like the Roma, gays 
and lesbians, and other religious minorities were targeted in widespread killing, they did 
not receive the same level of systematic killing as Jewish communities had.  
 Comparative Genocide Studies is an adolescent field that aims to understand a 
centuries old crime. Yet, Adam Jones writes, “Genocide studies has never been a more 
diffuse enterprise.”53 It is also one of the most attractive fields of research today to up and 
coming scholars. The most murderous conflicts no longer exist between and among states 
of the international community, but are being waged within their borders – largely since 
the end of the Cold War.54 Until the early 2000s, most works in our field focused on “uni-
genocidal” case studies.55 In recent years, influential scholarship has emerged to address 
patterns among and between genocides. However, much remains to be studied here.  
                                                 
Andrezej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, eds., The Black Book of Communism: 
Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
52 Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, eds., Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and 
Eyewitness Accounts, Second Edition (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). 
 
53 Adam Jones, “Diffusing Genocide Studies, Defusing Genocides,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:3 
(Winter 2011) 270.  
 
54 Christian P. Scherrer, “Towards a theory of modern genocide. Comparative genocide research: Definitions, 
criteria, typologies, cases, key elements, patterns and voids,” Journal of Genocide Research 1:1 (1999) 13-
23.  
 
55 A. Dirk Moses, “From the Editor: the eagles and the worms: on the future agenda of genocides studies,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 3:3 (2001) 345-346.  
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This chapter traces the evolution of Genocide Studies from Raphael Lemkin to 
present day. Section two recounts professor Lemkin’s founding influences on this 
academic field and the creation of an international legal regime aimed at protecting social 
groups from genocide. This following section explains the common problems and pitfalls 
of studying genocide from an academic and legal perspective. Section three describes the 
evolution of terms and categories deployed after Lemkin and the UN Genocide 
Convention’s first cut. Finally, this chapter concludes by offering a substitutive term – 
“mass political violence” – for understanding genocide in relation to other forms of large-
scale political violence.  
 
Raphael Lemkin: A New Perspective on an Old Crime 
 In 1943, Raphael Lemkin (1901-1959), a Polish-Jewish lawyer, conceived the term 
“genocide,” to describe Nazi atrocities for his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.56 
Having grown up with stories of “his family’s flight from pogroms and wars by and 
between Slavs and Germans,”57 and in conducting his own investigations into the plight of 
Christians murdered by the Ottoman Empire, Lemkin chose a career in law, because he 
believed such a job would enable him to punish those who make it their priority, as he said, 
“[to destroy] groups of human beings.”58 Lemkin completed his law degree in 1926; in the 
                                                 
56 According to A. Dirk Moses, Lemkin coined the term in 1943 for his book; however, his work was not 
published until the subsequent year because of “contractual negotiations with the publisher.” A. Dirk. Moses, 
“Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide” in Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds. The 
Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 22. 
 
57 Travis, Genocide in the Middle East, 27; Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
of Genocide Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) xi. 
 
58 “From the guest editors: Raphael Lemkin: the “founder of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention” as 
a historian of mass violence,” Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005) 448; Raphael Lemkin, “Totally 
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following year he joined the faculty at the Free University of Warsaw, teaching criminal 
law, and in 1928, was appointed the prosecuting attorney for Warsaw.59 Here Lemkin 
remained until 1934, when he was forced out “by the pro-Hitler Polish government.”60 
Professor Lemkin thereafter argued through his teachings and research at the university, to 
achieve the goal of prosecuting governments for committing acts of mass violence against 
their citizens, requires placing some limits on state sovereignty.61 To this end, Lemkin 
eventually persuaded over 58 countries to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) after World War II ended.62 
As is well known, Lemkin chose the words genos (Greek, meaning race, kin, or 
tribe) and caedere/occidere (Latin for, to kill or fall) as the basis for devising this new term 
“genocide.”63 Lemkin’s scholarly and activist work led to a profound change within 
international law and the academy.64 It is thanks to Professor Lemkin’s foresight and 
intellectual abilities, that we now have a vocabulary for writing about heinous crimes such 
                                                 
unofficial,” manuscript, undated, New York Public Library, Manuscript and Archives Division, The Raphael 
Lemkin Papers, Box 2: Bio- and Autobiographical Sketches of Lemkin. 
 
59 Daniel Marc Segesser and Myriam Gessler, “Raphael Lemkin and the international debate on the 
punishment of war crimes (1919-1948),” Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005) 456. 
 
60 Tanya Elder, “What you see before your eyes: documenting Raphael Lemkin’s life by exploring his 
archival Papers, 1900-1959,” Journal of Genocide Research 7:4 (2005) 471. 
 
61 “From the guest editors: Raphael Lemkin: the “founder of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention,” 
448. 
 
62 Elder, “What do you see before your eyes,” 470; Travis, Genocide in the Middle East, 27; Bloxham and 
Moses, The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, xi. 
 
63 Christian J. Tams, Lars Berster, and Björn Schiffbauer, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 6. 
 
64 Dominik J. Schaller, “From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:3 (Winter 2011) 245. 
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as genocide. Lemkin’s views of genocide however, was not restricted to a group’s complete 
physical destruction, but also included any coordinated action: 
“…aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national 
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objective of 
such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions 
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence 
of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups. Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their individual 
capacity, but as members of the national [sic] group.”65  
 
In this respect, Lemkin envisioned a maximalist understanding of genocide, which included 
attempts at dismantling inter-generational traditions (e.g., language and culture) and 
personal freedoms (e.g., liberty, health, and dignity). In other words, genocide is the 
systematic attempt to “liquidate a national population” which emanates from a chosen 
“political policy to assure conformity and participation by the citizenry.”66 Therefore, 
genocide is fundamentally linked to the ethnicization of politics by elites and, according to 
Scherrer, a “wave[s] of ethnic nationalism-from-below.”67   
Professor Lemkin opposed equating the term genocide solely with incidents where 
one group attempted or succeeded in exterminating another group.68 Genocide, according 
to Lemkin, is not simply the mass murder or attempted mass murder of a group, in whole 
or part, but is the attempt to destroy another group’s past, present, and future through 
                                                 
65 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 
1944) 79, emphasis added. 
 
66 Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1976) 18. 
 
67 Christian P. Scherrer, “Towards a theory of modern genocide. Comparative genocide research: Definitions, 
criteria, typologies, cases, key elements, patterns and voids,” Journal of Genocide Research 1:1 (1999) 14. 
 
68 Travis, Genocide in the Middle East, 29. 
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eliminating their collective life-force, heritage, and very existence from this world.69 
Lemkin’s maximalist understanding of genocide is made apparent by his many efforts to 
“search for a word that would capture Nazi ghettos, exclusion from economic life, 
biopolitical laws like the Nuremberg Laws, and occupation efforts,” activities that go 
beyond mass murder.70 This “total war” aspect distinguishes genocide from other crimes 
against humanity, peace, and war in general. Due to its insidious nature, it has been called 
the “crime of crimes.”71  
No more than five years after the publication of Axis Rule, Lemkin witnessed the 
United Nations adopt the UNGC.72 Drafted in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the UNGC 
was adopted in 1948. The Convention presents “a very broadly worded” set of offenses 
that does not limit itself to simply mass murder.73 Nevertheless, scholars have debated this 
legal definition for decades, with some arguing it embodies a minimalist description, based 
on the limited number of protected groups delineated in its text.74 The Convention sets 
                                                 
69 Ibid, 32. 
 
70 Hannibal Travis comments in electronic communication with the author, March 2, 2018. 
 
71 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Larry May, Genocide: A Normative Account (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
1.  
 
72 The General Assembly adopted Resolution 260(III) A on December 9, 1948, and after obtaining the 
requisite twenty ratifications by member states, the Convention entered into force on January 12, 1951. 
“Audiovisual Library of International Law,” retrieved January 30, 2017, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html.  
 
73 Hannibal Travis, “Genocide, Counterinsurgency, and the Self-Defense of UN Member States Before the 
International Criminal Court,” UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy Vol. 22, No. 2, (Spring 
2016) 156; Travis, Genocide in the Middle East, 32. 
 
74 Originally, United Nations Resolution 96(I) “The Crime of Genocide” included racial, religious, political 
and other groups.” The political category was later struck from the final draft of the Genocide Convention, 
which severely undercut the strength of signatories to prevent and punish systematic attempts to murder a 
population based on their political beliefs. Ultimately, the UNGC bestows protection on four social groups: 
national, racial, ethnical, and religious populations. See Barbara Harff, Genocide and Human Rights: 
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forth a definition of genocide that reflects the era of its conception. It is vital to remember 
that international laws particularly of wide ranging magnitudes, are products of their socio-
political environments. In this case, the Convention was an artifact of much debate between 
democratic and non-democratic states, of which many previously engaged in campaigns of 
mass slaughter against civilian populations (e.g., Joseph Stalin’s political purges and mass 
deportations of eight national groups from the Caucus region before the Second World 
War).75  
The Norwegian representative to the Convention’s proceedings, argued that a new 
international agreement was necessary “since States could not be depended upon to enforce 
the Nuremberg Principles against their own leaders.”76 These principles were established 
in the wake of World War II and presented states with a set of guidelines for determining 
which actions constitute war crimes. Similarly, Cuba’s representative noted that not all 
countries have adopted the Nuremberg Principles; therefore a new, superseding 
international convention was vital to protect citizens.77 It was the United States that 
emphasized the need for a convention because, Lippman claims, “the intent to destroy a 
group” is what distinguishes genocide from ordinary crimes, such as homicide.78 The 
                                                 
International Legal and Political Issues (Denver, CO: Monograph Series in World Affairs, Graduate School 
of International Studies, University of Denver, 1984) Vol. 20, Book 3; Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, 
“Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 
1945, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, (1988) 359-371. 
 
75 Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (The Macmillan Company, 
1970).  
 
76 Matthew Lippman, “A road map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
Genocide” Journal of Genocide Studies 4:2 (2002) 178. 
 
77 Ibid, 178. 
 
78 Ibid, 181.  
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United States signed the UNGC, despite opposition from the American Bar Association’s 
president Frank Holman who refused to support “any human rights legislation that 
infringed on the workings on the US Bill of Rights.”79 Holman’s argument was that, the 
US constitution is a contract between the government and its citizens; therefore, 
international human rights law inherently violates this contract. Thankfully, the US 
government took its first step toward genocide prevention and punishment even though 
future administrations would not measure up to the spirit of the Convention i.e., the U.S. 
did not become a party for another 40 years.  
Significantly, however, Article 2 of the UNGC bestows protection against this 
crime to four social groups: ethnic, racial, religious, and national groups, who confront the 
following:  
a. “Killing members of the group; 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;” 80 
 
To the layperson, genocide is often exclusively considered to be the killing of individuals 
who belong to a minority group. For obvious reasons, this action is easiest to observe 
because of the magnitude of resources required in murdering large groups of people. 
Killing, however, is only a fraction of the possible activities génocidaires (perpetrators of 
genocide) have relied on to annihilate social groups. Killing members of a group, is perhaps 
the most brutal and direct means of inflicting physical destruction upon them. 
                                                 
79 Elder, “What you see before your eyes,” 484. 
 
80 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2. 
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Unfortunately, génocidaire strategies have evolved over the centuries to include many 
indirect methods, such as starvation from man-made famines, deportation or forced 
relocations, malnutrition, disease, and neglect.81  
Leo Kuper describes the initial stages of the Armenian genocidal process that 
exhibit such characteristics. First, the Armenian soldiers serving in the Turkish army were 
“emasculated,” stripped of their ranks and positions. Soon after this purge of the army, the 
military began disarming Armenian civilians, thereby making resistance futile. In 
subsequent years, the military initiated mass deportations countrywide. “The deportations 
were carefully timed, moving from one region to another… Toynbee reports that in areas 
of strategic significance, because of proximity to the advancing Russians, the military 
authority, with the help of the local Kurds, carried out an extermination of the civilian 
population.”82 These actions constitute a direct method of killing. After massacres stopped, 
“The next stage in the genocide, was the journey to the final destination, the dreary, 
desolate waste of the Syrian desert and the Mesopotamian valley. The convoys of the exiles 
were little more than death caravans. The long journey on foot inflicted terrible physical 
sufferings… The deportations were merely a cloak for genocide.”83 As witnessed during 
the Turkish Armenian genocide, perpetrators can carefully interweave direct methods of 
human destruction with indirect means in order to inflict serious harm on a population.  
                                                 
81 Benjamin Valentino outlines a range of indirect activities perpetrators have employed to elicit death and 
destruction of civilians. “Deaths results from these kind of policies, whether perpetrators devise them to kill 
civilians or simply coerce them, should not be underestimated. Starvation, malnutrition, exposure, 
exhaustion, and disease were responsible for a large proportion of mass killing deaths in the twentieth 
century. Fatalities resulting from these factors sometimes rival direct methods of killing, even in cases 
notorious for their violence and brutality.” Valentino, Final Solutions, 11. 
 
82 Toynbee, cited in Leo Kuper, Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 109-112. 
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 Further muddying traditional conceptions of genocide is Article 2, subpart (b), 
which includes actions that cause serious “bodily or mental harm to members of a group 
(emphasis added).” What constitutes mental harm? Can perpetrators face prosecution if 
they solely cause “mental harm” but no physical harm to a population? Claudia Card argues 
that the notion of harm in the UNGC should be “best understood in terms of the loss of 
significant aspects of one’s identity.”84 Card goes on to equate loss of an identity almost 
exclusively with an individual’s physical death. Scholars like Larry May have pushed back 
against this conservative assessment, arguing physical death is a significant component of 
loss, but it is not the sole aspect worth studying.85 In fact, during the deliberations preceding 
the UNGC, a Chinese representative to the ad hoc committee responsible for drafting the 
text of the Convention raised the issue of mental harm.86 The Chinese representative 
referred his Committee members to Japanese actions during the Second World War. 
Stephen Gorove summarizes this discussion for us as follows: 
“… [Where Japan] built a huge opium extraction plant in Mukden, which 
could process some 400 tons of opium annually, producing fifty tons of 
heroin – at least fifty times the legitimate world requirements. This quantity, 
according to medical authorities, would be enough to administer lethal 
doses to [sic] from 200 to 400 million persons. The representatives of China 
pointed out that the Japanese had intended to commit and had actually 
committed genocide by debauching the Chinese population with narcotics. 
He considered this to be the most sinister and monstrous conspiracy known 
in history.”87 
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85 Ibid, 10. 
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Do systematic alterations of a population’s mental state through narcotics rise to 
the level of causing serious “mental harm” under the UNGC? Historically, common law 
has resisted giving protections to a person’s “peace of mind.”88 Nonetheless, judicial bodies 
have awarded redress when a victim suffers “mental anguish,” “mental distress,” or 
“mental cruelty,” though, no direct references to “mental harm” have been discovered in 
judicial decisions.89 All this is to say, the UNGC definition allows for a multi-layered 
maximalist, and simultaneously minimalist, definition of genocide. It is maximalist, in the 
sense that individuals may be prosecuted for crimes committed against members of a 
group, even though they fall short of the group’s physical destruction. And, minimalist in 
the sense of limiting these protections to only four protected groups (ethnic, racial, 
religious, and national) while excluding others (e.g., on the basis of political parties, sexual 
orientation, or gender). 
The UNGC’s single greatest achievement was the codification of the prohibition of 
the use of genocide in international law, and the recognition that the international 
community, at least in spirit if not action, would work to achieve the Convention’s dual 
mandate of prevention and punishment of systematic attempts to exterminate a population, 
based solely on its communal characteristics. Despite this substantial improvement to 
international law, there remain significant drawbacks to the UNGC.90 
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Problems and Pitfalls:  
Barriers to Explaining and Prosecuting the Crime of Genocide 
 In the aftermath of large-scale atrocities, it has become common practice for 
debates to emerge about whether such acts constitute genocide.91 In one respect, this 
repetitive dialogue has only been possible because of Raphael Lemkin and his tireless effort 
to promote and educate the global public on the crime of genocide.92 However, these 
deliberations have become all too scripted, with perpetrators and bystander governments 
alike, making denials, and victims, survivors, and activist groups lobbing complaints. As 
we know, the term genocide has brought about seismic changes in various academic and 
professional fields, yet it remains a deeply contested concept.93 By definition, genocide 
was supposed to identify a distinct social phenomenon that had not existed in our lexicon 
before 1943.94 This section will show, despite the benefits of naming mass atrocities 
“genocide,” substantial flaws exist in the legal concept and the process of conducting 
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rigorous scientific enquiry into its etiology. I am not the first author to highlight some of 
these concerns. What follows is an explanation of four drawbacks to the UN Genocide 
Convention that have contributed to the disarray of labelling crimes genocide and two 
dilemmas that have emerged within academic circles. Other shortcomings exist, but I argue 
those described here are the most pressing concerns that future scholarship must address.  
 
Problem 1: The Contested Meaning of “Intent” 
 Under the UNGC, heads of state or government, public officials, or private 
individuals can be prosecuted if their actions were “committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (emphasis added).”95 Two 
questions arise in response to assessing genocidal intent. How did the drafters of the UNGC 
envision “intent” and how have opposing interpretations of original intent impeded 
subsequent prosecutions? Hannibal Travis argues that Genocide Studies have been held 
back by the creation of an unrealistic standard of intent, which “is nearly impossible to 
satisfy because it requires the total destruction of a race.”96 In fact, the UNGC is quite clear 
that genocides directed at exterminating a social group from existence in whole or in part 
are equally heinous crimes, and subject to punishment under the convention. It is here that 
we see a collision between genocide’s legal and political connotations that has resulted in 
confusion and misinterpretation for decades. In a court of law, prosecutors must prove 
dolus specialis, a legal assessment that a “perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act 
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charged.”97 Katherine Goldsmith argued that the application of dolus specialis, in 
establishing genocidal intent, has been an “unforced error,” and is not reflected in the 
original text of the UNGC. She aptly notes:  
“The use of dolus specialis as the intent required by the Genocide 
Convention completely goes beyond the original intent of the Convention’s 
drafters, and especially beyond the intent of Raphael Lemkin. Before dolus 
specialis was held to be the required intent in the Akayesu trial, no legal 
document or UN paper had associated it with the crime. Although an 
argument was put forward in the Travaux Préparatoires to allow judges the 
freedom to interpret, this was because all cases would involve different 
circumstances and levels of involvement, requiring a case-by-case 
interpretation. It was not meant to allow a judge’s decision to restrict future 
decisions.”98 
 
Individuals fixed on implementing policies of mass destruction are likely to keep their 
thoughts private and not disclose criminal aspirations.99 Therefore, “obtaining actual proof, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the perpetrator’s intention was to destroy the group, in 
whole or in part” is a high bar to reach.100 William Schabas argues that it is this notion of 
special intent to destroy a social group that sets genocide apart from other international 
offenses, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes.101 Nevertheless, applying dolus 
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specialis to the crime of genocide has been one substantial setback in the punishment of 
perpetrators to date.  
The UNGC established a dual mandate for signatories to prevent and punish the 
crime of genocide. Contested meanings of intent have led to mixed results in the 
punishment of perpetrators, and this limitation has bled into the prevention mandate as 
well. The requirement for establishing intent prior to the behaviors associated with 
genocide, under points a through e of Article 2 has led governments to deny complicity in 
criminal acts absent written or agreed upon documentation of orders that explicitly call for 
the extermination of a group.102 The question of intent has become a hotly debated issue in 
international relations where accused perpetrators deny claims on the basis of this 
requirement, and it has become a common political and legal defense. For instance, Turkey 
continues to deny that the actions of the Ottoman Empire, taken against Armenians during 
the early part of the twentieth century were genocidal.103 In response to a recent German 
parliamentary motion, that described the killing of Armenians at the hands of Ottoman 
Turks in 1915 as genocide, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked:  
The Armenian issue is a useful blackmail opportunity against Turkey all 
around the world, and it is even starting to be used as a stick… I am 
addressing the whole world. You may like it, you may not. Our attitude on 
the Armenian issue is clear from the beginning. We will never accept the 
accusations of genocide.104  
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The difficulty in proving intent, in real-time and after the fact, has created a daunting task 
for the international community and genocide prevention. Therefore, this misreading of 
intent with dolus specialis, limits the effectiveness of prevention strategies. This de facto, 
retroactive process of prevention, does little to thwart genocide from erupting, as does the 
politics of genocide acknowledgment. 
 
Problem 2: Who Counts? 
 As addressed in the previous section, the UNGC was a product of its social-political 
environment. The Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities formed the basis of 
Raphael Lemkin and the UN’s definition. Regrettably, not all victim populations of Hitler’s 
Third Reich were “eligible” as protected groups under the UNGC.105 The convention grants 
protection to four social groups: national, ethnic, racial and religious populations. 
Noticeably absent, are groups formed on the basis of political affiliation, sexual orientation, 
and the physically or mentally impaired, all of whom had members targeted and killed for 
the betterment of German National Socialism. Limiting protection under the UNGC to four 
restricted categories of persons, has been a point of critique for decades.106 One area where 
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genocide scholars have focused their combined efforts in combating this restriction, is 
under the “national group” category.  
The Genocide Convention is unusually vague in defining the constitution of this 
group this confusion has led to the development of two distinct legal understandings (c.f. 
the Akayesu and Jelisic cases). The Akayesu Case of 1998, tried in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), defined a national group “…as a collection of 
people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with 
reciprocity of rights and duties.”107 Under the ICTR judicial ruling, one could conceivably 
prosecute episodes of politicide that target individuals holding a common citizenship and 
belonging to a particular political party, from earlier draft restrictions even though 
representatives to the Genocide Convention specifically omitted this category. Thus, 
providing a potential backdoor to the Convention’s shortcomings. The second 
understanding of a “national group” emerged a year later in the Jelisié Case, tried in the 
ICTR’s sister court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
This case defined “a national, ethnical, or racial group from the point of view of those 
persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.”108 This legal 
understanding is perhaps fuzzier in comparison to the former judicial decision, yet allows 
courts flexibility in hearing a variety of cases that may qualify as genocide under the 
Convention. Despite the many associated troubles of subjectivism and objectivism in 
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determining victim populations, this has been one area of advancement in expanding the 
category of protected persons.109  
 
Problem 3: Thresholds and Scales of Violence 
 Is killing one person of a group an act of genocide? How do we practically interpret 
the UNGC’s “in whole or in part” characterization of violence? What does “in part” 
empirically resemble? Establishing a uniform definition of genocide has been impossible, 
in part, due to this phraseology. Eric Weitz argues, it is unsustainable to define the killing 
of one person of a group genocide.110 As addressed earlier, the Chinese representative to 
the drafting committee of the UNGC argued for the inclusion of “mental harm” under 
prosecutable crimes. Taken literally, no killing is necessary for the punishment of an 
individual under the UNGC, if that person has contributed to creating severe mental harm 
to members of a group.111 An even more pressing question given increased levels of 
political violence globally, is, when does a massacre of a group cross into the realm of 
genocide? What factors conceptually, analytically, and empirically distinguish a massacre 
of members of a group from a partial or small-scale genocide? There is no easy answer to 
this question, as is author has discovered.112 Jacques Sémelin, a foremost expert on the 
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conceptualization of massacres, argues that there are two archetypal massacres: they are 
either “carried out in order to impose political domination (the case of submission) or they 
are aimed at eliminating the group in and of itself (the case of eradication).”113 Both of 
which could qualify as factors within a genocidal campaign. Mark Levene defines 
massacres as the asymmetry of power relations between groups:  
A massacre is when a group of animals or people lacking in self-defence, at 
least at that given moment, are killed, usually by another group [Coster’s 
point is a valid though not easily resolvable one] who have the physical 
means, the power, with which to undertake the killing without physical 
danger to themselves.114 
 
Both Semelin and Levene’s distinctions and proposed definitions touch upon aspects of 
genocide, at least in part if not whole. Disentangling small-scale, non-genocidal acts from 
small-scale genocides has been a particularly thorny problem for legal and genocide 
scholars.  
 
Problem 4: Politicization of the “G-Word”  
 “Is ‘genocide’ still a powerful word?” Luke Glanville argues that “genocide” has 
lost some of its “ideational power.”115 In 1994, during the height of the Rwandan genocide, 
the Clinton Administration, mostly prominently Christine Shelley, spokeswoman for the 
State Department, declared that only “acts of genocide have occurred” and not 
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“genocide.”116 The Clinton Administration viewed their use of the “G-Word” as so 
powerful that its very utterance would constitute a recognition of responsibility under the 
UNGC, and force the administration to take some actionable steps to stop the spread of 
genocide in Rwanda. Fast forward nearly a decade, and the Bush Administration felt 
wholly comfortable describing the atrocities in Darfur as genocide, yet this declarative 
statement “did not activate legal obligations” on behalf of the U.S., argues Glanville.117 To 
the casual observer, the obvious question remains, so what? Is not the increasing use of the 
“G-Word” a reflection of positive movements in human rights?  
Two vital points bear mentioning here. First, until the 21st century’s first genocide 
(i.e., Darfur), states and their constitutionally responsible leaders made every effort to 
avoid using the “G-Word” in describing countless episodes of mass violence.118 For 
decades, world leaders feared the politicization of this term and its possible legal 
obligations. Subsequently, they steered clear of identifying conflicts as genocidal, or at 
least until the proverbial dust settled. Major Brent Beardsley, an infantry officer in the 
Canadian Army attached to the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), served 
as a personal staff officer to then Force Commander Major-General Roméo Dallaire. 
Beardsley subsequently wrote: 
“One of the major reasons the genocide in Rwanda was not prevented or 
stopped was the endless debate in April, May, and June 1994, when the 
majority of attention and effort was focused on debating whether or not 
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genocide was taking place in Rwanda instead on preparing and conducting 
a multi-disciplinary (including military) intervention to stop the killing.”119  
 
Second, after the turn of the century, we have witnessed a shift in political and 
social recognition of genocide. After the U.S. condemned the actions of Omar Al-Bashir’s 
government and his associated militia, the janjaweed, in Darfur, Sudan, to be tantamount 
to genocide, there has been a sea change in the number of conflicts labelled “genocide.” In 
a post-Darfur world, views on the use of the “G-Word” have shifted, from fear of 
obligations, to that of excessive recognition – even in cases where it may not be warranted. 
Martin Mennecke writes, “The real problem of genocide prevention is to identify the 
circumstances under which such situations escalate into genocide – and distinguishing 
these from situations in which they do not and any external intervention could be deemed 
an unjustified interference in internal affairs.”120 The over- and misuse of the term 
genocide, including in official U.S. government documents, like the Genocide Prevention 
Task Force have further clouded the popular, legal and political understanding of genocide, 
reasons William Schabas.121 
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Within the span of a decade, the pendulum swung from that of ardent resistance, to 
genocide recognition, to that of exaggerated tagging. This switch in genocide recognition, 
reflects an effort by some, either intentionally or possibly unintentionally, to undercut the 
power of the “G-Word” and the phrase “Never Again,” so that its loss in ideational, 
rhetorical, and legal power reduces individual state’s international humanitarian 
obligations. The term is now widely used by dictators to vilify their political enemies.  
 
Problems 5-6: Inside Baseball: Dilemmas in Adhering To Rigorous, Scientific Standards 
in Genocide Research 
 Any serious genocide scholar would categorically reject mainstream, conventional 
political science debates over empirical versus normative research. Genocide scholars enter 
this field to make an analytical, political, practical, conceptual, or emotional impact on 
society through understanding why and how persons can murder, en masse, large groups 
of people based solely on their social characteristics. “Anyone studying genocide cannot 
help but feel intense anger and hatred toward genocide and its perpetrators,” argues Uğur 
Ümit Üngör.122 The normative objective is crystal clear: a world free of mass human 
destruction. However, the route to achieving this collective goal must proceed through 
sound, defensible (qualitative or quantitative), empirically supported scientific inquiry. In 
the view of this author, it is not only prudent to admit our normative bias here, but entirely 
necessary in exposing potential scientific prejudices that may emerge from this ideational 
goal. Unlike some other academic fields, genocide studies has always engendered both an 
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activist and intellectual component, something Adam Jones refers to as a “praxis-oriented 
component” which can be traced all the way back to the field’s founder Raphael Lemkin.123 
This scholar-activist dynamic has been both an asset in driving the creation of international 
human rights regimes and a potential liability, in terms of our ability to conduct rigorous, 
scientific investigations into the causes and consequences of genocide.   
 A second problem that arises pertains to the relatively new field of comparative 
genocide studies. Most scholarly research on genocide has historically occurred at the 
meso-level, meaning, it has remained trapped “in the level of non-comparative research, 
single case studies.”124 This problem results from two dilemmas. First, some argue the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust – which has become the de facto prototype by which all 
genocides are explicitly or implicitly compared – prohibits comparison with other 
episodes.125 Some, have even argued, the Holocaust is a “uniquely unique” event, further 
separating Holocaust Studies from its kin field of Genocide Studies.126 Second, the problem 
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of comparative research is further hindered by a lack of definitional consensus on what 
constitutes “genocide.”127 If every horrifyingly murderous episode is labelled “genocide,” 
then the term has lost all significance. Prior to undertaking comparative studies, scholars 
must determine the universe of cases are appropriately called that “genocides.” For this to 
happen, we must come to a consensus on the simple question: what is genocide? As will 
be discussed, dissatisfaction with the definition of genocide and the excessive “caveating” 
of scholars has led to a plethora of substitute terms in recent years. Definitional traps and 
a lack of academic and policy consensus continue to plague the field today.  
 In lieu of an agreed upon definition, genocide scholars have regularly relied upon 
the 1948 UN Genocide Convention as the preeminent benchmark by which all “analysis of 
genocide-related case studies and comparisons” are assessed.128 Misgivings about this least 
common denominator of a definition have accrued over time. As a direct result, and in part, 
due to the problems and pitfalls described above, we have seen the emergence of three 
waves of genocide scholarship materialize. The next section unpacks the many names 
given to identify the intentional destruction of a group of people based solely on their 
communal characteristics.  
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The Post-Lemkin Era: Terms and Categories 
 In a radio speech to the British Commonwealth on August 24, 1941, in stressing 
the special alliance between Great Britain and the United States, Winston Churchill 
referred to Nazi atrocities as profoundly revolutionary, and infamously called them “a 
crime without a name.”129 No more than two years after Churchill’s proclamation, Raphael 
Lemkin would coin the first of many terms to describe such barbarism. In the eight decades 
since professor Lemkin’s seminal book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, we have seen 
conceptual proliferation, matched, perhaps, only by the arms race between the cold war 
adversaries. Dozens of university professors have earned tenure on the basis of coining 
their own concepts to brand one-sided violence. This conceptual debate erupted from 
widespread dissatisfaction with the UN definition. Nevertheless, the UNGC has been the 
standard against which all other terms have been judged.130  
By my count, since professor Lemkin’s seminal work and the ratification of the 
UNGC, there have been dozens of alternative definitions of genocide offered, at least 24 
sub-categories, and at minimum 39 substitute terms for genocide that have been coined by 
academics, policymakers, independent researchers, journalists, and think tanks over the 
years (see Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 for a comprehensive list). I applaud the efforts to further 
our understanding of such destructive human behaviors by these aforementioned scholars. 
If our primary concern rests with understanding the common causes of social conflict 
across time, space, geography, culture, history, language, religion, politics, and 
                                                 
129 The International Churchill Society. Speech titled, “The Atlantic Charter.” URL: 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1941-1945-war-leader?start=10.  
 
130 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: A conceptual analysis of genocide,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 3:3 (2001) 349-375, see p. 361.  
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development, then the conceptualization and rules of social scientific investigation matter. 
Without a common basis for understanding genocide, academics and policymakers cannot 
begin to develop rigorous theories of one-sided violence or make concrete claims about 
contemporary episodes. Conceptualization determines which cases are included and which 
are excluded. This factor may potentially bias scholarly attempts at theorizing.131 Theories 
that explain the Holocaust or Rwandan genocides will be dramatically different from those 
explaining atrocities by the Islamic State or Boko Haram.  
In tracing the evolution of “genocide,” scholars have been slow to deviate from 
existing norms of identification and classification. This incremental expansion of what 
constitutes genocide, is a positive reflection of our field’s professionalism, to not make 
dramatic divergences from our existing knowledge base of mass violence. In contemporary 
Western societies, the Holocaust is portrayed as the epitome of evil, especially in North 
America, although the terms “ethnocide” and genocide” preceded the “Holocaust” in their 
introduction to our lexicon.132  Over time, the latter has come to signify our most heinous 
of crimes. One implication of this shift in terminology has been, “If mass violence does not 
resemble the Holocaust in being a massive racial hate crime, it is screened out as non-
genocidal.”133 Practically speaking, genocides that do not reflect Nazi methods of mass 
murder have all too often faced additional scrutiny for inclusion within this criminal 
category.  
                                                 
131 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: a conceptual analysis of genocide,” 359. 
 
132 A Dirk Moses, “Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 6:3 (Winter 2011) 288. 
 
133 Ibid, 290. 
 
45 
 
Beginning with Raphael Lemkin and the UNGC, we have seen three distinct waves 
of definitional expansion since 1948. Each wave is not a discrete temporal period and many 
continue today. I use the term “wave” as a heuristic device in grouping similar concepts. 
In order to compare the more than 80 definitions and terms below, I categorized them based 
on four criteria. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and many terms exhibit 
qualities of several. For the ease and utility of comparison, each definition and term has 
been listed under the category which reflects its primary foci. The initial two categories 
focus on membership as referent: that being the “victims” or “perpetrators.” The latter two, 
are derived from magnitude of violence: from “small-scale” to “large-scale.” Each 
definition and term is listed below one of these categories, yet as mentioned, many exhibit 
qualities of more than one. A complete list of alternative definitions of genocide, sub-
categories of genocide, and substitute terms for genocide can be found in Appendices A-C 
(at the end of this dissertation).  
 
First Wave: Changes Around the Edge: Alternative Definitions of “Genocide” 
In the post-UNGC era, initial scholarship focused on redefining the meaning of 
genocide, both for academic analysis and internal validity. This was no coincidence. There 
are institutional, political, and legal costs to changing the term “genocide.”134 Scholarship 
in this wave operated within the confines of re-classifying characteristics of genocide. 
Pieter Drost was the first to offer a rebuttal definition.135 Drost argued that genocide, is 
                                                 
134 Paul Boghossian, “Response to my critics,” Journal of Genocide Research 12:1-2 (2010) 105-112. 
 
135 Pieter Drost, The Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of Persons and Peoples 
(A.W. Sythoff, 1959).  
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“the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their 
membership of any human collectivity as such.”136 With this simple re-definition, Drost 
fired the first shot in this now perennial debate. Noticeably absent from his definition, was 
the delineation of victim groups. This removal of specificity in defining the victim 
populations was directly at odds with the UNGC. For Drost, and many scholars to come, 
membership in any group being targeted for destruction or physical harm would suffice. 
Drost also differs from Lemkin and the UNGC over the core objective of such actions.137 
Should we only use the term genocide to reflect violence intended on the group’s complete 
annihilation? Here, Drost contends, the intentional annihilation of a group is not central to 
the definition of genocide, but merely one possible objective of perpetrators. Conflicts that 
result in mass physical harm to members of a designated group that do not originate from 
their complete destruction, should also be counted within this category of offenses, 
according to Drost. On this point, Leo Kuper and Israel Charny also agree, in their 
formulations of genocide, that the intentional destruction of an entire group is not central 
to their conceptualization, instead, they focus on the “mode of annihilation,” that being, via 
the mass killing of a “collectivity” or a “defenseless” population in lieu of perpetrator 
intention.138  
  
                                                 
136 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: a conceptual analysis of genocide,” 350.  
 
137 Ibid, 350. 
 
138 Ibid, 350; Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: 1981); Israel 
Charny, The Widening Circle of Genocide (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).  
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Table 2.1 
Competing and Contested Definitions of Genocide, Listed by Author (Year)* 
 
Membership 
 
 
 
Magnitude 
 
 
Victims 
 
 Perpetrators 
 
 Small-Scale 
 
 Large-Scale 
 
 
Raphael Lemkin  
 (1944) 
Nuremburg Trial  
 Count 3  
 (1945) 
UNGA Resolution  
 96(I) (1946) 
UN Genocide  
 Convention 
 (1948) 
Pieter Drost  (1959) 
Vahakn Dadrian  
 (1975) 
Leo Kuper (1981) 
John L. Thompson 
 and Gail A. 
 Quets (1987) 
Tony Barta (1987) 
Henry Huttenbach  
 (1988) 
Ervin Staub  (1989) 
Robert Melson  
 (1992) 
Steven Katz  (1994) 
Irving Louis 
 Horowitz  (1996) 
Yehuda Bauer  
 (1984; 1999) 
Rome Statute  
 (2002) 
Jacques Semelin  
 (2007) 
 
  
Jack Nusan Porter 
 (1982) 
Isidor Walliman & 
 Michael N. 
 Dobkowski 
 (1987) 
Barbara Harff & 
Ted Robert Gurr 
 (1988) 
Frank Chalk and 
 Kurt Jonassohn  
 (1990) 
Helen Fein (1988,  
 1990) 
Manus Midlarsky 
 (2005) 
Mark Levene  
 (2005) 
Martin Shaw 
 (2007) 
 
  
 
  
Israel Charny  
 (1994) 
Levon Chorbajian  
 (1999) 
Jacques Sémelin 
 (2005) 
Daniel Chirot & 
Clark McCauley 
 (2006) 
Donald Bloxham 
 (2009) 
 
 
* This list denotes important and influential alternative definitions of genocide. This is not a 
comprehensive list of all alternative definitions, simply those viewed most prominent to the academic 
literature by the author. 
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 Following Drost’s expansion, Vahakn Dadrian offered a more nuanced 
understanding by stressing the hierarchy of groups embedded in society who are backed 
by the legal authority of the state, and possess an ideology of extermination; thereby 
choosing to enact violence against a vulnerable population for the purpose of achieving 
intergroup supremacy.139 Dadrian’s definition embodies much of the UNGC’s spirit, but 
he also offers an explanation of the process of genocide in his underscoring of group 
dynamics and competition over scarce resources. For Dadrian, the state is a conduit for the 
dominant group to legally execute violence against an oppositional population that cannot 
sufficiently defend itself. Here, Dadrian introduces both systemic factors, such as group 
dynamics and power imbalances, accentuated by the dynamism of political opportunity in 
defining genocide. Dadrian is the first scholar who integrates structural and dynamic 
factors into his categorization of mass violence. Irving Louis Horowitz expands upon 
Dadrian’s incipient definitional analysis, by emphasizing, “bureaucratic apparatus” of the 
state that engages in systematic “liquidation of a national population.”140 For Horowitz, the 
bureaucratic modernization of the 20th century is essential to defining mass violence as 
genocide, against (usually) a vulnerable minority group unable to adequately defend 
themselves from the power of the administrative state. Here Dadrian and Horowitz further 
refine the UNGC’s attention to state institutions as prime perpetrators.  
                                                 
139 Dadrian defines genocide as, “…the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority 
and/or preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the 
number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective 
vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide.” See Vahakn N. Dadrian, “A 
Typology of Genocide” International Review of Modern Sociology 5:2 (Autumn 1975): 204.  
 
140 Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (Transaction Publishers, 1976).  
49 
 
 As shown in Table 1, of preeminent scholarship that sought to redefine the meaning 
of genocide, no prominent authors did so with the intent of specifying violence on a small-
scale. All scholarly alternatives to genocide emphasize the role of the persecution of victim 
populations (i.e., specifying who counts and who is excluded), stress the importance of 
perpetrators (i.e., focusing on the role of organizational bureaucracy or systematic, state-
sponsored methods of mass destruction), or have explicitly shaped their conceptualization 
of genocide in broad terms to reflect and incorporate large-scale loss of life. The issue of 
small-scale or “partial” genocides was raised in the preceding section – particularly, the 
difficulties in analytically distinguishing massacres from partial genocides. The field, as a 
result, initially sidelined this dilemma and scholars focused their efforts on understanding 
genocide’s many complexities through referencing victim groups, perpetrator methods, or 
its sheer magnitude of violence. As will be apparent, second and third wave genocide 
scholarship has attempted to bridge this gap – at least somewhat more than first wave 
authors.  
 
Second Wave: Qualifications and Caveats: Sub-Categories of Genocide  
 The second research program to emerge involved the classification of different 
kinds of genocide. To date, by my tally, there are at least 24 different kinds of genocides 
described in the extant literature (see Table 2.2 for a complete list). Early scholars like Leo 
Kuper, Israel Charny, Frank Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, Ted Robert 
Gurr, Roger Smith, Donald Beachler, Yehuda Bauer, and Vahakn Dadrian put forward 
typologies of genocides. Thereby marking our field’s first attempts at disaggregating 
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genocide into analytically distinct sub-categories.141 Most of the sub-categories listed in 
Table 2 are derived from these premier authors. Each of the aforementioned scholars’ work 
divides genocide into comparable sub-categories. In the interest of simplicity, I divide these 
24 terms into six major groupings of motivations/type; therefore, these genocidal groupings 
aim: (1) to implement an ideology; (2) to enact revenge or revolution; (3) to scapegoat or 
repress a rival social group; (4) to colonize or develop a territory; (5) to pursue a struggle 
for power, and (6) finally, there is an “other” category that includes stand-alone sub-
categories or a combination of mixed motivations that do not fit neatly into the preceding 
five domains.  
 The central motivation of “ideological genocides” resides in the implementation of 
a belief system that does not include the targeted or marginalized population. Ideology has 
long been a focus of genocide scholars in theorizing this process and is regularly included 
as a primary motivator of violence. Roger Smith is among the first to include ideology as 
one of five sub-categories in his 1987 work “Human destructiveness and politics: the 
twentieth century as an age of genocide,” where he divides genocidal cases into retributive, 
institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic, and ideological sub-types.142 Frank Chalk and Kurt 
Jonassohn include ideology as one of four sub-categories in their widely referenced book 
The History and Sociology of Genocide, where they disaggregate genocide by perpetrator 
objectives, of which ideology is a central driver. Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr detail 
                                                 
141 Other authors have used the label “sub-types” to describe such concepts. For the purpose of this research, 
sub-categories and sub-types can be used interchangeably.  
 
142 See Roger Smith, “Human destructiveness and politics: the twentieth century as an age of genocide,” in 
Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski, eds, Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of 
Mass Death (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), 23–27. 
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genocides fueled by xenophobic beliefs, as in the killing of Ache Indians in Paraguay from 
1962-72, the Ibos living in northern Nigeria from May to October 1966, and Muslims 
residing in Burma’s border region in 1978.143 Finally, and perhaps most well-known is 
Helen Fein’s four-part classification of ideological, retributive, developmental and 
despotic genocides.144 As mentioned, most of the typologies within second wave 
scholarship overlap. It is due to Fein’s impact on the field of genocide studies that her 
typology is the baseline by which I contrast all others.  
 The central motivation of “retributive genocides” resides in enacting revenge on a 
social group that poses a threat to the state. Within this second major sub-category I include 
retributive, revolutionary, wealth, terroristic, and monopolistic genocides. The central aim 
here stressed by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, Israel Charny, Helen Fein, Roger Smith, 
Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, and Vahakn Dadrian is the successful domination of 
an opposition group and its forcible submission through violence and punishment. These 
cases may include a struggle for power between ethno-religious groups jockeying for 
control of the state or its resources. It may also manifest itself in the dispossession of a 
group’s land, resources, or wealth.  
 The central motivation of scapegoat or despotic genocides resides in the overt 
repression of a minority population whose very presence is deemed to pollute the national 
identity, pose a threat to internal security, or simply represent a convenient source of blame 
for all social ills and deprivations of the “superior” group. Stalin’s mass murder and 
                                                 
143 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, (1988) 
364-365. 
 
144 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: A conceptual analysis of genocide,” 352. 
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deportation of entire populations from the Caucuses included Volga Germans, Kalmyks, 
Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Meskhetians, and Crimean Tatars, because they 
posed “security concerns,” and were convenient scapegoats of the Stalinist USSR.145 Idi 
Amin’s mass killing in Uganda is another unfortunate example of scapegoating domestic 
social groups for annihilation or expulsion. Here the overriding factor is deep-seeded 
hatreds, repression, or fear of a population that results in their collective targeting for mass 
violence. (Table 2.2 shows, most categorizations of genocide fall into identification with 
victims or perpetrators. This is not surprising as most theories of genocide have centered 
on those who have been victims of mass violence or its perpetrators, and not necessarily 
addressed magnitudes of violence).  
The central motivation, of “developmental genocide,” was most common during 
colonialism. In virtually every context, colonization and decolonization proved an 
extremely violent affair. In the Americas, Africa, South and East Asia and Australia, 
millions of indigenous and first peoples fell victim to colonial conquest. Most scholarship 
has separated out genocides committed during this long period as a unique phenomenon 
comparable only amongst other similar endeavors. That being said, we have seen 
perpetrators of colonial genocides use their empires as laboratories of destruction, testing 
strategies of mass annihilation and refining them for later use. For example, German 
conquest of present day Namibia, began in 1885 with the appointment of Dr. Heinrich 
Göring, father of Hermann Göring a future Nazi leader – “It was [Hermann] Göring who 
ordered Security Police chief Reinhard Heydrich to organize and coordinate a “total 
                                                 
145 Robert Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (Macmillan, 1960), 74. 
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solution” to the “Jewish question.”146 The German colonial empire was not the first to 
develop or employ concentration camps as a means of mass violence, but future Nazi rulers 
would become its most avid users. German Southwest Africa was home to the empire’s 
first concentration camp, built on December 11, 1904.147 German troops under command 
of General Lothar von Trotha constructed two variants of camps: one was organized around 
forced labor, and the second was designed with the explicit intent to kill.148 It is the latter 
model that provided the basis for future Nazi concentration camps like Buchenwald and 
Dachau, argues Benjamin Madley.149 German colonial Namibia illustrates a most severe 
testing of methods of mass violence, though many colonial and decolonization efforts 
involved variations in the use of extreme violence against indigenous peoples.  
The central motivation of the fourth major sub-category, resides in the overt 
struggle for power between warring ethno-religious-national groups, or regime efforts at 
state preservation. Here I include intentional genocide, genocidal massacre, hegemonial 
genocide, and partial, total and “optimal” genocides. Broadly interpreted, these six sub-
types exude similar objectives of domination and domestic power politics. They are the 
personification of a zero-sum game’s worst outcome. This fight for power may occur from 
limited ethnic cleansings of a territory to total annihilation of a population (c.f. Srebrenica, 
                                                 
146 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 381; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
“Hermann Göring,” accessed on April 18, 2017 from URL: 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007112.  
 
147 Benjamin Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and 
Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe” European History Quarterly 35:3 (2005) 
446.  
 
148 Ibid, 446. 
 
149 Ibid, 446.  
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an ethnic cleansing, to the Holocaust, a total genocide). Power is the explicit factor that 
ungirds all six sub-categories of genocides here.  
Table 2.2 
Sub-Categories of Genocide Classification 
 
Membership 
 
 
 
Magnitude 
 
 
Victims 
 
 Perpetrators 
 
 Small-Scale 
 
 Large-Scale 
 
 
biological 
genocide 
ecological  
(or destruction) 
genocide 
indigenous 
genocide 
monopolistic  
genocide 
partial genocide 
repressive geno-/  
politicide 
revolutionary 
geno-/  
politicide 
total genocide 
wealth genocide* 
xenophobic  
genocide 
 
  
auto-genocide 
decolonization  
genocide 
despotic genocide 
developmental  
genocide 
hegemonial geno-/  
politicide 
ideological 
genocide 
institutional 
genocide 
intentional 
genocide 
latent genocide 
retributive geno-/  
politicide 
terroristic 
genocide* 
 
  
genocidal 
massacres 
utilitarian 
genocide 
  
optimal 
genocide 
* Denotes terms created by the author of this dissertation. In these cases, the original author of this sub-
category did not provide a brief title. Therefore, I applied an appropriate adjective to describe this sub-
category. To reflect the author’s original intent. A complete list of definitions is provided in Appendix B.  
 
Finally, we are left with singularly developed sub-categories that are narrowly 
defined to in some instances, identify genocidal events of a single case. Here we group sub-
categories like auto-genocide, biological, institutional, monopolistic, utilitarian and other 
mixed sub-categories of genocide. The term auto-genocide was originally developed to 
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describe Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge killing of its population. Cambodia is labelled an 
“auto-genocide” because of its exceptional nature where perpetrators and victims share 
membership in the same community, yet perpetrators engage in self (or “auto”) killings 
against one another. Similarly, as narrow a concept, biological genocide, though 
misleading, does not pertain to the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass 
destruction, but what Karl Marx referred to as our first division of labor – the segregation 
of the sexes and subsequent prevention of a group’s ability to procreate from policies of 
forced “castration, compulsory abortion, and sterilization.”150 This sub-type of genocide 
was coined to specifically identity instances of indirect methods of mass group violence 
detailed in the UN Genocide Convention’s Article 2, subparts c through e. This final major 
grouping holds the remainder of all singularly developed concepts or uncommonly 
exclusive methods of mass destruction.  
 Combined, these six major buckets of sub-categories comprise the bulk of second 
wave research in genocide studies. For decades’ scholarly articles and monographs were 
fixed on classifying genocidal episodes into neat four- or five-part typologies. Eventually 
this research program would become subsumed by scholars’ discontent with existing 
definitions of genocide and in disaggregation of its sub-types. These theorists forged third 
wave research whose aim was the coining of substitutive terms for genocide.  
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007) 76-77; Also see William A. Schabas, 
Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 119-120.  
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Third Wave: Discontent with “Tradition”: Substitutive Terms for Genocide 
 In many respects, third wave theorizing has fostered some of our most interesting 
debates. Scholars in this wave have revisited professor Lemkin’s founding assumptions 
and have updated these to reflect the voracity of modern atrocities. The emergence of third 
wave scholarship is attributed, largely, to three factors: the hyper-politicization of the “G-
Word,” attempts at clarifying case selection criteria, and professional advancement. Taken 
together, these motivators have consumed much of the recent scholarship on genocide.  
 As an educator and researcher of comparative genocide studies, the most common 
question I confront is: Was (fill in the blank) conflict genocide? This is perhaps the most 
important of questions a scholar in our field can answer. Despite its brevity, labeling a 
conflict “genocide” brings about a host of concerns. Classifying conflicts as genocide has, 
inevitably, become a politically charged act in addition to a scholarly assessment. For 
instance, undergraduate students from Turkey enrolled in my senior-level “Comparative 
Genocide” course often ask: Was the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of Armenians genocide? 
To this day, the Turkish government denies the actions of the Ottoman Empire, taken 
against Armenians during the early part of the twentieth century was genocidal.151 Within 
academic analysis, the Armenian genocide has become one of the “triad” of cases bearing 
most scholarly attention.152 With near uniformity of opinion, Ottoman deportations and 
massacres of Armenians constitute genocide. Nevertheless, this classification, as practiced 
by Turkish president Erdoğan, is viewed through an accusatory frame rather than an 
educational one. The hyper-politicization of the “G-Word,” in recent years, has led to an 
                                                 
151 Kifner, “Armenian Genocide of 1915: An Overview.” The New York Times.  
 
152 Genocide scholars commonly refer to the Holocaust, Rwandan and Armenian genocides as “the triad.” 
57 
 
explosion in creation of new terms and substitutive concepts for genocide. This toxicity 
surrounding the word genocide spawned third wave research. An unfortunate effect of this 
has specifically been the blurring of case selection criteria, which previously plagued first 
wave scholars, but now seems to have taken hold in a far-ranging fashion. 
 With new terms come new criteria. Scholars like David Scheffer, Martin Shaw, 
Stuart Stein, Mary Anne Warren, Adam Jones, Rudolph Rummel, Daniel Chirot and Clark 
McCauley, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, Benjamin Valentino, Christian Gerlach, 
Robert Jay Lifton and Erik Markusen, and many others who coined terms listed in Table 
2.3, have fundamentally reshaped, expanded, and reinvented genocide studies to include a 
broader set and range of human activities. This expansion in terms and their definitions, 
brought two important consequences. First, terms employed by scholars, policymakers, 
journalists, and governments today, more accurately reflect the circumstances of conflicts 
in our world than the use of one “catch-all” term, “genocide.” Despite this benefit, the 
second consequence of third wave research has been the muddying of the scientific waters 
of investigation, comparability and generalizability. With the emergence of nearly 40 new 
terms to describe human destruction, how might we establish a uniform set of criteria for 
evaluation? The unfortunate reality is – we cannot (at least, have not, yet).  
 As an advocate of social scientific research, the most important contribution 
genocide studies can offer the public is sound, scientific reflections on the causes and 
consequences of past genocides and their application to present social conditions, with the 
crucial aim of reducing bloodshed. The first step in achieving this outcome is generalizing 
the causes of human destruction based on a clear universe of cases. The establishment of 
operational concepts like culterecide, mass killing, politicide, urbicide, democide, 
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collective killing, dekamegamurders, and such, a priori, requires investigators to “address 
the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomenona – even if 
expressed in substantively different terms – across different contexts.”153 In laymen speak, 
for analyzing culterecide, which countries and conflicts across time and space should be 
included for analysis? And, which should not? Without this initial understanding of case 
selection, genocide scholars cannot take subsequent steps to generalize our findings. The 
complexities and caveats of third wave research generally undercut our ability to establish 
quantifiable criteria across these variable terms listed below. 
It is impossible to categorize every motivation for why researchers, scholars, and 
policymakers choose to create new terms. Such projects are usually undertaken with the 
utmost concern for bettering our collective understanding of social phenomena, 
particularly, one as important as human conflict. The final motivation mentioned here, is 
not done to undermine or challenge the motivations of scholars in the third wave – within 
which this dissertation clearly falls – but it is to shed light on the programmatic nature of 
our career. Scholarship that creates something new, whether a new term, idea, or theory, is 
rewarded. Research that does not, is tossed away. Those concerned with our ability to 
generalize from conflict to conflict should have the utmost concern for conceptual 
proliferation, as it makes generalizability all the more challenging. As long as assistant 
professors become associate professors and analysts are promoted to senior analysts on the 
basis of this paradox of conceptual innovation hindered by definitional disorder will 
continue to plague our field.  
                                                 
153 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2004) 19. 
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Table 2.3 
Substitute Terms and Categories for Genocide 
 
Membership 
 
 
 
Magnitude 
 
 
Victims 
 
 Perpetrators 
 
 Small-Scale 
 
 Large-Scale 
 
 
atrocity crimes  
classicide 
cultural genocide 
culturecide 
ecocide 
ethnic cleansing 
ethnocide 
femicide 
(gynocide) 
gendercide 
holocaust (shoah) 
holodomor  
infanticide  
mass death 
mass political 
 murder 
mass violence 
murderous  
 cleansing 
nuclear omnicide 
political genocide 
politicide 
population  
 cleansing 
proto-genocide 
urbicide 
 
  
democide 
man-made deaths 
mass annihilation  
mass murder 
megapogrom 
state crime 
vigilantism 
zones of violence  
  
collective killing 
communalism 
mass atrocity 
massacre 
multicide 
pogrom 
  
dekamegamurders 
extremely violent 
 societies 
mass categorical  
violence 
mass killing 
megamurders 
 
 Table 2.3 lists substitutive terms that have been coined by political scientists, 
international law experts, and policymakers, as viable proxies for genocide. I do not claim 
this to be a complete list of all terms created in place of genocide, but this represents a 
wide-ranging collection of terms discovered through an investigation of the extant 
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literature. The primary criteria used to include a term in Table 2.3 was that it had to be 
operationalized to address a social phenomenon as severe as genocide. For instance, one 
British official referred to the present conflict in South Sudan as “tribal genocide.”154 The 
official used the qualifier “tribal” to describe a type of ethnic atrocities that fall within the 
scope of genocide. In this sense, the diplomat was not attempting to create a new category 
or substitute for how we understand and conceive of genocide. Therefore, “tribal genocide” 
does not appear in Tables 2 or 3. Contrast this with Robert Lifton and Erik Markusen’s 
term “nuclear omnicide.” Lifton and Markusen describe the circumstances of nuclear war, 
often called “nuclear holocaust,” with their innovative term. Nuclear omnicide was created 
to define a new universe of (potential) conflicts, broader then the legal understanding of 
genocide. Therefore, it is included above.  
 By the early 2000s, a general consensus emerged on preferences for a select few 
terms.155 Initial substitutes for genocide focused on the limited scope of victim groups (e.g., 
exclusively, national, ethnic, racial and religious groups). Harff and Gurr used the term 
“politicide,” to refer to a sustained campaign of state-sponsored policies of mass murder 
aimed at the complete destruction of a population defined by their affiliation or suspected 
affiliation with a political movement or community.156 Comparatively, Rudolph Rummel 
favored a broader concept that reflected a range of government-led campaigns of mass 
                                                 
154 Rodney Muhumuza, “British official: South Sudan violence is tribal 'genocide,'” Associated Press. 
Accessed on April 21, 2017, URL: http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/35139385/british-official-south-
sudan-violence-is-tribal-genocide. 
  
155 Hannibal Travis, Genocide, Ethnonationalism, and the United Nations: Exploring the Causes of Mass 
Killing Since 1945 (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013) 28. 
 
156 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies.” Journal 
of Peace Research Vol. 35, No. 5, (1998) 560.  
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slaughter. He settled on “democide,” demos, meaning populace and –cide, meaning to kill 
or fall.157 Both Harff and Gurr and Rummel were dissatisfied with the complexities of the 
UNGC’s legal definition of one-sided violence, thereby opting to create their own (soon to 
be widely used) concepts. Politicide and democide reflect an era in which academics 
maintained their gaze on the role of the state in mass murder but expanded the universe of 
cases to include other episodes which did not neatly fit within the realm of the UNGC due 
to the scope of victim groups.  
 After attempts at expanding the legal description, some scholars returned to focus 
on classifying genocides which were geographically bounded. After the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia the term “ethnic cleansing” became academically and socially popularized.158 
Ethnic cleansing is substantively related to genocide; its essence embodies core notions of 
the UNGC: the clearing away of a territory from those deemed unworthy through forced 
relocation, dispossession of personal property, the use of torture, extra-judicial arrest, 
sexual violence, or murder.159 Similar concepts popped up into our lexicon as well, namely, 
“population cleansing,” “murderous cleansing,” and “partial genocide” to denote similar 
catastrophes. The paradox in using such a term as ethnic cleansing is that it labels a process 
that is anything but clean. 
 Subsequently, subscribers to the field of genocide studies have increasingly 
developed better theories to explain the onset and magnitude of mass violence, thus once 
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again, initiating new terms into our academic discourse. Benjamin Valentino’s work is 
most notable here, specifically, for introducing the concept of “mass killing.”160 Valentino 
invented the term, in part, to remove the politics of genocide acknowledgment or the 
stigmatization that accompanies the label when applying it to contemporary cases. His 
primary aim is to detail our most severe episodes of human destruction. Mass killing is 
defined as “the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants.”161 What 
constitutes a massive number? Valentino restricts his focus to conflicts that have resulted 
in at least 50,000 civilian or non-combatant casualties within a five-year time period. 
Others have concurrently defined large-scale destruction as “mass violence” or “extreme 
violence.”162 Opting for mass or extreme violence implies a broader range of actions, 
beyond killing, for example, extra-judicial repression, torture, sexual violence, 
deportations, kidnappings, disappearances, and including murder.163 Nonetheless, these 
recent concepts have advanced the field significantly. 
 Finally, the most recent wave of scholars to emerge in Genocide Studies, to which 
this dissertation belongs, have made efforts to advocate a return to the roots of our field 
with struggles to maintain professor Lemkin’s definitional spirit of genocide, while 
updating it for the 21st century. Yang Su has chosen to use “collective killing” to designate 
campaigns of mass slaughter which may be directed by national elites, but in practice have 
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manifested themselves differently across sub-regional levels.164 Su explores variations in 
collective killing as occurred across the county level in rural China during the Cultural 
Revolution. Scott Straus gives us “mass categorical violence,” an attempt to classify a 
range of actions beyond simply murder which has persisted across the developing world. 
Lastly, we have witnessed an explosion in the use of the term “mass atrocities” or “mass 
atrocity” to reference “widespread and systematic violence against civilians.”165 The use 
of the mass atrocity label, has garnered much acclaim in recent years, particularly in light 
of the 2005 “responsibility to protect” document.166 
 Having scolded my colleagues for conceptual malpractice, the final section of this 
chapter argues that we should situate genocide within a broader understanding of political 
violence. This reorientation of genocide within a broader field of study, requires a bit of 
rethinking of our founding assumptions about who its victims are, the scales of atrocities 
addressed, and the different motivations for enacting extreme violence. Next I introduce 
the term “mass political violence” in hopes of mitigating some problems discussed above.  
 
What is Mass Political Violence? 
 After World War II, most studies of genocide focused on explaining the horrors of 
the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal acts. Scholars like Raphael Lemkin, Raul Hilberg, 
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Lucy Dawidowicz, Léon Poliakov, Hannah Arendt, and Saul Friedländer underscored 
ideological and other existing German social structures, including anti-Semitism, anti-
Communism, totalitarianism, the Nazi criminal code, and the wide-ranging dynamics of 
mass violence that resulted in eliminationist killings of European Jewry, the Roma and 
Sinti populations, sexual minorities, political opponents, and other marginalized religious 
groups.167 Since this time, two narratives of genocide theorizing took hold. One argues that 
genocide is a unique phenomenon.168 The extreme nature of group eradication makes 
genocide sui generis to human conflict.169 Underlying this narrative are two research 
camps, exchanging salvos to this day. They agree that the phenomenon of genocide is 
unique, but in terms of comparative genocide studies, some argue the Holocaust was itself 
unique within the unique paradigm.170 In fact, British historian and Holocaust denier David 
Irving “claims that the Jewish “Holocaust industry” silences its critics by a combination of 
intellectual terrorism and moral blackmail and he has taken some of his opponents to court 
to attempt to provide it.”171 Thankfully, Irving’s perspective remains a minority opinion. 
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Conversely, others contend all genocides are exceptional and should be analytically 
compared to identify patterns of common casual pathways.  
Our second academic narrative argues genocide is an extension of existing levels 
of violence.172 It is now a widely accepted maxim that war and genocide often co-exist.173 
Building on this revelation, some researchers have sought connections with other parallel 
fields, like political violence, civil wars, state repression, human rights, counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, and geography.174 They argue that comparative genocide studies must 
embrace its interdisciplinary nature and pull from a variety of research disciplines so that 
we can understand human suffering from a holistic perspective. This dissertation fits 
squarely within the latter camp and is the reason I operationalize the term “mass political 
violence” below. 
 I will argue genocidal violence should be examined in relation to other forms of 
extreme violence. In solidifying my argument, this dissertation uses a broader term, mass 
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political violence (MPV), as a heuristic device in situating genocide as an extension of 
current forms of political violence. By employing the term MPV, it is my intellectual desire 
to address many episodes of mass violence as listed in Table 3. MPV is a multidimensional 
concept. Its primary benefits lie in the reality that its usage allows us to circumvent debates 
over terminology such as mass killing versus mass murder, collective killing versus 
classicide, or mass atrocity versus politicide, for instance. MPV, as shortly defined, is 
versatile enough to generalize across all substitutive categories.  
 I define mass political violence as the intentional killing, in whole or part, of a 
discernible group, by a government, its agents, or an organized social unit. There are four 
central characteristics of MPV. First, for the purpose of this dissertation, violence is defined 
as killing. There are alternative ways of examining political violence, including rape as a 
weapon of war, torture, terrorism (with or without killing), and maiming. This dissertation 
exclusively focuses on the killing component of violence and leaves the remaining 
categories of study for others to assess. The concept of “violence” has become so widely 
used, that a nearly 1,300-page handbook has been devoted to its study.175 In compiling the 
International Handbook of Violence Research Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan note:  
Almost all relatively detailed studies make it clear that violence takes 
extremely varied forms and may possess many different qualities; not only 
is there a very substantial range of (current) definitions, but there are also 
many disagreements about the authority of definitions of what violence is, 
or is said to be. Consequently, theories of violence not only vary in their 
validity and significance but also address different subjects and involve 
controversial assessments of the efficacy of possible strategies for 
addressing the problem. Moreover, what seems the clear condemnation of 
violence is significantly challenged in many social and political situations, 
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so that it is highly advisable to approach violence, and its different areas 
and contexts, on a basis of clear distinctions…  
 
This dissertation is centrally concerned with the study of mass political violence. 
That means, a study that includes by definition, many forms of violence (i.e., 
genocide, mass murder, tyranny, despotism, oppression, democide, and more). The 
use of the term “violence” enables a broader avenue for the study of large-scale 
destructive policies aimed at civilian populations.  
One of the central problems confronting a manual on violence is the 
ambiguity of violence itself, which is apparent in the characterization and 
framing of its phenomena, the logic of its occurrence and possible 
escalation, supposed causal explanations, and its evaluation. As a result, it 
frequently happens that clear divisions between levels of analysis and 
escalation dynamics become blurred, with the result that analyses cease to 
do justice to the complexity of violence. The problems of violence research 
begin at the outset, with the attempt to determine exactly what should be 
classified as violence.  
 
There is, admittedly, a broad consensus that violence causes injury and 
sometimes death and results in many different forms of destruction, so that 
there are always victims. But at that point, if not before, the consensus 
certainly ends. It is not even clear precisely who or what has been injured, 
or how serious that injury is. Can cases of mental devastation be classified 
as violence, or-because they cannot be objectively recorded-are they merely 
subjectively nuanced injuries, where the victims themselves may even come 
under suspicion? Should the definition of violence include structural forms, 
which need no direct perpetrators but undeniably produce their victims, or 
is the use of the label "structural violence" merely denunciatory?”176 
 
As addressed by Heitmeyer and Hagan, violence may take many forms, from verbal 
assaults and dehumanization campaigns on one end, to eliminationist murders on the other. 
For the purpose of scientific rigor, case studies for this dissertation are selected on the basis 
of killing, but, mass rape, dehumanization rhetoric, torture, discriminatory campaigns of 
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marginalization, and other forms of violence will be discussed on a case by case basis, 
when such forms of violence exist. In pursuit of creating scientific standards for including 
episodes of MPV, the universe of cases, is in part, determined by the number of victims 
killed by perpetrators. For example, within the Nazi dominion from 1933-1945, 
perpetrators systematically killed millions of citizens and prisoners of war who did not 
have a “place” within the Hitler’s vision of the post-war order. In addition to mass murder, 
Nazi officials and their minions, carried out appalling “medical” experiments and torture 
on countless human beings.177 This is perhaps the most notorious example of violence 
enacted on a targeted population. These events would be discussed under MPV, however, 
they would not be part of criteria in determining a case’s eligibility for inclusion. Simply 
because, these circumstances and violent episodes are all too common and difficult in 
creating measurable criteria. 
 Second, deaths attributed to perpetrators of MPV must be intentional. Establishing 
intent has been a long held characteristic of genocide and its many forms of violence. From 
Raphael Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe to the UN Genocide Convention, intent 
to kill, exterminate, liquidate, or otherwise dispose of a social group, has been central to 
studying this phenomenon.  Professor Lemkin suggested genocide is a product of the 
intentional “extermination of nations and ethnic groups” in his seminal work, and the 
UNGC explicitly declares genocide to be “acts committed with intent to destroy.”178 It is 
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the intention of perpetrators who target individuals that distinguishes MPV and genocide 
from other forms of mass death caused by disease, Mother Nature, or the collateral damage 
of unintentionally killing civilians.179 Similar to the UNGC, intentional acts of MPV are 
not restricted to “direct” methods of violence, such as homicide, hanging, gassing, or 
bombing. It includes any act that deliberately inflicts on a group “conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction,” such as starvation, exposure, disease, 
deportation, forced labor, man-made famine, prevention of births, or removal of children 
from one group to another group.180 Irrespective of perpetrators’ methods of violence, the 
presence of intent to harm members of a group, qualifies a conflict’s eligibility for inclusion 
as MPV. Determining, let alone proving the intention driving violence due to direct or 
indirect methods of perpetrators can be a nearly insurmountable task for academics and 
jurists. The difficulty of this characteristic is explained above, as the first problem of 
defining genocide. Therefore, little needs added here, except to reiterate, its difficulties in 
assessing perpetrator motivations.  
 The third aspect of the definition of MPV resides in assessing potential victim 
populations. I refuse to specify protected classes of victims in the definition of MPV. This 
is in stark contrast to the UNGC’s explicit statement that genocide can only be committed 
against a national, racial, ethnic or religious group. I take a comprehensive and inclusive 
stance on the potential victims of mass political violence. By specifying the eligibility of 
victim groups, authors and legal scholars, either intentionally or unintentionally exclude 
marginalized groups from protection. This is the case with the UNGC’s exclusion of sexual 
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minorities, genders, and politically motivated killings. For reasons of intellectual and social 
inclusion, MPV can be employed against any “discernible group.” The qualifier 
“discernible,” is used to cover objective and subjective groups. If a group is objectively 
discernible, for example, a group of individuals who openly identify as Christian or gay or 
lesbian, then they should be considered eligible to study as being the victims of MPV. On 
the other hand, if perpetrators incorrectly, but subjectively, believe a group of individuals 
to be part of a social group, for example, accused communists in Indonesia (1965-66) or 
accused capitalists in China (1949-1976), even if they are simply not members, they will 
be included for study as well. Limiting the definition of MPV (or genocide) would 
marginalize similarly targeted groups were exiled from inclusion before, which is not my 
intention.  
 Let me say a brief word on the use of the term “political.” Based on the examples 
above, violence directed against a religious, communal, sexual minority, or another group 
may or may not be directly “political” as we academically conceptualize it. I have chosen 
to use the term political to represent all activities relating to societal and governmental, 
public affairs within a country. The common phrase, “the personal is political” comes to 
mind. In this vein I operationalize mass political violence to be violence used and directed 
by perpetrators (of which there are four principal categories) against a target population for 
any number of reasons. The use of political is not meant to restrict our analysis to specific 
groups targeted for political gain. On the contrary, it is intended to broaden our discussion 
of a wide swath of group violence employed by perpetrators of extreme violence.  
 The final aspect of the definition of mass political violence resides in setting a 
threshold of violence. I have made an argument for situating genocide and MPV within a 
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broader field of political violence studies. In order to defend this repositioning, and the 
conceptual distinction of MPV, I define the word “mass,” in mass political violence, to be 
the killing of at least 10,000 civilians or noncombatants within a 12-month span. Let me 
be clear, I do not deny that genocidal events can consume a population of less than this 
threshold. Nor do I argue that conflicts which result in fewer deaths are any less atrocious 
then large-scale killings. There are two reasons for setting a threshold. First, creating a 
threshold for violence is one manner to distinguish “normal” policies and episodes of 
political violence (e.g., extra-judicial killings, torture, mob violence, lethal riots, and so on) 
from systematic, organized campaigns of violence that specifically target a social group. 
Violence that reaches such a level within one year, is most likely the outcome of intentional 
policies of group elimination and therefore of a wholly different nature than “normal” 
levels of political violence. Second, the use of a threshold allows for a consistent, 
measureable and standardized criterion in labelling conflicts. Consistency in selecting case 
studies matters for generalizing results and avoiding the politicization of conflicts. It allows 
for the author to assess comparable cases across time and span, with relative certainty that 
violence in each conflict reached comparable heights and were a product of similar 
preconditions and causal factors. It is for these reasons I utilize a threshold requirement. 
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CHAPTER III:  
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
“Murder is human… genocide is not.”  
– Gideon Hausner, 1981181 
 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past.”  
– Karl Marx, 1852182 
 
“What we are is shaped both by the broad systems that govern our lives–wealth and 
poverty, geography and climate, historical epoch, cultural, political and religious 
dominance–and by the specific situations we deal with daily.” 
– Philip Zimbardo, 2007183  
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I ask two basic questions: under what conditions do perpetrators in 
society opt for mass political violence? And, how do they sustain mass political violence 
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over time? I will take each question in turn. First, to identify societies at risk of mass 
political violence (MPV), we might employ a criminological perspective, asking what are 
the motives, means, and opportunities for perpetrators in a given context. Pinpointing 
perpetrator ideological beliefs would be one priority in unpacking possible motives. 
Harken back to inter-war Germany where society was imbued with notions of antisemitism 
that permeated nearly all aspects of life: Germans were taught to blame Jews for Germany’s 
defeat in WWI and subsequent decline. This scapegoating came from the administrative 
state, and was echoed in many churches across the continent. National Socialism of the 
1930s took advantage of this particularly violent strain of “eliminationist antisemitism” by 
tapping into preexisting beliefs, values, and attitudes towards Jews. This deep ideological 
belief, held by many, could have been a key motivating factor in the Holocaust and other 
Nazi genocidal atrocities. That said, antisemitism by itself is insufficient to explain the 
totality of National Socialism’s genocidal violence. Antisemitism was indeed a unifying 
credo among many Germans. However, running parallel to this national attitude were 
individual psychological reasons for participation in the Holocaust. Most Germans viewed 
the dispossession of Jewish businesses and property as “an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” 
to enrich themselves at the expense of their Jewish neighbors.184 In many of these cases 
German proprietors may have sympathized with anti-Semitic attitudes, but individual 
financial greed coupled with opportunity were triggers for violence. Greed is just one of 
dozens of psychological dispositions that have been catalogued to encourage people to 
commit violence against one another.  
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Most theories revolve in some way around the assessment of perpetrator 
motivations coupled with their ability to enact violence (i.e., the means). There is often a 
confluence of motives and opportunities, as discussed. Any cursory search of academic 
literature on the causes of genocide would return thousands of results explaining in granular 
detail ideological motivations of individuals and societies. However, investigating 
individual motives for violence can be a slippery slope. Many social scientists, including 
myself, contend human beings engage in violence for a variety of reasons including, but 
not limited to, greed, grievance, frustration-aggression, revenge, love, convenience, simple 
fear, fear of polluting one’s group, anger, hate, shame and humiliation, disgust, 
essentialization, prejudice, establishing dominance, hierarchy or independence, realpolitik, 
scapegoating, social cleavages, deep-seated hatreds, and for any other reasons.185 Perhaps 
most pertinent to this study is the question of the circumstances under which violence is 
wielded in a specific, quasi-organized fashion that result in massive numbers of fatalities. 
If operating from the assumption that violence is first and foremost instrumental, thereby 
tied to elite or mass goals, establishing a unified theory of mass political violence based on 
the “strategic” goals of individuals is inherently difficult, as human goals may change from 
decade to decade or even week to week. Rather than asking why people kill – because such 
a list is never ending – we should ask what conditions enable people to kill on a large scale. 
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Understanding the conditions that give rise to mass violence will yield analytically more 
fruitful responses than scholarly attempts at unpacking the psychology of individual 
perpetrators? Therefore, isolating particular motives is not the most efficient way of 
identifying societies at risk of mass political violence. 
Because agents are largely bound by their physical, and to some extent social 
environments, theorizing these constraints is vital to explaining why violence occurs or is 
prevented in society. In other words, rather than emphasizing “motives and means,” I stress 
the role “opportunity” plays in the development of violence. The social scientific term for 
my approach would be “dynamic structuralism.” I define dynamic structuralism as an 
approach that examines both slowly changing variables – i.e., structural factors – like a 
regime’s military capacity, ideology, infrastructure and bureaucratic state capacity, civic 
tolerance, or social cleavages, along with dynamic processes such as exogenous shocks to 
society as in terrorism, armed conflict, assassination, or economic collapse.   
Therefore, in assessing state-society relations before, during, and after episodes of 
mass political violence, I build a model that uses three variables combined with estimates 
of perpetrator tactics and stratagems (the dynamic “agency” oriented processes) to 
determine the likelihood of mass political violence onset. For violence to reach a level of 
10,000 or more victims within a 12-month period, these structures (i.e., regime power, state 
capacity, and social appetite for violence) must interact in specific ways to facilitate such 
desires. Two structural factors reflect the role of the state and one of society. Mass political 
violence can emerge during armed conflict or its absence, in developed or developing 
economies, and in (ethnically) heterogeneous or homogenous states. Thus, rather than over 
complicating our model of MPV onset, I rely on three principal variables that are most 
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likely to enable potential perpetrators to turn violent. Savvy perpetrators of mass political 
violence use state and societal indicators as a means of triangulating their window of 
opportunity. Any perpetrator dead set on enacting violence can attempt so at any time, 
irrespective of these social structures. This chapter unpacks how each of these conditions, 
when interacting at particular levels, create the conditions under which determined 
perpetrators are able to commit mass political violence. Despite all my edits, I’m following 
you, the model makes sense to me.    
 
A Typology of Mass Political Violence  
Assumptions and Debates in Theory Building 
 There has been much progress within Comparative Genocide Studies since the end 
of the Cold War. In the last three decades, we have seen a virtual tsunami of interest in 
theory development, non-major case analysis, and social activism on the part of faculty and 
students and in non-governmental organizations like Save Darfur, The Enough Project, 
and Genocide Watch.186 With these additional resources, scholars have pursued new 
avenues of research. The comparative method is an ideal framework for addressing these 
emerging areas. One principal aim of theory building and comparative research lies in our 
ability to generalize.187 To accomplish this, one tendency has been to distil complex 
theories into parsimonious models of human behavior. To this end, most scholars have 
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relied upon some decades-old assumptions in framing their analysis. In this section, I argue 
that we need to rethink these conventional assumptions that permeate the field.  
 Israel Charny asks, “Can there be any case of mass murder which is not 
genocide?”188 His conclusion is unequivocal – no. As articulated in the previous chapter, I 
argue that not all mass murder is genocide, but all mass murder deserves analysis. For 
Comparative Genocide Studies to advance our understanding of the mass violence, there 
must be an assumption that all genocides are – directly or indirectly – comparable on some 
level. If they were not, then what good is having a research program devoted to its study? 
This (mis)perception of comparability has dogged the field for decades. Giovanni Sartori 
warned of the “conceptual element problem” in his seminal work on concept misformation, 
conceptual stretching, and ladders of abstraction.189 As Sartori noted, concepts can be used 
in a very general or a very specific manner. Genocide is an “empirical concept,” meaning 
it “can be located at, and moved along, very different points of a ladder of abstraction.”190 
Nazi Germany and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge are empirical examples of genocide 
in the twentieth century. Both episodes display similar characteristics of a “class of things,” 
as Sartori would maintain.191 In each case, perpetrators systematically murdered ethnic, 
national, religious, and political opponents. Each government sought a fundamental 
transformation of society – where killing was only one of the means to achieve a utopian 
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191 This phrase, “class of things,” is used to describe the relationship between higher and lower levels of 
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vision. The comparison between Nazi Germany and Cambodia is useful and logically valid 
in distinguishing between genocidal and non-genocidal events. However, once stepping 
inside the universe of genocide cases, we should ask: are the Holocaust and Cambodia truly 
comparable in its causes and consequences? I will argue that most literature of Comparative 
Genocide Studies operates at a high level of abstraction, meaning scholars engage in 
comparisons of the broadest sense. What we must do to gain more clarity is to climb down 
this ladder of abstraction toward specificity, and to disaggregate cases of genocide and 
mass political violence into similar classifications based on their causes of violence. I will 
argue that the Holocaust and Cambodia are examples of two different kinds of genocide 
and mass political violence. Understanding these refined differences in great detail will 
enhance our analytical leverage in assessing the causes and consequences of mass political 
violence. The first step toward this nuanced approach lies in rejecting the assumption that 
all mass political violence episodes possess similar beginnings, middles, and ends to 
violence.   
 Why compare Nazi genocidal atrocities against Jews and other ethno-religious 
minorities with Mao’s Great Leap forward or the Cultural Revolution? There are many 
logical and methodological reasons to make this comparison. First, any study of the 
twentieth century’s bloodiest regimes, in terms of the sheer number of victims, must 
include Nazi Germany and Communist China. Each state was prototypical of a totalitarian 
regime.192 Under Hitler and Mao’s tutelage, each governing party retained de jure and de 
facto authority. Each despot articulated a guiding ideology for society, an ideology that 
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sought fundamental transformations of current circumstances to an obtainable utopia. 
Finally, each regime stimulated mass mobilizations across its territory. Private life became 
yesteryear, and the party was all encompassing. In this sense, Nazi Germany and China are 
directly comparable with respect to the role of the state.  
Scholars like R.J. Rummel compare these cases based on their devastating power. 
Rummel classifies each episode as a dekamegamurders, which roughly translates to 
“murderer of tens of millions.”193 Rummel is correct to study Nazi Germany and China 
under the premise of the twentieth century’s most heinous murdering regimes. As shown, 
there are methodological reasons (i.e., isolating regime type) and logical reasons (i.e., from 
a victimological perspective) to compare Hitler’s Third Reich with Mao’s People’s 
Republic of China. Therefore, why do I argue that existing classifications are not 
sufficient? As will be demonstrated, regime type and sustained killing capacity are not ideal 
factors in arranging comparisons between genocides and mass political violence episodes. 
Such comparisons are too facile. To understand the differences between these preeminent 
cases, we must unpack the role of the state in the implementation of violence. Here is where 
we find intrinsic and crucial differences that undergird my typology and more importantly 
nuances of the state in the contemporary world.  
The assumption that states function similarly is reasonable given an investigatory 
requirement that some factors remain constant over time. However, this analytically valid 
belief largely simplifies the role states play today. For example, Hervé Savon, a French 
sociologist, developed a typology for classifying genocide into three categories: 
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substitution, devastation, and elimination.194 The outcomes in each episode are different 
but the inputs (i.e., state and perpetrators) are viewed as homogenous. States propagate 
violence based on three motivations according to Savon – substitution, devastation, or 
elimination – and their actions result in one of three possible outcomes. The only difference 
in state behavior lies in the tactics used to reach these outcomes, but tactics are not 
considered fundamental variations in state behavior. In The Killing Trap, Manus 
Midlarsky’s aim was to “pinpoint” the reasons small-scale massacres can be transformed 
into large-scale genocides.195 In his comparative analysis of mainly three cases – the 
Holocaust, the Armenians, and Tutsis – Midlarsky assumes state behavior originates with 
elite impressions of loss, continues through a complex process of risk evaluation, and ends 
with decision-makers concluding the ideal mechanism for minimizing their perception of 
loss is through genocidal acts.196 Even in Daniel Feierstein’s Genocide as Social Practice, 
we see the assumption of state similarity implicitly applied. Feierstein compares the 
policies of Argentine’s military junta with that of Nazi Germany – drawing similarities 
between the goals of each perpetrating government.  
Skeptics may argue that notable authors like Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, and others 
have developed typologies to explain variation in the alleged homogeneity of state 
behavior. But these typologies merely disaggregate episodes along the lines of state 
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motivations, and not by perpetrator composition or their precise role in enacting violence. 
Fein separates genocides into four categories: ideological, retributive, developmental, and 
despotic. What is common to all episodes is perpetrator intent to eliminate a substantial 
number of people of a social group. The literature is shrouded with endless examples of 
research resting upon the assumption that state behavior remains relatively homogenous. I 
challenge this assumption in my typological framework. By triangulating between state 
and society involvement in mass political violence we unpack four discrete, often obscured 
categories. Each quadrant of the typology reflects a different combination of state-society 
relations that enables particular types of perpetrators to become activated – see table 3.1 
below. 
Table 3.1 
A Typological Framework of Mass Political Violence Perpetrators 
  
Societal Participation 
  Low High 
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The State 
 
Government: principal perpetrator 
Societal: opportunism, 
bandwagoning 
Sustained killing capacity: high 
 
 
State-Society Coalition 
 
Government: co-perpetrator 
Societal: co-perpetrator, militias, etc. 
Sustained killing capacity: high  
 
L
o
w
 
 
Non-State Actors 
 
Government: none 
Societal: non-state armed groups  
Sustained killing capacity: low  
 
 
State-Sponsored Groups 
 
Government: enabler, clandestine  
Societal: principal frontline 
perpetrator 
Sustained killing capacity: moderate  
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Second, while many researchers have over-simplified the role of the state in mass 
political violence studies the same cannot be said of its antecedent causes. In fact, as Scott 
Straus recently writes, there are far too many variables used to predict when and where 
genocide will emerge.197 A cursory review of pertinent risk factors for genocide and mass 
political violence onset generates dozens of “exacerbating” factors.198 Much of 
Comparative Genocide Studies scholarship suffers from this dilemma – “frequency 
mismatch.” According to Finkel and Straus, theories suffer from frequency mismatch when 
they employ causal variables or exacerbating circumstances that commonly exist in the 
world outside of genocidal contexts.199 For instance, many societies possess deep-seated 
hatreds among and between social groups. The conflict in Northern Ireland raged for more 
than three decades with episodic tit-for-tat killings between loyalist paramilitaries targeting 
Catholics, and Irish nationalist forces carrying out deadly bombings and terrorist attacks 
throughout the United Kingdom. The 2007 electoral violence in Kenya largely occurred 
along socio-political divides and nearly fomented a collapse of the democratic order. Even 
the United States, a consolidated democracy, is not immune from the scourge of deeply 
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198This is not an exhaustive list of risk factors for genocidal violence but a representative sample: armed 
conflict (or) war; assassinations; authoritarianism; convenience and opportunity; deep-seated hatred; 
dehumanization and deindividuation; discriminatory legislation; economic causes (numerous); ethno-cultural 
elite; existing discrimination against a particular group; fear (simple and of pollution); fragile, weak or state 
collapses; frustration-aggression; government capabilities; greed and grievance; high infant mortality; 
ideology (exclusionary or transformative); large-scale instability; low-trade openness; nonviolent protests; 
outlawing political parties; percentage of GDP spent on military; polarized society; political and social 
upheaval; prior genocide or mass atrocities; realpolitik and risk minimization; regime type (all); religious 
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divided societies. Ideological tribalism dominates American politics with political 
affiliation determining which social circles a person navigates. Yet none of these societies 
experienced MPV as defined here. Intergroup animus is far more common in societies 
across the globe than states experiencing mass political violence and genocide. Therefore, 
existing theories have been unable to assess when this (and other) risk factors might trigger 
mass violence. The abundance of societies possessing any number of likely risk factors 
greatly exceeds the number of states who devolve into large-scale mass murder. This 
frequency mismatch has plagued Comparative Genocide Studies since its founding.  
Related to frequency mismatch is our collective inability to accurately predict 
tipping points for mass political violence. The problem with these variables is that they are 
often slowly changing factors.200 For example, a state’s ethno-religious composition is 
likely to remain constant over the short term; changes in population growth may come over 
time, but slowly. Yet, deep-seated (primordial or instrumental) ethnic tensions have been 
the backbone of theories for decades. The Rwandan genocide is often mooted as the 
archetypal ethnic conflict. One, among many, problems with this example lies in the fact 
that Rwanda’s ethnic composition remained relatively consistent throughout the latter half 
of the twentieth century. If ethnicity caused the 1994 genocide, why did this slowly 
changing variable precipitate mass political violence in 1994 and not 1973 or 1985? To 
extend the example further, if ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsi caused – either 
partly or wholly – the Rwandan genocide, why did Burundi who possessed near identical 
ethnic demographics not descend into genocide along with Rwanda? The answer to these 
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questions obviously means ethnic composition cannot be understood as a triggering factor 
in the onset of genocide in a particular context. This leads to two theoretical conclusions:  
Either another factor was working in conjunction with ethnic divisionism, or we have yet 
to understand the role ethnicity plays in such contexts. This problem is endemic to the study 
of genocide and mass political violence generally. It is precisely this problem that led to 
my approach to the study of mass political violence – namely, a “dynamic structural” 
analysis of state-society conditions before, during, and after mass political violence.  
 
On Perpetrators  
 The publication of Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men sparked one of the most 
influential and contentious debates on the issue of why and how individuals become 
perpetrators. In his 1992 book, Browning methodically defines his “ordinary men” thesis 
by examining the men of German Reserve Police Battalion 101 who murdered and rounded 
up Jews for deportation to Nazi concentration camps in 1942 Poland. Browning found that 
the men of Reserve Battalion 101 were not ideologically committed, card carrying Nazis, 
and nor were they inherently more sadistic than their contemporary German brethren. Unit 
101 was comprised of otherwise ordinary middle-aged, working-class men who had been 
drafted for military service, but found ineligible to serve. Browning’s thesis argues that 
otherwise “ordinary” persons placed in certain circumstances (i.e., within an authoritarian 
structure) might commit heinous crimes, including cold blooded murder, torture, and terror. 
The men of Unit 101 did not engage in these monstrous crimes for fundamentally nefarious 
reasons, but even more disturbingly, from their perspective, enacted violence because of a 
basic sense of obedience to authority and in response to peer pressure. Daniel Goldhagen 
85 
 
reignited the debate in 1996 with the publication of his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
in which he argued against Browning’s “ordinary men” thesis. For Goldhagen, the genesis 
of the Holocaust and Nazi genocidal atrocities can be traced to a particularly violent strain 
of antisemitism – an eliminationist outlook. Goldhagen argues that both ordinary and elite 
Germans were influenced by this eliminationist antisemitism and therefore those who 
participated in the perpetration of the Holocaust willingly acting upon this preexisting 
belief structure.  
 In an attempt to transcend this case-specific debate about the motives of 
perpetrators, I ask two questions that assess the social composition of perpetrators. First, 
what criteria do we use in defining a perpetrator? In other words, who counts as a 
perpetrator of mass political violence and who does not. This question has both pragmatic 
and theoretical implications. If our goal is prosecutorial justice after violence, we must first 
know who is culpable. Moreover, for theory building and explanatory purposes, we must 
be able to distinguish individual acts of violence committed as part of an organized 
campaign to further specific goals from unassociated deaths that happen concurrently to 
these insidious campaigns. For example, in 1982 Efraín Ríos Montt, a senior officer in the 
Guatemalan army, seized power in a coup – subsequently declaring himself president. 
When Montt came to power he waged one of the Western hemisphere’s most brutal 
genocidal campaigns against Guatemala’s indigenous Mayan and Ladino populations.201 
According to the United Nation’s Commission for Historical Clarification between 1960 
and 1996 some 200,000 people were massacred or disappeared as a result of state-directed 
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terror.202 More than 400 villages were destroyed and burned to the ground, with some 
regions experiencing between 70 and 90 percent of villages ruined.203 Though Montt was 
quickly deposed by his Defense Minister in 1983, he made a substantial impact on the 
course of Guatemala’s civil war and genocide.204 Twenty years later, in 2003 Montt was 
blocked from partaking in the presidential election as a candidate by a judicial ruling.205 In 
response to this court decision, Montt was instrumental in fomenting violent 
demonstrations in July. During these violent protests a journalist suffered a heart attack 
and consequently died “while being chased by a mob of FRG [Guatemalan Republican 
Front] supporters.”206 How do we characterize this particular death? Is Montt responsible 
for the death of this journalist? Should we consider Montt a perpetrator (in addition to his 
previous acts) because of his actions that instigated mob violence? This example illustrates 
the difficulties in categorizing specific violent episodes as part of a broader phenomenon. 
Distinguishing between violent episodes associated with mass political violence and deaths 
that transpire concurrently is an inherently difficult task. Counting direct and indirect 
fatalities attributable to perpetrators is an essential and often overlooked facet of mass 
political violence studies – particularly when a conflict results in tremendous numbers of 
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deaths (e.g., the Holocaust or Rwanda). However, it is one endeavor we must pursue for 
the purpose of intellectual and historical accuracy.  
 The second question logically follows from the first:  does an individual have to 
personally engage in violence against another to be labelled a perpetrator? Those who 
murder, rape, torture, or destroy property with intent to harm are indeed perpetrators. 
Nevertheless, those who perform these manual tasks are most likely low ranked soldiers or 
conscripts – frontline personnel responsible for implementing the wishes of superiors. 
Often leaders who direct their minions to commit violence in pursuit of ideological or 
otherwise motivated goals do not directly participate in the acts of violence themselves. 
And yet, the obvious answer here is that individuals who facilitate, organize, and direct 
violence without personally wielding instruments of violence themselves are equally 
responsible and should carry the label “perpetrator.” 
 The central premise of my dissertation framework rests in differentiating “types” 
of perpetrators. I use the word “type” in reference to classifying the collective social 
composition of perpetrators in a given episode.  The types are identified by the relationship 
of the perpetrators to state authorities? For example, the Cambodian genocide/mass 
political violence perpetrators represent one archetype. In April 1975, a small communist 
revolutionary group – the Khmer Rouge – emerged from the Cambodian countryside and 
marched on Phnom Penh, the capital. From the beginning of their campaign, soldiers, 
peasants, and conscripts led by Pol Pot engaged in murderous violence against all ethno-
religious-national groups that opposed the Maoist revolt. It was common for perpetrators 
to slaughter anyone seen exhibiting Western culture, including those who were wearing 
glasses or speaking a foreign language. Of the estimated 3.3 million victims, most perished 
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from forced relocation from urban centers to rural communities, murder, torture, slave 
labor and illness including malnutrition.207 This type of mass political violence perpetrator 
includes the leaders of the Khmer Rouge – Pol Pot, Son Sen, Yun Yat, Thiounn Thioeunn, 
Ta Mok, and senior party leaders – their bureaucratic minions responsible for implementing 
Pol Pot’s Maoist ideology, and of course the ground-level perpetrators and accomplices 
who engaged in widespread dispossession, torture, and murder of the Cambodian people.  
In this instance, all of these persons from the top of the governing pyramid to the 
lowly murderous soldier are considered perpetrators under my framework. Figure 3.1 
visually represents the distinctions between each perpetrator complicit in the act of 
violence. In all mass political violence episodes there is a hierarchical structure of 
perpetrators. At the top of the order resides the leaders and organizers of violence. These 
are the Hitlers, Stalins, and Pol Pots of the world. Their vision and ideology form the basis 
for generating violence on a large-scale. Immediately below these leaders are what Richard 
Olson terms “managers.”208 This second tier is critical to the organizational structure of 
perpetrators. Managers are bureaucrats. They relay orders and directives of the leaders to 
the masses. Managers are a key link in the command structure between senior leadership 
and principal perpetrators on the frontline. Following managers are what most observers 
see when they examine violence – what I term “principal perpetrators”. These individuals 
are the frontline personnel responsible for carrying out the directives of violence. Often 
these are the “notorious murderers” who reign terror upon victims. Though they are most 
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influential in the process of violence, principal perpetrators may not comprise the bulk of 
the command structure. In order for perpetrators to possess the means of violence they must 
be supported by what I refer to as “accomplices.” These persons can be willing supporters 
of the regime or conscripts forced to provide logistical, communication, or transportation 
support. The prime difference between principal perpetrators and accomplices is that the 
former may engage in all activities from direct violence to logistical support, while the 
latter does not directly engage in the act of violence against a target group. They support 
frontline soldiers in their war against “opponents.”  
Taken together, perpetrators of mass political violence include leaders, managers, 
principal perpetrators, and accomplices. All four categories of persons are complicit, in 
some manner, in the collective act of violence. There is a fifth category that straddles the 
line between perpetrator and bystander. This includes the beneficiaries of violence. 
Beneficiaries are those who do not directly provide support to perpetrators in their pursuit 
of violence but have personally benefited from perpetrator actions. For instance, during the 
Holocaust many ordinary Germans financially benefited from the destruction of Jewish 
businesses and their loss of personal property. These individuals were beneficiaries of the 
dispossession of Jewish property but many had no influence in the enactment of these 
policies; though many supported them. In Figure 3.1 I place beneficiaries on the border of 
perpetrators – sometimes included and other times excluded. The reason for this variable 
approach to beneficiaries is that some individuals and, by extrapolation, the companies 
they ran, profited from the Holocaust. Stuart Kreindler writes, “thus far, the companies that 
have been sued [on behalf of former employees who claim they were forced to work 
without pay] include Volkswagen AG, Siemens AG, Bayersiche Motoren Werke AG, 
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Daimler Benz AG, Leica Camera AG and I.G. Farben AG.”209 How do we characterize 
Volkswagen or Hugo Boss – a Nazi uniform manufacturer?210 It would seem Hugo Boss 
financially benefited from the Nazi regime while, not directly from the mass murder of 
millions. Other beneficiaries may not have received any financial gain but benefitted 
socially. An individual may be promoted over a peer because of their affiliation with so-
called “undesirables” groups in society. This category is multifaceted and can be highly 
fluid, which is why it straddles the periphery of perpetrator and non-perpetrator categories.  
Figure 3.1 
Hierarchy of Perpetrators  
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 Finally, Figure 3.1 lists three other classifications: bystanders, victims, and 
rescuers. Bystander is a generic term, referring to any person who does not participate in 
the process of violence. They ignore, neglect, remain passive or might be unaware of 
ongoing events. Furthermore, I distinguish bystanders from beneficiaries, as the former do 
not receive any gain from the events of the day. Victims are easily identified as those 
targeted by perpetrators irrespective of motivation. The final category worth noting is 
“rescuers.” This group may be domestic actors who form collective security organizations 
or rebel groups that fight back against perpetrators. Or, they may take the form of 
international peacekeeping missions sent to stop, ameliorate, or prevent the spread of 
violence. The important distinction here is that these individuals could be domestic or 
internationally constituted or a mix.  
 
Four Modes of Mass Political Violence 
My research identifies four major types of perpetrators of mass political violence: 
(a) state actors, (b) state-society coalitions, (c) state-sponsored groups, and (d) non-state 
actors. Each type of perpetrator is conceptually and empirically distinct. Moreover, each 
category is most likely to emerge under specific state-society conditions. Unlike previous 
authors who investigate “why” perpetrators maim, torture, and kill victims en masse. I ask, 
“How” perpetrators sustain violence over time. To some extent, the “why” question can be 
case-specific. For instance, why regimes murder dissidents or expel ethnic groups from 
their territory is a question fundamentally about motivations of both leaders and societies. 
Motives can emerge from broad ideological goals or they may come from narrow personal 
grievances. What I am concerned with is, chiefly, how perpetrators garner the capacity and 
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capability to enact violence on a large-scale, irrespective of their particular motives or those 
of their leaders. I contend that individuals may choose violence over alternative options for 
any number of reasons, or for simply no reason at all. Unpacking the political psychology 
of perpetrators is ultimately impossible. Therefore, my research examines the state-society 
relations and institutional structures that enable perpetrators to emerge with the intent to 
physically execute extreme violence. Understanding these enablers of violence allows for 
a better understanding of how perpetrators enact their destruction on targeted groups.  
What makes each category of perpetrator unique? To start, the level of government 
support varies by category, as does the level of social participation. Each category is most 
likely to occur under three specific state-society conditions. First is regime power, which 
is a function of public and private sector support of senior political and military leaders in 
a state. Membership within the regime requires unbridled loyalty to the chief executive and 
his/her senior advisors. The larger regime membership is; the greater regime power may 
be over time. Second, is state capacity. My definition of state capacity is derived from 
McAdam et al.’s 2001 work Dynamics of Contention, in which they contend that state 
capacity is “the degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and 
resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction.211 Third, a society’s appetite for 
violence is the extent to which the regime and perpetrators can depend on individuals in 
society to participate in the perpetration of mass political violence. Societies may be docile, 
cooperative, supportive, or apathetic to violence. In all of these cases, perpetrators make 
assessments of society to determine their level of support and act accordingly. 
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Table 3.2 details each of the three specific conditions each category of perpetrator 
requires for them to engage in mass political violence. Each category is conceptually and 
empirically distinct from the others. Not only are they distinct types of perpetrators, but 
they have not empirically occurred at the same rates throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. 
State actors and state-society coalitions have been by far the two dominant modes of 
perpetrators since the early 1900s. More recently, state-sponsored groups and non-state 
actors have become increasingly more relevant and advantageous to those seeking power, 
control, or independence. What follows is a summary of each perpetrator category and 
associated characteristics. 
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Table 3.2: Perpetrator Ideal Types (Modes) and Defining Characteristics 
Characteristic State  State-Society Coalition State-Sponsored Groups Non-State Actors 
Perpetrators   Government agents, 
bureaucrats, institutions, 
and regime hardliners are 
the primary perpetrators of 
violence; in some cases, 
individual opportunism and 
bandwagoning exists at a 
local, non-systematic level, 
that is concurrent to 
governmental actions 
 
Government and 
organized social units 
are explicit partners in 
the implementation of 
violence, neither 
possesses a clear 
command and control 
over its counterpart, 
they work in 
conjunction towards a 
common goal/enemy 
 
 
Government lacks 
resources, will or 
determination to 
implement violence on its 
own; it coordinates non-
state or sub-state actors to 
kill on its behalf; 
government may 
participate in a supportive 
or clandestine role in 
executing violence 
 
No government 
involvement; all 
violence is carried out 
by an independent non-
state actor that 
mobilizes and 
coordinates amongst 
itself; perhaps with 
coercive or voluntary 
methods of maintaining 
social support 
Regime Power 
(Condition 1) 
HIGH: Hierarchical regime 
with strong, charismatic 
leader, able to wield 
personal political power 
outside bureaucracy (e.g., 
commands personal 
loyalties) and inside 
bureaucracy via rule 
enforcement and creation; 
regime maintains a 
monopoly on the use of 
force 
 
HIGH: Hierarchical 
regime with strong, 
charismatic leader, able 
to wield personal 
political power outside 
bureaucracy (e.g., 
commands personal 
loyalties) and inside 
bureaucracy via rule 
enforcement and 
creation; shares a 
monopoly of the use of 
force with independent 
organized social units 
 
 
MODERATE: Powerful 
regime with strong, 
decisive leader, controls 
formal and informal 
institutions; lacks 
resources to fully 
implement strategy; relies 
on coercive and co-opted 
support from organized 
social groups to maintain 
power and influence; lacks 
a monopoly on the use of 
force 
 
LOW: Regime lacks 
political power and 
influence, control often 
limited to capital and/or 
essential installations 
within territory; regime 
confronted with 
competition from 
below; lacks a 
monopoly on the use of 
force 
95 
 
State Capacitya 
(Condition 2) 
HIGH: Strong degree of 
control over persons, 
activities, and resources 
within the territory 
  
HIGH: Strong degree of 
control over persons, 
activities, and resources 
within the territory 
LOW: Weak degree of 
control over persons, 
activities, and resources 
within the territory, often 
lacks complete control 
over territory 
 
LOW: Weak degree of 
control over persons, 
activities, and resources 
within the territory, 
often lacks complete 
control over territory 
 
Social Appetite  
for Violenceb 
(Condition 3) 
LOW:  
The median resident is not 
supportive of participating 
in killing of target group; 
low appetite for direct 
involvement in violence 
 
HIGH 
(COOPERATIVE): 
Organized social units 
emerge from society 
that embraces 
dehumanization of 
target group and 
encourages participation 
in violence 
 
HIGH  
(SUPPORTIVE): 
Organized social units 
emerge from society that 
embrace government led 
targeting and encourages 
participation in violence 
LOW  
(ISOLATED POCKETS):  
Localized support for 
non-state actor and 
participation in 
violence; often coerces 
support from below 
Sustained Killing 
Capacity 
(Likely Outcome by 
Perpetrator Type) 
HIGH ABILITY: to 
organize, implement, and 
sustain killing overtime 
with use of state 
bureaucratic structures 
without external 
intervention 
 
HIGH ABILITY: to 
organize, implement and 
sustain killing overtime 
with use of state 
bureaucratic structures 
without external 
intervention; often 
targets an ethno-cultural 
minority group 
MODERATE ABILITY: to 
organize, implement and 
sustain killing overtime; 
often time bound by order 
of regime 
LOW ABILITY: to 
organize, implement 
and sustain killing 
overtime, often 
temporal and 
geographically 
constrained  
Notes: 
aDefinition of state capacity is derived from McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 78. State capacity the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s 
territorial jurisdiction.”  
bSocial appetite for violence (SAV) is similar to a society’s national mood/desire towards participation in violence against a target group. 
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State Actors 
State actors, or their time-period equivalents, have long been considered the usual 
suspects in the perpetration of mass political violence. In the modern era, government 
agents, bureaucrats, institutions, and regime hardliners are the primary culprits of violence. 
When states choose to enact violence as public policy, the results are often most 
devastating. For example, the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin fomented the 1932-33 
Ukrainian “great famine,” which is recognized to have claimed more than 6 million lives.212 
The great famine of 1932-33 was unlike its predecessor of 1921-22; in this case, the state 
induced famine was brought about by Bolshevik leaders in response to early Ukrainian 
nationalist sentiments. In pursuit of maintaining the Soviet Union’s grip over the 
breadbasket of Europe, Soviet collectivization policies forced Ukrainian peasants to 
produce tons of crops for consumption outside their borders. Here, the state enacted public 
policies and indirectly murdered millions to maintain political power over their territorial 
claims of Eastern Europe. When states choose to pursue such a path toward mass political 
violence, for whatever reasons, the results have shown to be most deadly of any perpetrator 
category.  
For states to opt for mass political violence, specifically violence that reaches a 
threshold of 10,000 victims within a 12-month span, certain state-society conditions must 
be in place prior to the commission of violence. Here, I discuss each specific structural 
factor: regime power, state capacity and a society’s appetite for violence. First, “regime 
power:” when assessing perpetrator strength and ability to commit extreme violence over 
                                                 
212 Stephane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 159. 
97 
 
time, we must distinguish between the strength of a state (i.e., its ability to govern its 
territorial space) and the power wielded by hardliners within the state. For a state to 
sanction, support, enact, and commit mass political violence, the regime must have 
immense hierarchical power with a strong, often charismatic leader at the top, able to wield 
personal political power outside the bureaucracy (i.e., commands personal loyalties) and 
inside the bureaucracy via rule enforcement and creation. The regime must maintain a 
monopoly on the use of force within its territory and be unquestionably the sole domestic 
entity capable of enforcing “justice” as it deems appropriate.  
These are “strong” states. They do not have to be rich or economically powerful 
states in the international system; but the institutions and regime in power must be strong 
and capable vis a vis society –  capable of weathering domestic and international political 
storms and returning political fire when necessary. For example, the Soviet Union from 
Stalin to its collapse under Mikhail Gorbachev is a prime example of a state exhibiting high 
regime power. At various periods, particularly in the early 20th century, the Soviet Union 
was not exceptionally rich nor was it as economically developed as its Western 
counterparts. However, the regime maintained a strong sense of ownership and control over 
its peoples; never allowing for the opportunity of political rivals to emerge in any sufficient 
fashion.  
A strong regime is the first and foremost condition for state actors to commit mass 
political violence. Nevertheless, there remain many strong regimes around the globe that 
have not pursued such policies despite some desire to do so. Herein lies our second 
structural factor: state capacity. Within political science and public administration, there 
are dozens of definitions (similar to my previous discussion of competing definitions of 
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genocide) to delineate state capacity. Embedded in these descriptions are differences 
between a nation’s bureaucratic and infrastructure state capacity. The differences here can 
be crucial to understanding how I operationalize this condition for the sole purpose of 
anticipating mass political violence onset. In my analysis of states at risk of violence, I am 
solely concerned with a nation’s bureaucratic state capacity and to a lesser degree its 
infrastructural power. I adopt Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly’s 
conceptualization of state capacity as “the degree of control that state agents exercise over 
persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction.”213 
When perpetrators possess high state capacity, as delineated here, they are able to mobilize 
people and material across their territory irrespective of their level of economic 
development.  
Perhaps the most notorious example of a perpetrator type exhibiting strong state 
capacity is when hardliner Hutus took control of the Rwandan state in 1994 The Rwandan 
genocide is an example of a state-society coalition perpetrator, however in both categories 
of perpetrators (i.e., state actors and state-society coalitions) high state capacity is a 
requisite. Unlike Rwanda’s neighbors, the Habyarimana regime exhibited uncanny 
strength at regional and local levels throughout its sovereign territory. Rwanda was saddled 
with low economic development and poor infrastructural capacity at the time of the 
genocide. However, the regime and bureaucratic state capacity were remarkably strong for 
an underdeveloped economy. Regime hardliners were fully capable of mobilizing support 
across all provinces and communes for the purpose of implementing mass political 
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violence against moderate Hutu political opponents and the Tutsi minority across the state. 
Here, hardliners and regime elements quickly mobilized support and executed countless 
pogroms, ambushes, house-to-house raids, executions, and roadblocks which turned into 
mobile killing centers within days of the genocide’s start. Though the Rwandan genocide 
reflects a separate category of perpetrator, the specific condition of high state capacity is 
perhaps our best example to date.  
Finally, for a state to target a substantial portion of the population, at least 10,000 
persons, perpetrators must at some level assess society’s response to violence. Not all 
societies will remain docile, cooperative, or supportive of such measures, particularly if 
members of the targeted group are capable of self-mobilization in response to violence. 
Here, state actors explicitly and implicitly assess the national mood in society. Are average 
workers, teachers, students, farmers, and the like going to passively stand by during the 
evolution of violence, or will they fight back? When there is a low social appetite for 
violence, meaning the median resident is not supportive of participating in the killing of 
the target group, they will largely become bystanders to mass political violence and offer 
little to no resistance. Taken together, when regime power is strong, bureaucratic state 
capacity is high, and the social mood is low for obstructing violence, state actors are more 
likely to emerge and enact mass political violence against any perceived target group that 
is deemed a rival to their strategic goals and objectives.  
 
State-Society Coalitions 
As mentioned, state actors have been one of two primary perpetrators of mass 
political violence throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. The other dominant perpetrator 
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type in this regard has been what I refer to as state-society coalitions. This category of 
perpetrator is principally distinguished from the former by the role of organized social units 
as explicit partners in the implementation of violence. When state-society coalitions form 
and emerge to marginalize and destroy targeted groups, they do so in states with a strong 
regime, high level of state capacity, and a high degree of support from independent societal 
actors.  
There are several reasons why state actors may form an explicit or implicit coalition 
with sub-state or non-state armed groups. First, a regime may not possess a clear monopoly 
on the use of force within its territory. In these cases, regime officials deem a rival group 
to be an obstacle to national goals or objectives. However, the regime may lack sufficient 
military capability to enact its designs on this target group. Therefore, in order to achieve 
their desired outcomes, state actors enter into an informal (though possibly formal) contract 
with non-state armed groups. This newly formed coalition possesses the financial and 
physical capacity to engage the targeted group in sustained violence over time. The 1994 
Rwandan genocide is a prime example; the governing Hutu regime did not retain sufficient 
military prowess throughout the territory, and thus actively sought out the support of two 
militias groups which were seen to be very aggressive in hunting down Tutsi civilians 
during the genocide.  
A second situation in which a state-society coalition is deemed effective for MPV 
results when the government maintains a monopoly on the use of force within its territory, 
but actively encourages vigilantism and extra-judicial killing squads to support its agenda. 
In addition to providing much needed resources to the cause of the regime, active vigilante 
mobs roaming the country side in search of “asocial” persons provide the regime with ample 
101 
 
domestic political cover, plausible deniability of action, and an indirect measure of social 
support for mass political violence. The Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities 
during World War II are a particularly violent example of a state-society coalition’s ability 
to target pariah groups en masse. 
 Similarly, a third reason this category of perpetrator is seductive to murderous 
governments is that this coalition is most likely to emerge against an ethno-religious 
minority group and not a substantial majority of the population. One reason the Holocaust 
was so comprehensive in its ability to enact violence across Nazi-occupied Europe is that 
its perpetrators had broad social support and a unifying anti-Semitic ideology to propagate 
Nazi racially-driven policies. Because non-state armed groups targeted ethno-religious 
minorities, there was little risk of these killing squads’ and regime soldiers’ goals colliding. 
In fact, they overlapped and buttressed one another’s mission. Therefore, a state-society 
coalition has two separate parts that pragmatically function quasi-independently, but with 
a unified goal in mind.   
Fourth, state-society coalitions cannot be conjured out of thin air. In order for this 
category of perpetrator to emerge and solidify its cooperation in advance of mass political 
violence, there must be a unifying ideology that brings together state actors and persons in 
society to form sufficiently capable non-state armed groups or militias. Absent any 
unifying belief system that forms the basis of cooperation between each wing of the 
coalition, perpetrators are unlikely to gain sufficient momentum in accomplishing 
widespread violence. In these cases, ideological support is crucial. However, once 
ideological support evolves, it may gain strength and energy of its own accord. Thereby 
sowing the seeds of vigilantism in the population. If states do not partner with non-state 
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armed groups at this point, they may face opposition from society in pursuit of their goals. 
Under this fourth reason, state agents may have fueled the flames of violence with their 
ideology, thereby fanning the flames of hatred and forcing them into violent action against 
political rivals. If these feelings remain unchecked by the state, non-state armed groups 
could turn on the state. Therefore, aligning with such groups becomes paramount to the 
state in achieving its goals and objectives. 
Finally, state-society coalitions are likely to gain strength during times of great 
political upheaval or rivalry. States that face intense interstate wars or intrastate armed 
conflict are likely to mobilize support among social actors. This mobilized support can be 
used in a coordinated fashion to target domestic minority groups while the armed forces 
and state actors direct the bulk of their efforts to addressing ongoing armed conflict. The 
Rwandan genocide is a case in point in which Hutu militiamen largely carried out the 
slaughter of moderate Hutus and the Tutsi minority concurrent with the military’s campaign 
against the rebel Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Irrespective of the particular 
reason for the formation of a coalition to enact violence, state-society perpetrators are most 
likely to emerge in countries with a strong regime, strong state capacity to mobilize and 
control persons, activities, and resources within their territory, and a high degree of 
cooperation from organized social units often in the form of armed militias.  
 
State-Sponsored Groups  
Each prior category of perpetrator describes violent episodes in which the regime 
and state capacity maintain a strong degree of power, control and influence over domestic 
politics and a quasi-monopoly of violence. The final two categories of perpetrators are 
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empirically less common in the 20th and 21st centuries, but have gained substantial 
momentum in recent years. One needs not look past the atrocities committed in the Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Syrian Civil War, or in the Western jungles of Burma 
(Myanmar) where social groups labeled by the state and government officials sanction mob 
violence, looting, slash-and-burn tactics, and intense vigilantism that has resulted in 
thousands of Rohingya Muslim deaths and tens of thousands more internally displaced and 
refugees.  
First, state-sponsored groups as perpetrators of mass political violence, particularly 
episodes where at minimum 10,000 victims perished, are indicative of a government that 
lacks resources and the will or determination to implement violence on its own. This 
category reflects a regime that possess a high level of regime power but low state capacity. 
In these instances, governments employ third-party organizations such as non-state actors, 
sub-state actors, non-state armed groups, or armed militias to kill on its behalf. Because 
the government maintains strong regime power but suffers low state capacity, it may 
occupy a supportive or clandestine role in the execution of violence, but does not possess 
sufficient capabilities to directly confront its political rivals in total.  
The chief difference between state-sponsored groups as perpetrators of mass 
political violence and state actors as the sole offender lies in a society’s collective 
atmosphere. State-sponsored groups are most likely to materialize when the regime is 
strong, state capacity is weak, but society retains high and supportive appetites for 
committing violence (on behalf of the regime). In addition to feasibility, the clandestine 
nature of seeking third-party perpetrators has particularly become advantageous in the era 
of great human rights awareness. Plausible deniability and outright denials of offenses 
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committed during armed conflict has become increasingly a popular tactic used by 
perpetrators of mass political violence. In fact, denials of genocide have been furthered in 
no small part by the example given in the Turkish government’s vehement denials of the 
Armenian genocide under its predecessor ruling regime, the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey’s 
case, denial is less about particular violent events, though this is a central tenet to its 
unfounded claims, but is more about the allure of maintaining international prestige and 
honor. Therefore, I expect this category of perpetrator to become increasingly more 
strategic for strong regimes seeking to remain in the shadows of anonymity moving 
forward.  
Where might we see state-sponsored groups commit mass political violence? 
Typically, state-sponsored groups are most likely to emerge in fragile and weak states 
experiencing armed conflict or political upheaval – especially states where the government 
has limited to no ability to govern all territorial provinces under its sovereign control. For 
example, the on-going armed conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is one 
example of a violent episode involving state-sponsored groups who have perpetrated mass 
political violence. The non-state armed group M23 is a prime example of a state-sponsored 
group waging war and violence in the nearly uncontrolled territory of eastern Congo. In 
this instance, M23’s state benefactors sought anonymity and deniability of this support in 
exchange for financial and material resources discovered during the evolution of violence 
in Congo. Chapter six of this dissertation unpacks in greater detail this newly formed 
category of mass political violence perpetrator. To date, state-sponsored groups remains 
relatively uncommon, particularly in the sense that they are capable of reaching a 10,000-
victim threshold within a 12-month time period. That said, as the technologies perpetually 
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change and social movements continue to upend autocratic regimes globally, it is more 
likely we will see this category of perpetrator increase in occurrence over the coming 
decades to the detriment of human security and international peace.  
 
Non-State Actors 
 Often overlooked by Genocide Studies scholars are the progressively violent 
capabilities of non-state actors to enact, perform, execute, and deliver mass political 
violence against targeted groups in the modern era. Most theories of mass violence have 
neglected studying the effects and causes of non-state actor violence in the evolution of 
large-scale violence. Here, I correct this omission and under-theorizing of these particularly 
vicious and brutal agents. This category of perpetrator is most likely to emerge in weak, 
failing, and failed states. The perpetrators enjoy no government involvement. All violence 
is carried out by an independent non-state actor that mobilizes and coordinates amongst 
itself with a potential limited degree of society support within its governable territory. The 
limited nature of societal support may be from coercive or voluntary methods. In the case 
of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, the non-state actor regularly utilizes coercive 
measures in forcing the local population to support its efforts at self-governance and 
sustainability. It is likely that non-state perpetrators of mass political violence may be large 
rebel movements or ad-hoc militias, organizations with the ability to sustain an 
organizational structure overtime. Nevertheless, these relatively new perpetrators of mass 
political violence are increasingly gathering more capabilities and territorial opportunities 
to enact violence as the number of weak and failing states persists across the globe. Chapter 
six will discuss this paramount problem further.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter constitutes the basis of my framework for understanding the causes 
and consequences of mass political violence. Much progress has been achieved over the 
course of the past eight decades. Notwithstanding the seminal works of many in our field, 
much has yet to be unmasked about the nature of perpetrators and under what conditions 
they materialize to commit, enact, prescribe, coerce, mastermind, or otherwise engage in 
perhaps humanity’s most abominable crime. Perchance an even more appalling discovery 
would be the understanding that in any given country, state, or context society and its many 
factions could be mere steps away from enduring such heinous crimes that befell our mortal 
forebears. 
I did not intend at the outset of my doctoral studies to explicitly write this 
dissertation on the perpetrators of mass political violence and genocide. Perhaps Judith 
Herman writes it best, “When…traumatic events are of human design, those who bear 
witness are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator.”214 When confronted 
with a choice between victims and perpetrators, morality, ethics, and common decency 
dictate we take sides with those experiencing persecution. As discussed in chapter two, the 
field of Genocide Studies cannot escape this scholar-activist dynamic. If we are truly going 
to understanding the causes of mass political violence and genocide, we must examine, in 
detail, those who wish to perpetrate such crimes. It is only with intense studies of these 
perpetrators that academics and policymakers can hope to mitigate such conflicts in the 
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(New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 7.  
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future. I believe, that focusing our attention on the conditions that give rise to mass political 
violence perpetrators is the most effective means of achieving long-term understanding and 
ultimately prevention of such heinous acts.  
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CHAPTER IV:  
STATE ACTORS AND MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
“…it is not by speeches and majority resolutions that the great questions of the time are 
decided… but by iron and blood.”  
– Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck, 1862215 
 
“On the one hand, tyranny and barbarism are seen as a reversal of progress and 
rationalization. On the other hand, they were seen as the very culmination of rationality 
and modernity.”  
– Abram de Swaan, 2001216 
 
“If massacre proceeds first and foremost from a mental process, it is clearly a priority to 
examine the “intellectual framework” that provides meaning to mass violence before it 
occurs.”  
– Jacques Semelin, 2007217 
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September 30, 1862. Translated by Jeremiah Riemer from source: Otto von Bismarck, Reden 1847-
1869 [Speeches, 1847-1869], ed., Wilhelm Schüßler, vol. 10, Bismarck: Die gesammelten Werke [Bismarck: 
Collected Works], ed. Hermann von Petersdorff. Berlin: Otto Stolberg, 1924-35, pp. 139-40. URL: 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=250&language=english.  
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Introduction 
States or their time period equivalents – villages, fiefdoms, municipalities, 
principalities, city-states, kingdoms, or empires – have been responsible for some of 
humanity’s most odious atrocities: genocide and mass political violence (MPV). Political 
scientists commonly trace the “contemporary international system” back 370 years to the 
treaty of Westphalia in 1648.218 However, governments, their time period equivalents, or 
organized social groups have waged “war” against civilian populaces for millennia. 
Examples of genocide and genocidal language can be read in some of our most sacred 
religious texts that we often turn to for guidance and comfort in our moments of 
desideratum. Although the Christian bible cannot be viewed as “historically precise,” it 
can elucidate the prevailing military tactics of antiquity. According to the book of 
Exodus, God said, “I have indeed seen the misery of my people in Egypt. I have heard 
them crying out because of their slave drivers… so I have come down to rescue them… 
[and bring them to] a good and spacious land, a land flowing in milk and honey” [3:7-8]. 
Subsequently, in the book of Deuteronomy, God stated, “…of the cities and these people, 
which the Lord thy God doth give, thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing 
that breatheth” [20:15-16]. Finally, read the book of Samuel in which the Lord instructs 
Samuel to “…go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them 
not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass” 
[15:3]. However unfortunate these passages are for the victims, they are but a small 
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window into human history’s tortured path that includes mass political violence and 
genocide enacted by various forms of governments or their paramilitaries groups.  
As rhetorically demonstrated, mass political violence is not a new phenomenon. 
Perhaps, MPV episodes of the last two centuries have been more intensely traumatic and 
trial-tested then their comparable events in antiquity; but they are simply new takes on an 
old scourge. The increasingly violent nature of MPV perpetrators in the modern era can 
in some part be attributed to the maturation of society. Within social science spheres – 
first in sociology and later picked up by political science – two opposing camps exist in a 
heated debate over the role of development and modernity’s relationship to mass death in 
the 20th and 21st centuries. This is not the appropriate venue to analyze each theoretical 
explanation at length, as there is not sufficient time nor space in this chapter to delve into 
each camp’s minute arguments. In lieu of a detailed analysis, here I offer a summary of 
their positions for instructive purposes in situating MPV today.  
The first faction emerged in the late 1930s with Norbert Elias’s publication The 
Civilizing Process. Elias’s work was originally published in German in 1939 and largely 
remained obscure to social scientists until its eventual translation into English in 1978. 
Elias was forced into exile by the rise to power of Adolf Hitler early in his career.219 
Elias’s thesis is that state formation through what he termed the “monopoly mechanism” 
– i.e., the enlargement and centralization of the administration state around the 
monopolization of violence and the control of taxation – foments a more “‘civilized’ 
relationship between individuals resulting in a reduction of all forms of violent behavior, 
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including state-instigated violence.”220 Elias and his faction view the Holocaust (and by 
extension all state-instigated mass political violence) as an unfortunate side effect of the 
civilizing process. In their view, the breakdown of the civilizing process can occur for a 
variety of reasons, predominantly during: a) economic or political declines; b) the 
radicalization and mobilization of extreme elements in society that empower “father-
figures” to embody the nation’s conscience and give rise to domestic power politics and 
the scapegoating of marginalized communities for the nation’s ill-gotten circumstances; 
or c) the “lust for submission” on the part of the masses to “father-figures” and extreme 
elements that manifest in times of great crisis or what we often term today as during the 
rise of Caudillos or Big Men in politics.221 Elias and his supporters view this return to 
savagery as an unfortunate mitigating effect of the civilizing process not indicative of 
modernity or the developmental process but resulting from case specific circumstances.  
Contrary to Elias, Zygmunt Bauman, a renowned sociologist in his own right, was 
born into a secular Jewish family in Poland in 1925.222 In his most famous work, 
Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman argues that, “We suspect (even if we refuse to 
admit it) that the Holocaust could merely have uncovered another face of the same 
modern society whose other, more familiar, face we so admire…”223 For Bauman, the 
Holocaust (and by extension many mass political violence episodes of the modern age) 
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occur in “civilized” societies. In the example of Nazi Germany, “…culture and art had 
attained the height of refinement and intelligence, and where – what is more – the 
integrations of Jews had progressed furthest, that their fate of extermination would be 
sealed.”224 Bauman and his supporters contend MPV is not an unfortunate side effect of 
modernity that is reached by mitigating factors. In fact, the manifestation of MPV and 
genocide in modern societies is a result of their progress toward bureaucratization and 
advancements in technology.225 It is because of modernity, Bauman argues that the 
Holocaust was so severe under the Third Reich.  
You might ask, “how is this possible?” in a modern society that values the 
concealing of violence from public view and has yet to shed what Hannah Arendt terms 
“the animal pity by which all normal men [and women] are affected in the presence of 
physical suffering.”226 Contemporary theorists argue that three conditions enable 
“normal” individuals to overcome their moral codes and participate in bloodthirsty 
killings. First, compartmentalization of violence from otherwise a pacified society.227 
Once the intended victims, often marginalized communities used as scapegoats for the 
nation’s problems are identified and perpetrators have been selected for the impending 
butchering, the target group is “screened off from the uninitiated so that the torturing and 
killing may proceed unnoticed…”228Abram de Swaan refers to this compartmentalization 
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of violence away from Main Street and forced into the shadows of society as the 
“bureaucratization of barbarism.”229 This compartmentalization enables society writ large 
to maintain its passivity, thus abiding by the “civilizing process” while perpetrators 
exterminate “undesirables.”  
The second condition is the dehumanization of persons. Many scholars of violent 
conflict have studied the consequences of dehumanization and its importance in 
empowering perpetrators to murder members of a target population.230 Dehumanizing 
one’s opponents to that of sub-human, possessing animalistic or even insect-like qualities 
is “the central construct in our understanding of man’s [and woman’s] inhumanity to man 
[and women].”231 According to Philip Zimbardo, a preeminent psychologist responsible 
for the infamous Stanford Prison Study writes, “A Japanese general reported that it had 
been easy for his soldiers to brutally massacre Chinese civilians during Japan’s pre-
World War II invasion of China, ‘because we thought of them as things, not people like 
us.’”232 Essentializing the enemy as inherently inferior to the perpetrators’ race, group, or 
creed allows for the characterization that all members of this group are inferior and thus 
exterminating them is almost an act of mercy rather than murder. This perverse 
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rationalization of perpetrator actions has been recorded as a motivating factor in 
facilitating perpetrator’s acts of violence (c.f., the Holocaust, Rwandan, Cambodian, 
Armenian, or Sudanese/Darfur genocides).   
The final condition is the routinization of violence. Bauman refers to this as the 
“social production of killers” where “murder…masquerades as a routine and [an] 
unemotional function of orderly society.”233 When the state and its agents legitimize 
killing, thereby bureaucratizing the process from mobile killing units to assembly lines of 
mass death, perpetrators are able to disconnect their moral compasses from each robotic-
like act of violence. The routinization of violence has a twofold effect. First, it numbs the 
perpetrator’s senses and dulls his/her emotional response to each murder. Rather than 
viewing each victim as a separate, unique murder, the perpetrator is able to disassociate 
the humanity of his/her victim to that of simply another widget in the assembly line of 
mass death. Second, because killing is ordered by the perpetrator’s superiors, there is a 
rationalization that “I have been ordered to do this; those being killed are doing 
something wrong; they stand in my way; they deserve it; they are a threat to my own 
people; they are not quite human; [or] they are polluting [our way of life]” which further 
enables the routinization and thereby enhancing each perpetrator’s proficiency in carrying 
out mass political violence.234  
All of this is to articulate that in the modern era (circa 1900 forward for the 
purpose of this research agenda) mass political violence and genocide perpetrated by the 
state has increasingly relied on the levers of the administrative state and its bureaucratic 
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forces to instigate widespread violence against targeted populations. In my analysis, 
Elias’s assumption of the civilizing process to be of a linear nature, progressing toward a 
utopian end state is misguided. His analysis his useful in dissecting aspects of modernity, 
however, Bauman’s thesis that the problem of MPV and genocide is related to society’s 
drive toward development reflects, in my view, a more accurate reflection of events. 
Bauman’s argument on modernity and the Holocaust forces us to grapple with the fact 
that for centuries states and their time period equivalents have engaged, instigated, 
perpetrated, funded, supported, and led campaigns of slaughter against opposing 
populations for a variety of reasons. Our history is scarred with the memories of such 
atrocities. The only difference today is that these perpetrators have the capability to bring 
their destruction to new heights by piggybacking off the levers of government.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I 
describe the dynamic structural approach to understanding state-instigated mass political 
violence. In the second and third sections I apply this approach to the mass political 
violence in the Soviet Union and Cambodia. In the final section I conclude with a 
discussion of the variations between state-led mass political violence episodes. 
  
A Dynamic Structural Approach to State-Led Mass Political Violence 
As discussed at length in chapter three, understanding why (state) perpetrators 
ostracize, dehumanize, and murder target populations is inherently a difficult endeavor. 
Unpacking motives is a complex process. Therefore, rather than guessing at perpetrator 
motives, my framework examines conditions that give rise to mass political violence 
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onset and its consequent duration. Understanding social structures before, during and 
after mass political violence is vital to grasping the nuances of this process of violence.  
State perpetrators can emerge anytime and under nearly any circumstances. This 
does not mean they will be successful in achieving their goals and objectives, or in 
reaching the thresholds I discuss in chapter two for mass political violence. That said, 
they are often “first movers” in committing violence against target populations. 
Therefore, it is worth remembering that we must carefully distinguish once again 
between state perpetrators of “normal” political violence and those that reach mass 
political violence levels. The former is exceedingly more common than the latter; as 
such, we must not confuse the conditions that give rise between these different 
phenomena.  
Figure 4.1 presents a model of the generic process of mass political violence. The 
circumstances within the existing polity structure that determine the emergence of 
perpetrators are threefold: regime power, state capacity, and a society’s appetite for 
violence. State perpetrators continuously assess these slowly changing variables in order 
to grapple with possible rival groups, opportunity structures for success, or in assessing 
the strength of their own forces vis-a-vis the target group(s). When regime power is high, 
state capacity is strong and there is a low social appetite for violence – either in 
participating or obstructing state perpetrators – the state-society relations are most 
conducive to the emergence of state perpetrators for mass political violence.235  
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Figure 4.1 
A Model of the Generic Process of Mass Political Violence 
 
The emphasis on requisite conditions for perpetrator emergence is essential, but 
requisite conditions and perpetrator commencement are two entirely distinct matters. 
There are many societies in the world where these three conditions align but no 
perpetrators of mass political violence have emerged. Therefore, in addition to the 
requisite conditions, what factors explain mass political violence onset? I argue that 
perpetrators begin this process when they perceive a threat from some aspect of society 
that is perceived to challenge perpetrator goals and objectives. It is critical to note, that a 
“perceived” threat does not have to be based in reality or objectively measured. As long 
as the state perpetrators believe a target group qualifies as a “real” perceived threat to 
their goals or objectives they may embark on the process of violence (see Figure 4.1) that 
eventually ends in mass political violence. There are numerous examples in history where 
the state’s goals did not align with a portion of its population and as such state 
perpetrators moved to quell, marginalized, or eliminate these groups. In each of these 
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examples state perpetrators did not embark on policies designed to eliminate groups for 
the sake of killing. To the contrary, these governmental organs would have preferred each 
population abide by government’s wishes and lay down whatever objections they held. 
Violence was first and foremost instrumental in nature and primarily was not the product 
of sadistic motivations.  
In the beginning of 1921, the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Civil War was fast 
approaching victory against its enemies: The White army, the Cossacks, and had 
successfully routed Nestor Makhno’s peasant anarchist movement.236 With victory in 
sight, the Bolsheviks turned to “pacification” strategies across the Soviet Union. One 
particularly brutal example can be traced to Tambov Province.237 In June 1921, the 
Politburo appointed General Mikhail Tukhachevsky to form an occupying force and 
“pacify” Tambov.238 Tukhachevsky’s brutal tactics included hostage taking, extra-judicial 
killings, the construction of death camps where persons were gassed, and finally he 
ordered the mass deportations of individuals across the territory.239 Two months later on 
June 11th, Tukhachevsky and his co-conspirator Vladimir Antonov-Ovssenko, president 
of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the Central Executive Committee, co-signed Order 
No. 171. The order instructed personnel to, among other things, “Shoot on sight any 
citizen who refuse[s] to give their names,” arrest or shoot residents of any village found 
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to be harboring weapons and munitions if discovered, “…Where arms are found, 
executive immediately the eldest son in the family,” arrest or deport so-called “bandits” 
from Tambov province, confiscate bandit possessions and they instructed all personnel 
that “These orders are to be carried out rigorously and without mercy.”240 After five 
weeks Order No. 171 was dissolved due to opposition at the highest-levels toward this 
“eradication” policy. Despite the order being withdrawn, military authorities and their 
minions continued their brutal assault. Just one snapshot of Tukhachevsky and Antonov-
Ovssenko’s reign of chaos can be found in the construction of seven concentration camps 
where the mortality rate of prisoners rose to 15-20 percent a month by summer 1921.241  
The Tambov Province example demonstrates perpetrator tactics and their depths 
of brutality when confronted with a perceived threat; in this case a perceived insurrection 
and disobedience of residents in Tambov to the conquering Bolshevik regime. As the 
example shows, after a perceived threat is believed, step two in the process of mass 
political violence is the emergence of the perpetrator type – in this case state perpetrators 
– with a strategy and unifying ideology to confront the target group. After the 
perpetrators emerge as a fighting force, there is escalation in hostilities between the 
perpetrators and target group(s). This escalation is followed by a polarization between 
each faction. Likely in response to state orders, propaganda, discrimination or initial 
violence. At this point perpetrators re-assess social support for government, target group, 
and the general willingness of society to fight, flee, or standby.  
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Steps two through five may occur in rapid succession or over a drawn out, 
protracted period of time. After perpetrators have re-assessed society’s appetite for 
violence, and have explicitly or implicitly concluded that most of society will remain 
docile to their intentions, further mobilization of perpetrators takes place. For obvious 
reasons, there must have be at the very least initial mobilization efforts prior to step six in 
this process. Step six merely reflects an acceleration in this previously established effort 
and is a pseudo-formalization of perpetrator efforts at mobilization or recruitment.  
As mentioned, the cycle of violence (see Figure 4.1) may transpire over the 
course of days and weeks or even months and years – as was the experience in the 
Holocaust. At some point, whether due to an exogenous or endogenous shock or by 
decision of the perpetrators a triggering event acts as a catalyst and propels the cycle of 
violence forward into mass political violence thresholds. I term this catalyst the “decision 
point.” This moniker encompasses both strategic, premediated decisions to engage in 
mass political violence and/or allows for perpetrators to take advantage of opportunity 
structures that emerge from domestic or international shocks to the state. Until this point, 
actual physical violence remains beneath mass political violence levels. By no means is 
this model of the generic process of mass political violence deterministic. It is a 
probabilistic model, forecasting the hypothesized relationship of perpetrators to violence 
and target groups over time. It is vital to unequivocally state, at any point in this process a 
simple factor or confluence of events may have the ability to stop, prevent, alter, or 
stymie conflict thus avoiding mass political violence levels.  
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What comes next is two case studies in state-led mass political violence. The 
Soviet Union and Cambodia under Pol Pot’s regime are extreme examples of a state’s 
catastrophic power when used against civilian and target populations.  
 
The Soviet Union 
“Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost – maybe even millions. I can’t give an exact 
figure because no one was keeping count. All we knew was that people were dying in 
enormous numbers.”  
– Nikita Khrushchev242 
 
Existing Polity Structure 
The brutal tactics employed by Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and successor 
chairman of the Soviet Union can trace their origins all the way back to Vladimir Lenin. 
Bolsheviks/Soviet leaders from Lenin (1917-1924) to Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) 
employed some form of terror against domestic or international civilian populations.243 
Even before the February and October 1917 Revolutions, Lenin advocated for a “real, 
nationwide terror which reinvigorates the country.”244 Lenin and his co-conspirators 
despised the Russian peasantry and those who would come to obstruct his utopian vision 
for a Communist Russian state. Lenin constantly advocated for “merciless” and “pitiless” 
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calls for “gratuitous violence” directed against the peasantry and bourgeoisie.245 This 
“revolutionary violence” was whole heartedly endorsed by Lenin at the outset of the 
revolution and would be perfected under Stalin’s subsequent dictatorship.  
In March [February] 1917, the Russian people weakened by years of war, “did 
little more than riot for several days in their capital city and the old [Tsarist] political 
order collapsed.”246 At the time of the February Revolution there were no more than 
3,000 Bolshevik party members in the capital and fewer than 25,000 nationwide.247 
Seizing the opportunity, Lenin’s Bolsheviks quickly mobilized in response to the sudden 
power vacuum. In comparison to what lay ahead, the February Revolution was relatively 
minor in terms of casualties.248 Sadly, the so-called October “Revolution” marked the 
beginning of decades-long war, violence, mass repression, genocide, and mass political 
violence episodes that reached its zenith under Stalin’s dictatorial rule and subsequently 
stabilized over time.249 In November 1917, the Bolsheviks released their “Declaration of 
the Rights of the People of Russia.” This declaration provided all peoples of the Soviet 
Union a right to “self-determination, including the right to secede.”250 On paper this was 
a remarkable step toward equality and collective determination. In practice, as will be 
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demarcated by the Ukraine famine-genocide, efforts at secession were met with 
barbarous, savage, deadly and merciless policies designed to punish 
“counterrevolutionaries” and force their obedience to Moscow and the Soviet 
“dictatorship of the proletariat.”251 
Under the direction of Lenin, many Bolshevik leaders were steeped in Marxist 
theory, like Leon Trotsky. When Stalin took control, he empowered bureaucrats over 
theoreticians, “men who showered their characteristics were doggedness and a 
willingness to work at the dull detail of administration.”252 From the outset, Lenin and 
Stalin decided to “eliminate, by legal and physical means, any challenge or resistance, 
even if passive, to their absolute power.”253 In November 1920, the Bolsheviks (Red 
Army) defeated the anti-Bolshevik White Army under the command of General Pyotr 
(Peter) Wrangel.254 This was the last major counterrevolutionary force to be conquered 
and opened the way for the Bolsheviks to seize complete control of the state. The same 
year marked the beginning of Soviet de-Cossackization policies.255 Peter Holquist argues 
that “the de-Cossackization [policy] pursued in 1919 at the height of the civil war, not as 
a war policy, but as a state policy that happened to be pursued during war… the civil war 
policy of de-Cossackization is an early demonstration of the Soviet regime’s dedication 
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to social engineering.”256 As such, Cossack populations were slaughtered, “the men shot, 
the women, children, and the elderly deported, and the villages razed or hundred over to 
new, non-Cossack occupants.”257 
Thanks to Robert Conquest’s numerously influential works on the Soviet Union, 
most notably, The Great Terror, The Nation Killers, and The Harvest of Sorrow we know 
much more about the inner workings of the Soviet regime and its development of mass 
terror and repression across its lands. In The Great Terror Conquest shows, contrary to 
his contemporary colleagues’ knowledge, Lenin was just as bloodthirsty as Stalin. The 
only difference “was that Stalin was simply in a better position to carry out the program 
Lenin had already plotted.”258 I agree with Conquest’s assessment that both Lenin and 
Stalin bear equal culpability. The difference lies in Stalin’s ability to successfully achieve 
his goals while Lenin could not. As most legal prosecutors would argue, success of one’s 
actions and their mere attempt and failure does not reduce one’s complicity in such 
nefarious acts. To summarize, Michael Kort writes:  
Stalin’s rise to power resulted in a tyranny over the Russian people far worse than 
Lenin or almost anyone else could have imagined in the 1920s. Yet the evidence is 
compelling, indeed overwhelming, that Lenin, whatever his intentions, prepared the way 
not just for Stalin the dictator, but, more fundamentally, for the totalitarian system 
associated with his name. Before 1917, Lenin created a political party with an ethos that 
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in the name of revolution justified many activities that repelled many other 
revolutionaries. That ethos also heartily endorsed a regime based on force so long as it 
was a “proletarian dictatorship” committed to socialism. Lenin’s highly centralized party 
also required all members to subordinate themselves completely to the collective – all 
members, that is, except the leader.259 
Therefore, it is crucial to understand the Bolshevik regime power structure per my 
framework of mass political violence. The Bolshevik power structure was quite complex 
– though under Stalin this complicated bureaucracy ultimately had little influence under 
his totalitarian rule.260 The official “public face” of the Bolsheviks resided in the Central 
Executive Committee, the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars was the central 
lawmaking body, and the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Command (PRMC) was 
responsible for the actual seizure of power.261 Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka – 
a secret police organization – and leading member of the PRMC, characterized the 
organization as “a light, flexible structure that could swing into action at a moment’s 
notice, without any bureaucratic interference. There were no restrictions when the time 
came for the iron fist of the dictatorship of the proletariat to smite its foe.”262 Initially 
developed during the civil war, the doctrine of what would become known as “war 
communism” “represented a series of ad hoc measures to combat emergency 
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situations.”263 Under war communism, the Bolsheviks requisitioned supplies, nationwide 
many factories, and began to take control over Russia’s vast agricultural sector.264 
When states direct their minors to engage in mass political violence, regime 
power is strong. At the top, this high regime power may be semi-egalitarian as was the 
case under Lenin or hierarchical in nature as was Stalin’s leadership structure. Lenin 
believed in elevating Marxist ideologies, particularly those who could expand upon the 
practical application of Marxism to the Russian context. However, the regime power 
under Stalin’s totalitarian rule was monopolistic in nature.265 Stalin was personally 
marked with “deep suspiciousness and insecurity” and this paranoia is reason mass 
political violence under dictatorship became so severe.266 The organs of the state (e.g., 
the Politburo) contrived to meet regularly from 1924-1930; however, even decisions 
made at this highest level of government could not guarantee decisions were made as the 
real authority ultimately rested in Stalin’s hands.267  
Since more people were murdered under Stalin’s regime than any other – before 
or after him in the Soviet Union – let’s turn to examining, in detail, his regime’s power 
structure and strategy. Conquest’s book, The Great Terror is the definitive work on 
                                                 
263 J.P. Nettl, The Soviet Achievement (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1967), p. 76.  
 
264 Howard J. Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 59; Valentino, p. 101.  
 
265 Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 26. 
 
266 Kershaw and Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism, p. 49. 
 
267 Julian Cooper and Maureen Perrie eds., Soviet History, 1917-53 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 
1995), p. 105. 
127 
 
Stalin’s political purges and mass terror campaign in the 1930s. Conquest perfectly 
captures Stalin’s strategy in the following passage:  
Stalin’s terror, in fact, begins to show a more rational pattern if it is considered as 
a statistical manner, a mass phenomenon, rather than in terms of individuals. The absence 
of strict categories of victims, such as a Trotsky might have listed, maintained the 
circumspect deviousness of the Purge and avoided presenting any clear-cut target to 
critics. The effect of terror is produced, he may have argued, when a given proportion of 
a group has been seized and shot. The remainder will be cowed into uncomplaining 
obedience. And it does not much matter, from this point of view, which of them have been 
selected as victims, particularly if all or almost all are innocent.268 
Conquest shows embedded within Stalin’s pursuit of hegemonic power, he used 
mass political violence as a means to coerce, subdue, and scare the peasantry, bourgeoisie 
specialists, ethnic groups, and even members of his own political party into submission. 
The ingenuity of Stalin was to empower leaders just like him. These henchmen were 
bureaucratically proficient and perhaps equally ruthless. One such principal was Lazar 
Kaganovich, leader of the Organization and Instruction Section of the Central Committee 
under the Secretariat.269 Kaganovich is noted as an exceptional administrator and 
unwaveringly harsh enforcer.270 Kaganovich was a true believer, in that the ends did in 
fact justify the means. The ends were anything the party desired – power, control, land, 
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business, agriculture, or lives. During the terror he told a member of the party that while 
this “cleansing” occurs mistakes are bound to happen, “When the forest is cut down he 
chips fly.” Conquest notes that Kaganovich added, “That a Bolshevik must be ready to 
sacrifice not only his life but his self-respect and sensitivity.”271 Under Stalin’s savage 
reign, he empowered many like-minded figures as Kaganovich into positions of 
authority. In addition to exterminating political opposition within and beyond the party, 
Stalin punished whole segments and national groups who expressed independence like 
the Ukrainians and ordered the systematic deportations of eight entire populations – the 
Volga Germans, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Meskhetians, and 
Crimean Tatars – both before and during World War II.272 For those groups “fortunate” 
enough to face property dispossession and relocation to concentration camps in lieu of 
extra-judicial killing, their survival rates were just as low as other contemporary regimes 
employing concentration camps in the 20th century.273 All told, it is clear Stalin’s regime 
tactics, strategy and ruthlessness embody many of the characteristics outlined in the later 
drafted Genocide Convention.  
At this point regime power and perpetrator state capacity begin to overlap with 
the development of Soviet collectivization policies and mass deportations of ethnic 
groups. It’s worth exploring these two variables together. One of the benefits Stalin and 
his perpetrators possessed was a unifying ideological belief system that rewarded true 
believers, at least initially, up until the Great Terror and again after Stalin’s death in 
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1953. Both Lenin and Stalin coopted the Communist credo “workers of the world, unite!” 
in building an apparatus that many of whom would eventually succumb to. To reiterate, 
in my framework of mass political violence, I use McAdam et al.’s definition of state 
capacity, “the degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and 
resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction.”274 The regime’s high level of 
state capacity is one enabling condition that Stalin and other Soviet dictators used to 
mobilize and murder populations from the hills of Eastern Europe to Siberia and 
everywhere in between. 
At the time of the October 1917 Revolution Russia’s population was 
approximately 140 million, of which 80 percent were peasants.275 Serfdom was abolished 
in 1861 and as a lingering effect, only about half of the peasants in European Russian 
territory were literate.276 During the early years of the Bolshevik Soviet Union, state 
capacity – as defined above – was in a tenuous situation. As such, the violence in this 
period is relatively limited compared to later years. After the Bolshevik regime solidified 
itself as the sole governing authority, initially under Lenin and maximized by Stalin, state 
capacity became immense. In 1919, Walter Rathenau, a German politician and 
businessman, characterized Bolshevik Russia as an atrocious, “rigidly oligarchic agrarian 
republic.”277 Knowing the shortcomings of this inherited system, the Bolsheviks set out to 
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reorganize the government along a federal structure; and under the bureaucratic hands of 
Stalin, became one of the histories strongest totalitarian governments. Fused within this 
federal structure was the Communist Party. The party became the connective tissue of the 
Russian state, everything depended on the party. By 1921, the party banned its opponents 
– the Mensheviks and anarchists – and had successfully achieved hegemony over the 
levers of power.278  
Russian state capacity of the late 1910s and early 1920s cannot compare to 
contemporary standards of Western industrialized nations. That said, Russian state 
capacity in terms of its ability to exercise control over persons, activities, and resources is 
incredible. From 1919 to 1936, the Bolshevik regime had forced more than 130 million 
Russian into 240,000 collectivities.279 What Stalin called the “revolution from above,” by 
the end of 1931, the regime had invested massive amounts of money into industrializing 
the nation and increasing its grip over the country’s industries and peoples.280 Valentino 
notes, collectivization in the Soviet Union completely altered existing power 
structures.281 Decisions that were previously made at the local and village level were now 
decided by a centralized bureaucratic system, run by the party. The same year, Stalin 
would say that there is “no fortress that the Bolsheviks cannot storm.”282 This was true 
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for physical barriers as well intellectual enclaves. Also in 1931, two million people were 
believed to be in an “enemy” class – Kulaks – were disposed of property and mass 
deported into collectives.283 All this is to show that state capacity was strong, in terms of 
McAdam et al.’s definition – an essential ingredient for my framework’s analysis on 
state-directed mass political violence.  
Within 12 years of the October Revolution, the Communist Party was “the 
complete master of all Soviet territory and institutions. And Stalin controlled the 
party.”284 Most students of history remember Stalin’s purges of the 1930s, however, 
before he commenced the Great Terror, Stalin began removing political and personal 
rivals from government and the party. His pre-Great Purge actions allowed Stalin to 
enhance his personal control over the levers of government and further strengthen Soviet 
state capacity, as all rural party bosses owed their positions (and their lives) to Stalin. 
One tool Stalin used to enforce party control over the entire nation was by implementing 
an internal passport system in 1932.285 The internal passport system became a central tool 
in bolstering regime power and state capacity. The system was developed by Stalin 
himself, but enforced by local police authorities. In addition to keeping staring and 
malnourished peasants out of urban centers – where food stores were located – and 
confined to state induced famine territories (i.e., Ukraine 1932-1933) it was commonly 
                                                 
283 Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, p. 89-90. 
 
284 Rummel, Lethal Politics, p. 81.  
 
285 Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, p. 120. For more information on the internal passport system, see Mervyn 
Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993); David R. Shearer, “Elements Near and Alien: Passportization, Policing, and Identity in the Stalinist 
State, 1932-1952,” Journal of Modern History 76:4 (2004), 835-81, especially 840-44; Gijs Kessler, “The 
Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940,” Cahiers du 
Monde Russe 42:2-4 (2001), 477-504.  
132 
 
used to apprehend “dangerous” and “harmful criminals.”286 Within several months, the 
internal passport system became one of the party’s most important policing and 
enforcement mechanisms against so-called undesirable populations across the Soviet 
Union.287 
Deeply connected to the development of the internal passport system was the 
expansion of the Soviet administrative state and the enhanced powers of centrally located 
bureaucrats. This highly complex and eventually totalitarian governing structure greatly 
enabled the Politburo and their minions to crackdown on “dissident” populations. Sheila 
Fitzpatrick writes, “Extrajudicial repression was so thoroughly intertwined with the 
everyday operation of the policy system by the mid-1930s, even regarding relatively 
petty crimes, that reforms of the judicial system ultimately made little difference in the 
overall direction of Soviet criminal justice.”288 By 1934, there were some efforts made to 
control extrajudicial actions on the part of political police authorities. However, Soviet 
bureaucracy had become so powerful that Richard Sakwa called it “a hydra-headed 
beast.”289 He goes on to note that the principal benefit of this immense internal political 
state apparatus was to secure the Bolshevik’s hegemony in domestic power politics.290 As 
was written, the party controlled the state and Stalin controlled the party. The channeling 
of all power through a central authority greased the skids for Stalin – an exceptionally 
                                                 
286 Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, p. 120. 
 
287 Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, p. 120.  
 
288 Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, p. 149. 
 
289 Cooper and Perrie, Soviet History, p. 45. 
 
290 Cooper and Perrie, Soviet History, p. 45. 
133 
 
knowledge bureaucrat – to seize total control of the State and therefore the country. Stalin 
himself possessed more authority than the Politburo collectively, and as such is 
personally responsible for wielding the Soviet sickle and hammer against millions of 
civilians throughout his reign of terror. 
The final criterion of the Soviet existing polity structure to assess is the society’s 
appetite for participating in violence. As Table 3.2 shows, we would expect to see a 
population that is not supportive of widespread mass political violence, or at minimum 
possesses little appetite for personal involvement in killing. There are several ways to 
evaluate Russian society’s active or passiveness. We may start with the October 
Revolution. If large segments of society were involved, it is logical to conclude that they 
would remain involved and perhaps supportive of Bolshevik violence moving forward. 
Historians and political scientists who have studied social movements and revolutions 
have long asked whether the October 1917 Revolution was a coup d’état or an actual 
revolution of the working class.291 There is three schools of thought regarding the 
October Revolution. First, a “liberal” view argues that the revolution was little “more 
than a putsch imposed on a passive society.”292 For these scholars the revolution was 
simply a clever marketing trick of a few elite conspirators that fomented a coup against 
the weakening Provisional Governmental Authority. If this view were valid, it would 
support my argument of a passive society. The second perspective on the October 
Revolution comes from a Marxist or critical approach to these events. They argue “that 
the events of October 1917 were the logical, foreseeable, and inevitable culmination of a 
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process of liberation undertaken by the masses, who consciously rallied to 
Bolshevism.”293 This view is perhaps a favorable analysis of the revolution and its 
“popular” support. That said, once the coup or revolution began, there is evidence to 
support the argument that workers and disaffected soldiers joined the Bolshevik cause. 
What we should ask is, is this evidence indicative of a broad nationwide movement, 
particularly, one that is in support of mass political violence? The answer to this question 
is convincing. There is a difference between support in theory and actual, tangible 
movement from the masses toward widespread violence. The third view of the revolution 
finds common ground between these two scholarly camps, by arguing that the “uprising 
of October 1917 was simultaneously a mass movement and an event in which so few 
people actually took part.”294 There is evidence to a degree that supports mass 
mobilization during this period. I would argue that this mobilization of society was in 
support of opposition to Bolshevism and a reflection of the civil war and not tacit or 
explicit support for mass political violence directed against civilian populations.  
Between 1923-1927 there was a fleeting pause in the confrontation between the 
regime and society – namely the peasantry.295 In March 1923, Lenin had been suffering 
from his third stroke which had left his partially paralyzed and left him unable to 
speak.296 The following January Lenin had finally succumbed from complications with 
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his stroke and passed. During this temporary reprieve of violence, and subsequent fight 
for control of the state, the peasantry and society writ large was able to rest and recover 
from mass repression and disaster agricultural policies. Unfortunately, this respite did not 
last long.  
By the end of the decade, Stalin had begun to solidify control over the party and 
reinstitute repressive policies nationwide. The generally accepted view of state-society 
relations during this time period is that regime acted and society re-acted to the state’s 
efforts at “chang[ing] their entire manner of life, forsake their immemorial customs and 
rights.”297 Despite this conventional notion of state-society relations, there are those who 
have pushed for nuance. Fitzpatrick is one such scholar. She argues that this totalitarian 
model of state-society relations “gives a one-sided and simplistic picture of the 
interaction of state and society.”298 Yes, the Soviet regime sought to dramatically 
transform society through Communism and specific socialist policies (i.e., 
collectivization policies). However, Fitzpatrick contends that the lack of resistance to 
these policies is not indicative of a passive society, but more of their inability to mobilize 
against the state.299 Irrespective of the exact reason why society did not or could not 
mobilize, for the purposes of my analysis, the important notation is that society did not 
partake (regardless of the reason) in mass political violence outside of persons affiliated 
with the regime.  
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Cycle of Violence 
To a large extent, the section breaks here are somewhat arbitrary but nonetheless a 
helpful guide to unpacking mass political violence under the Soviet Union. Much of what 
has already been written under the previous heading applied to the cycle of violence. 
Therefore, I will not belabor the points. For mass political violence to occur, perpetrators 
must act in response to a perceived threat. What was this perceived threat under the 
Bolshevik / Soviet regime? Depending on the time period, this threat came from ethno-
national groups, class enemies, political opponents, or from within the Communist 
regime. It’s crucial to regime that the mere perception of a threat does not need to be 
based in any objective reality. This is perhaps most evident during the Great Terror and 
its political purges by Stalin. In short, the Leninist-Stalinist regime viewed any person 
uncommitted to the ideological goals of Communism a threat. Martin Latsis, one of the 
first heads of the Cheka, a secret political organization, issued an order on November 1, 
1918 saying, “We didn’t make war against any people in particular. We are exterminating 
the bourgeoisie as a class. In your investigations [as political police agents] don’t look for 
documents and pieces of evidence about what the defendant has done, whether in deed or 
in speaking or acting against Soviet authority. The first question you should ask him [or 
her] is what class he [or she] comes from, what are his [her] roots, his [her] education, his 
[her] training, and his [her] occupation.”300 Substitute “what class” he or she comes from 
with what ethnic group and the same order applies during much of the Soviet’s reign.  
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The Soviet Union is an extreme case within this extreme phenomena of mass 
political violence. The Communist dictatorship engaged in near perpetual violence 
against varying populations from its inception to collapse.301 Since the state and its 
perpetrators continually acted on perceived threats and violence therein. I argue that they 
existed in a constant state of “fear” and thus a constant state of cycle of violence (see 
Figure 4.1). Violence was enacted upon when decision points were individually reached 
vis-à-vis social groups, political opponents, or entire populations. “Lighting never strikes 
from a clear blue sky. Stalin could not have existed without certain preconditions…. the 
Bolsheviks called their regime the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and they certainly 
lived up to this name.302 
Perhaps part of the reason the Bolsheviks viewed so many populations and groups 
as threats to their rule lay in their ideology. Belief in Marx’s idea “…that human society 
would not be “liberated” without achieving unity. And, except for despotism, there is no 
other technique known to produce a unity of society; no other way of suppressing the 
tensions between civil and political society…no other means to remain the conflicts…but 
the destruction of the individual.”303 I will not delve into the debate on whether Stalinism 
and its totalitarian nature is a logical, inevitable conclusion of Marx’s ideas and their 
application. For one, this debate is far too cumbersome to expand upon here. Second, for 
the purpose of this study on mass political violence the answer to such a question is a 
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diversion. For me, what matters is the actions of these elites and in assessing their 
motivations, not in philosophical debates on the application of Marxism.304 
To cap this discussion on the “destruction of the individual,” we need to look no 
further than Stalin’s Great Terror campaign of the late 1930s. Between 1936-1938 
hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were arrested or accused of crimes against the 
state.305 The accused were given political show trials and many were summarily executed 
or imprisoned.306 In 1937 and 1938 the NKVD, a so-called law enforcement agency, shot 
681,692 people for political and non-political crimes. Moreover, 1,575,259 were arrested 
by the NKVD; of which 87 percent were charged with political offenses against the state 
and the NKVD “achieved” an 85 percent conviction rate.307 Considering this widespread 
repression of society, it is not surprising that society would remain passive to the state’s 
wishes of total control. 
 
Decision Points 
A complete accounting of crimes committed by the Bolshevik/Soviet regime is 
too copious to analyze in great detail here. Frankly, the regime was far too successful in 
killing to account for all its atrocities. Tomes of books have been written on each episode 
and still more are needed. For the purpose of illustrating state-directed mass political 
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violence, let’s examine the 1932-1933 Ukraine famine that has been called on one hand a 
catastrophic natural disaster to a man-made famine-genocide. This section explores the 
Ukrainian tragedy and unpacks the decision points of Stalin’s regime to induce and 
sustain mass political violence against the Ukrainian people.  
The decision by perpetrators to enact mass political violence can take several 
forms. First, perpetrators may view the perceived threat from a group or population to be 
substantial but not imminent. Therefore, the way they enact violence on this group could 
be as a result of “slow-burn” tactics. A drawn out assault on the group’s culture, property, 
finances, civil and political rights, and ultimately their lives. The second type of decision 
to execute violence could stem from a triggering event. There could be some exogenous 
or endogenous shock to the state. Perhaps an assassination that traumatizes the nation, an 
explosion or fire-bombing of government offices, or even severe economic collapse. 
Whatever the proximate cause, the decision here would be to at upon this course with 
swift vengeance in the form of mass political violence. In the case of Ukraine, the 1932-
33 famine permanently ended talks of revolution or independence.308 The famine was 
only part of the story. As Lenin once said, “How can you make a revolution without 
firing squads?”309 There is a clear distinction between the way Lenin and Stalin viewed 
the use of mass political violence. Lenin’s acts “might have been partially justified as the 
desperate acts of a desperate ruler to curb political chaos… [While] Stalin…was 
deliberate, calculated, [and a] cold-blooded effort at complete control that was not 
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provoked by events.”310 In the case of Ukraine, Stalin’s reaction to a decade’s long effort 
at revolution and independence seemed to instill in him deep anger and it manifested 
itself in harsh, dispossessive policies that inevitably killed millions. 
Three questions will guide my discussion of the Great Famine. First, why did 
people starve? Was this tragedy avoidable? And, third, if the answer to the last is yes, 
why wasn’t the famine avoided? Let’s begin with a brief overview. By early 1932 there 
was ample evidence – both in public accounts and from secret, internal police reports – 
that the people of Ukraine were beginning to starve.311 Anne Applebaum writes that “in 
March [1932] a medical commission found corpses lying on the street in a village near 
Odessa. No one was strong enough to bury them” because of their malnutrition.312 
Counting civilian casualties is an incredibly difficult task. One that is exacerbated when 
the regime in control of the territory actively hides and classifies the true death tolls. As a 
result, there are many estimates of the victims that commonly range between 3.2 and 10 
million people who died in Ukraine between 1932-1933 from starvation and politically 
motivated murders.313 Unlike the previous famine of 1921-1922, the Soviet Union denied 
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the famine was occurring and that any assistance was needed for the people of Europe’s 
bread basket.314 The government made show efforts at transporting foreign dignitaries 
like French senator Edouard Herriot throughout the country to show them “model 
children’s garden” so that they could deny any reports of widespread famine.315 
Notwithstanding the French blindness to Ukraine’s reality, both German and Italian 
officials made reports on the growing catastrophe.316 
Why did people starve? The famine is only part to blame. Soviet authorities 
ordered grain and food supplies to be guarded and housed in central locations to avoid 
illegal seizure by locals. In 1932, peasants and farmers began to siphon off parts of the 
harvest during night time in hope of feeding themselves and their families. Then, “to 
collect the grain… central authorities had to send out new shock troops, recruited in the 
towns from among [local] Communists and Komsomols.”317 Arrests, searches, and 
seizures took the nation by storm. Many Ukrainians were charged with stealing from the 
harvest and could be sentenced to 10 years in prison or execution.318 Between August 
1932 and December 1933, greater than 125,000 people were convicted under this crime 
and 5,400 sentenced to death.319 There was concern over the severity of this growing 
                                                 
Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), p. 3. 
 
314 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 159. 
 
315 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 159. 
 
316 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 160. 
 
317 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 161. 
 
318 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 162. 
 
319 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 162.  
142 
 
national crisis expressed from within the party. In April 1933, famous Soviet novelist 
Mikhail Sholokhov wrote two letters to Stalin regarding the barbarous actions of Soviet 
troops forcing peasants and workers to hand over their remaining food stores to the 
party.320 In response, Stalin wrote,  
“To avoid being mistaken in politics – and your letters, in this instance, are not 
literature, they are pure politics – one must see another aspect of reality too…the workers 
in your district…went on strike, carried out acts of sabotage, and were prepared to leave 
workers from the Red Army without bread!... these people deliberately tried to 
undermine the Soviet state. It is a fight to the death, Comrade Sholokhov!”321 
What Stalin omits is that these workers and peasants were simply trying to feed 
themselves and not bring harm to the Soviet state. Was this calamity avoidable? Further 
bringing the state back into this famine-genocide, it is during this period that Stalin 
implemented the internal passport system to keep – in part – starving Ukrainians in these 
food deserts. Here, if Stalin would have not implemented the passport system, allowed 
Ukrainians to leave, or even more simply provided them with their own food that they 
grew, the famine could have been minimized and millions of deaths averted. It is clear 
through Stalin’s actions that the Ukrainian 1932-1933 famine was if not brought about by 
his disastrous collectivization policies previously, certainly the effects and sustained 
weaponization of food resulted in unimaginable levels of death and mass political 
violence. E.A. Rees and J. Arch Getty argue that much of the violence during this period 
(and in later years) can be attributed to disputes between the central Soviet authority and 
                                                 
320 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 165. 
 
321 Courtois et al., Black Book, p. 166-167.  
143 
 
individual localities.322 This revelation has become increasingly self-evident in recent 
years as more documents are released that shed light on “man’s” role in this famine-
genocide.323  
 
The Victims 
At the very least, a few words must be expressly written on the many victims of 
the Soviet Union. There are unfortunately far too many to accurately count or recite in 
this venue. The vast majority of people killed between 1917 and 1991 were done so in the 
first few decades of Soviet rule.324 Similar to counting civilian casualties in the Ukrainian 
famine, cataloguing accurate deaths tolls across eight decades is an even more difficult 
task. According to R.J. Rummel, up to about 62 million people were killed between the 
Russian civil war, new economic policies of the 1920s, collectivization efforts, the Great 
Terror, and throughout the end of Gorbachev’s tenure.325 Some have criticized Rummel’s 
figures as inflationary; though he admits it’s better to overestimate than neglect to include 
possible victims in an analysis of democide. Nevertheless, using Rummel’s estimate of 
62 million victims, two-thirds of them perished in concentration camps and political 
prisons.326 Victims here included domestic political opponents throughout the eight 
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decades of Soviet rule and includes prisoners of war from Poland and Germany during 
World War II.327 These figures include class enemies like Bourgeoisie specialists and 
ethnic groups like the Cossacks and Kulaks and national groups like in the Ukrainian 
famine. Some victims were summarily executed on the spot, other given show trails and 
thereafter executed, and the unfortunate others carted off to concentration camps in 
Siberia, or fell victim to rape and plundering. To stress, the extent executions were 
commonplace, between 1937-1938, three-fourths of a million people were executed 
without a trail or some form of legal adjudication because they were labelled as 
“counterrevolutionaries.”328 
When these dictators and their henchmen could not plausibly deny the mass 
political violence episodes, they invented stories to justify the violence or gloss over its 
excessive nature.329 First came the justifications “when you cut down a forest, the 
shavings get blown away” or “you can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.”330 
Next came the cover ups. The concentration camps were referred to as the “re-education 
system,” the dictators, autocrats, tyrants, and perpetrators were the “educators,” and 
prisoners were forcibly “invited” to participate in the re-education system.331 In one of 
the greatest attempts at covering up or explaining away crimes of the state, Khrushchev 
announced after Stalin’s death that these atrocities were the result of Stalin and Stalin 
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alone; not crimes of Communism or the state writ large.332 However we know from the 
historical record that this is simply false. Notwithstanding perpetrator’s individual 
exuberances in killing but by observing that violence did not begin or end with Stalin. 
 
Cambodia 
“All we need to build our country is a million good revolutionaries No more than that. 
And we would rather kill ten friends than allow one enemy to live [Quoting a Khmer 
Rouge spokesperson].”  
– Pin Yathay333 
 
Existing Polity Structures  
With the exception of Laos, Cambodia was “more isolated and landlocked than 
any other Southeast Asian country.”334 Cambodia is a small country, about the size of 
South Dakota. Her “geography, we are taught, resembles a bowl, with a vast central plain 
surrounded by a series of mountains.”335 The small Southeast Asian nation resides in a 
tropical climate, regularly experiencing heavy rains, thunderstorms, and flooding 
throughout.336 Ben Kiernan, one of several definitive voices on the nation wrote, 
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“Compared to neighboring Thailand and Vietnam, it was geographically compact, 
demographically dispersed, linguistically unified, ethnically homogenous, socially 
undifferentiated, culturally uniform, administratively unitary, politically undeveloped, 
economically undiversified, and educationally deprived.”337 Pre-revolutionary Cambodia 
was 80 percent Buddhist, 80 percent peasant, and 80 percent Khmer.338 Village life was 
decentralized and quite individualistic. The nuclear family composed the “social core” of 
society.339 Despite being majority peasant, there were two Cambodias. One, the 
dominant, consisted of rural village life and the second for those in urban centers (small 
towns and cities).340 With four-fifths of the population residing in rural lands, the 
plantation came to be the most significant player in pre-industrial Cambodian 
economy.341 The Khmer work force was characterized as having low productivity. As 
such, the French during colonial rule, imported a lot of Vietnamese to support plantation 
work.342 This influx of Vietnamese workers would eventually be one cleavage in 
revolutionary Cambodia. 
Between 1954 and 1970, Cambodia underwent a rapid change – particularly in 
education.343 In 1953 there were eight high schools, by 1967 there were 200, eleven 
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universities with a combined student population of about 11,000, and over one million 
educated youth across the nation.344 Moreover, nearly all Khmer were able to achieve 
basis literacy. Nevertheless, disparities remained in the population – particularly the 
peasantry. There were two peasantries: the majority were poor, indebted small 
landowners and a minority of the peasantry were landless.345 Politically, the 1950s and 
1960s were a period of “moderate pluralism.”346 This moderation was principally led by 
former King Norodom Sihanouk who renounced the throne on March 2, 1955, so that he 
could actually engage in politics.347 He formed the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (or Sangkum) 
party which subsequently captured 83 percent of the vote and all 91 seats in the 
assembly.348 Despite this seemingly political cohesion at the national level under 
Sangkum, many cleavages and growing tensions were masked at the local level.349 Craig 
Etcheson writes, “Beneath the artificial unity of the Sangkun political movement, 
competing interests simmered and struggled for representation. Untended cleavages 
depended between ethnic Khmer majority and the various ethnic minorities, between the 
urban and rural economies and among the urban elite.”350 
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Saloth Sar, also known as “Pol Pot,” “Pol,” “87,” and “Brother Number 1,” 
sought a radical transformation in Cambodia and “attempt[ed] to implement total 
communism in one fell swoop, without the long transitional period that seemed to be one 
of the tenets of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.351 The name Khmer Rouge was always 
rejected by Pol Pot and his followers. Sihanouk was the first to use this term to describe 
the communist guerrilla movement in the late 1960s. In Cambodia the term “Polpotists” 
is more common, but as Jean-Louis Margolin notes, this term allowed other high ranking 
leaders such as Ieng Sary and Khiev Samphan to distance themselves from the 
“personalistic” regime of Pol Pot.352 In reality, they went along with or even orchestrated 
much of these heinous crimes Cambodia’s transformation into Democratic Kampuchea – 
the official name of Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia – began more than two decades 
before the civil war of 1970.353 Japan lost control of Cambodia at the end of World War 
II. Following Japan’s defeat and subsequent surrender of all colonial territories, France 
began to reassert their claim over the region. By 1954, an independence movement 
overthrew the French and saw the emergence of a viable communist party.354 
Like the Soviet Union, Cambodia’s internal conflict was influenced by external 
war. By March 1970, the Vietnam War had completely engrossed the country. Pol Pot’s 
success in capturing control of Cambodia, would not have occurred without “US 
economic and military destabilization…which began in 1966 after the American 
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escalation in next-door Vietnam and peaked in 1969-73, with the carpet bombing of 
Cambodia’s countryside by American B-52s. This was probably the single most 
important factor in Pol Pot’s rise.”355 The US dropped about 161,000 tons of bombs on 
the Cambodian countryside, targeting Vietnamese communist forces.356 It is unknown 
exactly how many civilians died as a result of these bombing missions Kiernan estimates 
up to 150,000 civilian deaths from US bombing campaigns from 1969-73.357 What is 
certain, the Khmer Rouge used the bombings and subsequent civilian massacres as a 
recruitment tool. After one such attack in Kompong Cham province, a survivor said, 
“some people ran away…others joined the revolution.”358  
The Khmer Rouge engaged in guerrilla combat against the Cambodian 
government from 1970-75. Etcheson breaks the civil war period down into seven parts: 
the initial collapse of government (March-June 1970), retrenchment, counterattack, and 
parry (July 1970 to August 1971), a period of tactical blunders (August-December 1971), 
attrition (December 1971 to December 1972), attack and repulse (January-August 1973), 
the rise of siege warfare against urban areas (August 1973 to December 1974), and 
finally the victory by Khmer Rouge (January-April 1975).359 By 1972, the Khmer Rouge 
had encircled many urban areas, eventually cutting them off from their supply chains. In 
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1973, the Khmer Rouge broke with neighboring communist Vietnam.360 On April 17, 
1975, the civil war ended, Pol Pot and his loyal companions captured Phnom Penh, the 
capital, thereby closing one chapter and beginning another. The speed by which the 
Khmer Rouge moved to implement their radical transformation is perhaps unmatched by 
any other regime in modern history. Within seven days, money was abolished, mass 
deportations of all urban areas were well underway, and within two years “total 
collectivization was achieved.”361  
Pol Pot’s revolution took two parts. First, he moved to overthrow the existing 
political order. Then, he moved to re-make society by his own vision, that being, a 
communist utopia. To achieve this new Democratic Kampuchea, he first had to eliminate 
the existing political and social orders, so that he could reconstruct them by his own 
vision.362 One significant departure in Cambodian communism from that of the Soviet 
Union, was that Pol Pot and the new regime deeply valued their privacy. One Khmer 
Rouge mantra was, “if you preserve secrecy, half the battle is already won.”363 It took Pol 
Pot and his followers about one year to set up the government and all of which was done 
in secret from public view. 
The regime power accumulated by Pol Pot’s Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK) is nearly unprecedented in modern history.364 Brother Number One was named 
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Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea and chairman of the military commission.365 
The principal standing committee was composed of nine members and supported by 11 
or 12 candidate members.366 This committee was often referred to as the “high 
organization,” or “the center,” which was the senior decision-making body in Democratic 
Kampuchea. Contrary to the Soviet Union, we still decades later know very little about 
the leaders of the Khmer Rouge because they rarely spoke publically or published 
materials themselves.367 However, we do know that CPK leaders sought a radical 
transformation of society and in so doing relied heavily upon mass political violence and 
terror.368 
It’s clear that the CPK possessed enormous state capacity – as described – to 
order and complete an evacuation of all urban areas within one week of taking Phnom 
Penh. As early as 1970, CPK officials had begun constructing a “six-tiered framework of 
political organization” that connected the party to every resident in newly occupied 
territories during and after the civil war.369 As the CPK advanced, this political 
framework became one crucial element in the party’s ability to manage the population 
across a wide swath of land. The Khmer Rouge tapped into Cambodian society’s already 
hierarchical social structure; even if they would eventually destroy it down the road. 
Democratic Kampuchea was segregated administratively into seven geographical zones. 
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Each zone was sub-divided into regions, each region was composed of several districts, 
and each district possessed sub-districts (which were village level principalities).370 The 
Southwest zone in Democratic Kampuchea became Pol Pot’s power based in 1976.371 
Though Polpotism has strong roots here dating back to 1971, Pol Pot’s CPK possessed a 
relative high degree of state capacity – that being his party’s ability to “exercise [control] 
over persons, activities, and resources” – most clearly demonstrated in his ordering of 
mass deportations after April 17, 1975. 
Finally, Cambodian society possessed little appetite for participating in 
widespread mass political violence. Ravaged by five years of civil war and near constant 
harassment bombing by US B-52s in the countryside, Cambodians by enlarge wanted to 
remain out of these conflicts. In digging deeper, we need to assess the two Cambodias: 
urban elites and the rural peasantry. For Sihanouk, or his predecessors, obtaining support 
of the urban elite was necessary to maintaining rule.372 Similarly, “without at least the 
tacit ambivalence, if not the support, of the rural masses it is an unimaginable task to 
govern the nation.”373 As Kiernan and Malcolm Caldwell note, a small group of 
individuals is not sufficient to make a revolution successful.374 The peasantry became 
discontent and highly motivated by the protracted conflict. This widespread discontent 
allowed the CPK to top into these reservoirs of hate and recruit from the masses during 
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their campaign to retake the state.375 However, Valentino notes, revolution and the 
implementation of mass murder are two very different tasks. The latter does not require 
widespread support of the masses as a necessary condition. In the case of Cambodia, this 
was certainly true. 
 
Cycle of Violence 
 In Politics, Aristotle advocates for moderation to ensure political stability. When 
the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, moderation was not part of their 
strategy.376 Cambodia’s history of political diversity and ethnic heterogeneity – in 
modern times – posed a problem for CPK leaders; thus, they saw enemies in every 
segment of society.377 When the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh, their level of brutality 
came as a surprise to most observers.378 Dissent was not tolerated. Resistance was viewed 
as a threat, not only to the regime’s ideational goals, but to its stability and legitimacy. 
Thus, all resistance – active and passive in many instances – was to be squashed. The 
Khmer Rouge quickly moved to suppress all civil, political, and economic freedoms.379 
Broadly analyzed, the Khmer Rouge used two methods in subduing and murdering 
individuals from primarily four categories. Most Cambodians either directly murdered or 
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those that died from state policies, did so from mass deportations or in political purges. 
There are four broad categories of persons the CPK targeted: ethnic groups, political 
opponents, urbanities, and intellectuals. Cambodians who did not accept the Khmer 
Rouge’s leadership were often called “traitors” or “Khmer bodies with Vietnamese 
minds.”380 Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were specifically targeted and Cambodians 
who rejected the CPK were often linked to this group as well. The second group targeted 
by the Khmer Rouge was any person directly opposed to the implementation of this 
radical form of Communism. This includes civilians and members of the party who 
would be purged. The third categories are residents of Cambodia’s urban areas. The death 
rates for urbanities forced to flee towns and cities was considerably higher than those 
who already resided in rural lands. Finally, the regime murdered anyone who possessed 
individualistic qualities, like intellectuals, including doctors and professors. These victim 
categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they definitive. These are simply the 
broadest categories of which Khmer Rouge victims can be described. 
April 17 marks the official date Cambodian society was fundamentally 
transformed. All social, economic, religious, cultural, and political relations underwent a 
radical transformation. In the immediate days after April 17th, all cities were evacuated, 
hospitals were cleared of their patrons, schools sealed, factories closed, money abolished, 
religious monasteries shuttered and the library system abandoned.381 As Jean-Louis 
Margolin writes, “As with the other mass crimes of the century there is a temptation to 
seek an ultimate explanation in the madness of one man or in the dazed enthrallment of 
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an entire people.”382 The violence enacted for and by the Khmer Rouge in Democratic 
Kampuchea to some extent strains credulity. Many have debated whether this episode of 
state-driven mass death constitutes “genocide” (c.f., Midlarsky 2005; Cook 2009).383 It is 
precisely because of the complexity in Khmer Rouge tactics – direct and indirect means 
of murder – that I developed the term mass political violence. While mass deportations 
and political purges occurred simultaneously, their peak effects occurred in different 
years. Deportations took immediate effect, in terms of execution and their impact on 
civilian deaths. Having won the civil war and captured Phnom Penh on April 17, the 
Khmer Rouge claimed evacuations of all cities were a temporary safety precaution to 
ensure Cambodian lives were spared from possible American bombing campaigns.384 
Initially, city residents accepted this explanation and largely left of their own volition. 
They were further enticed by the promise that they would find better sustenance in rural 
lands.385 However, out of the approximate 2-3 million city dwellers who relocated to 
rural provinces, about 10,000 died – mostly hospital patients, those who were executed 
by the Khmer Rouge and in some case entire families are reported to have committed 
suicide.386  
Although city residents freely abided government orders to evacuate they were 
prodded to maintain a steady progress. Some deportees attempted to stop during this long 
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march at monasteries but they were strictly warned against entering by regime soldiers, as 
these temples were supposed to remain closed. Loung Ung remembers, “Those who 
didn’t listen were shot inside.”387 Remarkably, within days, between 46 and 54 percent of 
Cambodia’s population were said to be on the move, relocating from all urban areas 
towards the periphery.388 Survival rates primarily depended on two factors. First, if 
deportees joined relatives in the countryside they often stood a better than average chance 
of survival.389 The second factor that correlates with an increased risk of death from 
starvation, over-working, malnutrition, or executions, is the number of times a person 
was relocated after their initial deportation.390 The higher this number, the more likely a 
Cambodian faced certain death. As one can imagine, a mass influx of urbanities to rural 
villages created dramatic tensions and turmoil. Local conflicts over resources, 
particularly food, and its consumption drove much of the conflicts in these areas.391 As a 
result, an apartheid system developed with rural villages and “New People”392 living in 
separate areas of the village and in principle could not talk to one another.393 There were 
several layers to the apartheid system. First, those who had previously lived in the 
Cambodian countryside were divided into four categories: poor peasants, landed 
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peasants, rich peasants, and former traders.394 In the New People, those who were poorly 
educated and not associated with the former bureaucracy were separated from civil 
servants and intellectuals. After successive rounds of purges, former civil servants and 
intellectuals were nearly eradicated and by 1978, the purges began to target women and 
children of these two categories.395 
As mentioned, the second relocation of New People was ordered within a few 
months on the Khmer Rouge taking power, but this time former city dwellers were not 
willing participants.396 Just in September 1975, several hundred thousand New People 
were deported from the eastern and southeastern regions and forced toward the northwest 
territories.397 Outside the hardship of traversing Cambodia’s harsh terrain, “work 
brigades” were established, which took all young people and parents with no young 
children far away from their designated villages for months on end. This arduous task led 
to many deaths. The Khmer Rouge had four intentions when they created these so-called 
work brigades. First, these work brigades helped separate village peasants and New 
People, thereby thwarting any possible collaboration between these factions in society. 
The atomization of society buttressed the regime and diluted individual Cambodian’s 
power. Second, these work brigades introduced New People to the harsh realities of 
peasant life in the countryside by “proletarianizing” them and dispossessing them of all 
their worldly possessions. The third motive of the CPK was to control the population and 
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the nation’s agricultural system. This order of mandatory participation in work brigades 
allowed the regime to achieve both goals in a single policy. Finally, these harsh work 
conditions rid the Khmer Rouge of “useless mouths” without the need to directly murder 
or purge unwanted persons from society.398 Taken together, this policy demonstrates the 
regime’s power and strategic foresight in eliminating rivals and any person that could 
cause a problem to the regime without direct bloodshed. Though the Khmer Rouge would 
not shy away from the latter either. 
The Khmer Rouge did allow for “voluntary” transfers to occur rather than forced 
deportations. By enlarge New People were allowed to “return to their native villages” 
where they believed working conditions and their overall quality of life would be 
better.399 In many cases many of these volunteers faced harsher conditions in these new 
areas than was advertised. In a perverse way, any person who came forward as a 
volunteer “…in effect denounced themselves” and found themselves in “a ploy to weed 
out people with individualistic tendencies… Anyone who fell into the trap showed that he 
had not yet got rid of his old-fashioned tendencies and needed to go through a more 
severe regime of retraining in a village where conditions were even worse.”400  
When states engage in mass political violence they become principal perpetrators 
when governments endorse, sanction, or command persons to enact violence, inevitably 
some individuals in society bandwagon and partake in local acts of violence too. This 
was the case in Cambodia. “The [very] utterances of Pol Pot motivated people to kill. But 
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individuals took advantage of the permissive atmosphere of terror to settle old scores and 
kill as a form of momentary sport.”401 Most of the victims during the CPK ruling period 
(1975-79) were from collectivization campaigns or political purges and not from these 
isolated opportunists’ killings. Pol Pot was convinced that collectivization of the 
country’s agricultural system and abandoning all individualistic tendencies would 
provide Cambodia with economic independence.402 The first efforts at collectivization 
began while the Khmer Rouge was still fighting for control. In 1973, this policy was 
implemented in regions controlled by the party.403  
At the beginning, it was relatively easy for the CPK to define who and what they 
opposed, rather than express any forward looking agenda. According to Pin Yathay, a 
survivor of Democratic Kampuchea, remembers the Khmer Rouge sought revenge.404 
They sought a national revenge in the form of revolution. They wanted revenge for rural 
Cambodia against urbanities. The regime had quickly stripped everything of these New 
People and leveled the playing field with that of the rural peasantry. Yathay also notes 
that revenge was personal. Pol Pot and the regime took advantage of the chaos they 
sowed to eliminate “professional and familial hierarchies” and promoted previously 
marginalized persons to positions of power (e.g., alcoholics were given positions of 
authority at the village level).405 Within one year, the CPK goal of ridding the population 
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of former military and governmental officials had been widely achieved and a new 
government had taken over in the capital.  
By the second year of CPK rule, the time came for political purges and pogroms. 
This strategy would last until the Khmer Rouge was ousted in 1979. When Khmer Rouge 
loyalists came across anyone or anything that threaten their “preeminence” or legitimacy 
it was immediately crushed.406 Wiped from society. The purge specifically targeted 
anyone who diverged from Pol Pot or expressed support for neighboring Vietnamese 
communists. It was clear, communism in Democratic Kampuchea was to be unique and 
exclusive, overriding all other geo-political ties. By September 1976, key members in the 
CPK hierarchy – such as Keo Meas, number six – were arrested and purged.407 The speed 
and breath of political purges increased because of a rising sense of mutual suspicion 
towards one another. This led to many false accusations and finger pointing that would 
lead to purges all across the country. In 1978, the disintegration of the economy from the 
governance more difficult. Coupled with initial Vietnamese incursions, Khmer Rouge 
officials continued their harsh policies and crackdown.  
Despite widespread mass political violence, the “really massive genocide took 
place in the eastern zone.”408 Many victims in this zone were accused of being 
Vietnamese sympathizers were often executed for being “Vietnamese in Khmer 
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bodies.”409 This perceived threat was heightened because of neighboring Vietnam. 
Clashes with Vietnam begun in 1977 and by January 1979, the two countries were in a 
full-fledged war. From May and December 1978 the regime murdered between 100,000 
and 250,000 people.410 To reiterate, the impact of CPK deportations –in tens of thousands 
of Cambodians were sent on trucks, trains, and boasts from the east to other regions of 
the country.411 Many of these deportees died in transit and those who survived were 
forced to wear blue clothes – as opposed to everyone else under Pol Pot who were to 
wear black.412 These deportees were systematically targeted and massacred. “In one 
cooperative in the northwest, when the Vietnamese army finally arrived, only about 100 
easterns of the original 3,000 remained.”413  
During the final year of CPK rule, the regime carried out many last minute 
atrocities – including at the infamous Tuol Sleng, also known as S-21 prison. Throughout 
CPK rule prisons were called “reeducation centers” and increasingly became difficult to 
distinguish between “detention centers,” which were for hardened criminals, and these 
now torture centers.414 It seems it was decided early on that prisoners were to be executed 
or suffered a slow-death from disease, malnutrition, and starvation. Similar to the Soviet 
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Union and China prisoners were often invited to attend “study sessions.”415 The Khmer 
Rouge’s complex prison system was carefully hidden from public view. Haing Ngor 
writes:  
The reality of the prison system was carefully hidden – and this was a mystery 
that made it more frightening still – some deportees had a reasonable idea of how the 
system worked, “Perhaps, I thought, there were two parallel systems of punishment: first, 
a prison system that was part of a bureaucracy that needed to be fed to justify its 
existence; and second, an informal system that gave the leader of the cooperative freedom 
to hand out punishments, although the effect of each on the prisoner was ultimately the 
same.416 Because of the CPK’s desire to keep the prison system secret, all executions 
sentences were carried out after night fall.417 
At Tuol Sleng, the CPK’s chief interrogation center, saw about 14,000 men, 
women, and children come through its doors.418 Almost all of them were tortured and 
executed.419 S-21 may be the most notorious “security prison,” but there were about 150 
others constructed and used during CPK governance.420 The level of violence propagated 
by Khmer Rouge perpetrators in staggering. Despite its intensity, the regime preferred 
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disappearing victims rather than murdering them in the public square. In this case, the 
terrifying absence of direct violence was itself traumatic to many Cambodians. 
 
Decision Points 
François Ponchaud aptly writes, “Nothing in Democratic Kampuchea seems to 
happen by chance; on the contrary, everything appears to be planned in advance and 
executed methodically and with relentless consistency.”421 It is clear the decision points 
for mass political violence in Democratic Kampuchea were strategic and instrumental 
calculations to achieve radical transformation of society in preserving the regime’s 
dominance. Just over a month into power, Pol Pot declared eight objectives of the regime:  
1. Evacuate people from all towns. 
2. Abolish all markets. 
3. Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency 
that had been printed. 
4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice 
5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders 
6. Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country with communal 
meals. 
7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population. 
8. Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.422 
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It’s clear all ruthless actions of the CPK from 1975 to 1979 were an effort to 
achieve these eight points Pol Pot laid out in May 1975. This meeting of senior military 
and political leaders in the newly established regime is perhaps the closest we have to a 
smoking gun. 
Pol Pot could not have been more different – in terms of his psyche – than Stalin. 
Pol Pot never sought to develop a cult of personality. In fact, he valued his secrecy above 
all else. According to Margolin “…it was only after January 1979 that many Cambodians 
finally learned who their prime minister had been over the preceding years.”423 This lack 
in a cult of personality did not prevent him from seeing “enemies everywhere within our 
ranks, in the center, at headquarters, in the zones, and out in the villages.”424 By October 
1975 Pol Pot had decided to consolidate power by eliminating five of the top 13 CPK 
officials along with many regional secretaries.425 As was the case in later years, this 
initial purge reached all the way down to the grass-roots level with one district seeing 
about 57 percent of its population killed as “traitors.”426 But, in terms of total deaths 
stemming from regime policies, the true depravity of the Khmer Rouge “owes its origins 
in part to the contradiction between the huge ambitions of its leaders as the tremendous 
obstacles they faced.”427 The decision to radically transform Cambodian society, 
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seemingly overnight, is the greatest factor that resulted in the slow death of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent Cambodians. 
Finally, who were the perpetrators of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge? According to 
many survivors, the overwhelming majority of soldiers were extremely young.428 Khmer 
Rouge systematically employed child soldiers that were twelve years old or younger in 
many aspects of its reign. This led some to call the regime a “dictatorship of infants.”429 
Broadly speaking, the research on the moral development of child soldiers is mixed. 
Bruce Auster and his co-authors write, “War deforms their [children’s] sense of right and 
wrong, turning twelve-year-olds into cold-blooded killers.”430 While Elbedour et al. 
(1997) find participation in violence and armed conflict disproportionately affects boys 
compared to girls.431 On the other hand, Jo Boyden argues that we need to consider “the 
possibility that images of young former combatants as moral outlaws on the margins of 
society may be based more in the moral panics of adults than in lived realities.”432 
Irrespective of this academic debate on the moral development of child soldiers, it is clear 
the Khmer Rouge employed these adolescents as soldiers and guards and in many cases 
they partook in the execution of violence with little resistance.  
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The Victims 
There is great debate in legal, political, and academic circles on the total number 
of people killed in Democratic Kampuchea. If we were to take Pol Pot and senior Khmer 
Rouge officials at their word – and we should not – they claim minimal casualties. In a 
rare interview in December 1979, Pol Pot claimed that “only a few thousand Cambodians 
have died as a result of the application of our policy of bringing abundance to the 
people.”433 Khiev Samphan, the head of state for Democratic Kampuchea, declared in 
1987 that 3,000 people were killed “by mistake,” 11,000 were killed because they were 
“Vietnamese agents,” and 30,000 Cambodians were put to death by “Vietnamese agents 
who had infiltrated the country.”434 Samphan went on to say when Vietnam invaded their 
soldiers killed about 1.5 million Cambodians in 1979-80; perhaps an inadvertent 
admission of internal CPK estimates of death tolls. Lon Nol, who led Cambodia until the 
Khmer Rouge overthrew him in 1975, estimated about 2.5 million perished under 
Democratic Kampuchea Finally, Pen Sovan, a former secretary general of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, which came to power to 1979 has cited Vietnamese 
propaganda that 3.1 million were killed.435 Academic and policy circles are also divided 
over the death tolls. David Chandler estimates there were 800,000 to 1 million victims.436 
To the contrary, Michael Vickery, an American historian, puts the figure around 
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750,000.437 Both Ben Kiernan and Usha Welaratna independently found that about 1.5 
million people died.438 Welaratna further calculates that 80 percent of those who perished 
were men between 20 and 50 years old.439 Marek Sliwinski reached 2 million dead or 26 
percent of the population.440 Finally, a secret CIA study calculated that between 1970 and 
1979, about 3.8 million people died from malnutrition or disease and from direct 
violence.441 All told, we may never truly know the extent of Khmer Rouge’s 
devastatingly brutal reign.  
When we unpack these national figures there is considerable variation and 
nuance. As can be expected, the death toll was terribly high among city dwellers who had 
been deported from Phnom Penh and other urban areas to the periphery. These residents 
were ill-prepared, ill-advised, and dramatically unqualified for surviving years on end in 
Cambodia’s harsh rural landscape. There were disparities in religious groups. Though 80 
percent of Cambodians identified as Buddhist, the worst religious atrocities were 
experienced among Cambodia’s small Catholic population, where about half were killed 
under the Khmer Rouge.442 The CPK also viewed monks with great suspicion. You will 
recall, one of the CPK’s first orders in April 1975 was to forcibly close all monasteries 
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and kill any who entered their doors. Because monks had historically played an important 
role in Cambodian society, they were considered to be a direct threat to the regime’s 
power. Any monk who refused to “defrock [was] systematically eliminated. Nationwide, 
their number fell from approximately 60,000 to 1,000.”443 Those who were intellectuals, 
such as doctors, lawyers, or any educated elites were short listed for extermination.444 
Somaly Lun recalls, “Although all the senior members of the Khmer Rouge were 
educated abroad in France, anyone else with an education, including much-needed 
doctors [like her father], was seen as a dangerous class enemy that had to be 
eliminated.”445 Her father was sent to heal a senior CPK official and once his task was 
completed he was summarily executed for being part of this “dangerous” enemy class. 
Some intellectuals were apparently “allowed to survive if they renounced all pretense to 
expertise in any field and abandoned attributes such as books and spectacles.”446  
As a self-proclaimed Communist state, the peasantry was treated markedly better 
than other designated groups. They were provided with relatively better food and work 
assignments. There was a minuscule working class that lived in Phnom Penh and other 
urban areas. These Cambodians were “subjected to extremely harsh discipline. Gradually, 
poor peasants, who were considered more reliable than workers, replaced workers who 
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had been in Phnom Penh before 1975.”447 Naturally, Khmer soldiers were treated the 
best. Despite Democratic Kampuchea’s utopian goal of equality, Khmer soldiers were 
first to feast and first to satisfy. Some of the Khmer Rouge’s real ire was reserved for 
ethnic minorities, particularly the Vietnamese. After May 1975, about 150,000 
Vietnamese were forcibly deported and repatriated to Vietnam.448 This left only a fraction 
of the initial immigrant population behind, with most of these Vietnamese already being 
intermarried with Khmer families. With respect to Cambodia’s Cham Muslim minorities, 
they were largely invited to participate in CPK policies because of their reputation as 
exceptional fighters.449 The Cham were generally treated with dignity, though there were 
punished for being “overly involved in commerce… [and] Cham was now banned as a 
‘foreign language.’”450 How did these groups generally fair? The Chinese minority living 
in Democratic Kampuchea suffered about a 50 percent death rate.451 The Vietnamese 
experienced an even higher proportion of killing. More than four-fifths of former army 
officers were executed, about 51.5 percent of intellectuals, and about 42 percent of the 
residents of Phnom Penh were killed.452 
In Democratic Kampuchea, survival depended on two factors. First, for deportees, 
survival depended on where one was sent. “Being sent to a wooded or mountainous zone 
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or to a region where the main crop was jute was a sentence to almost certain death, since 
there was very little interregional communication, and supplies rarely arrived.”453 The 
Khmer Rouge mandated consistent agricultural food production quotas across all zones 
and regions, regardless of each zone’s ability to produce food and supplies. According to 
Yathay, “In the village of Don Ey, famine was widespread, there were no births at all, 
and as many as 80 percent of the inhabitants died.”454 The second factor was a person’s 
luck. Survival greatly depended on “adopt[ing] a completely new set of rules.”455 
However, even an unwavering adoption of Khmer Rouge laws could not guarantee one 
would not be accused of spying for United States or Soviet espionage agencies (e.g., the 
CIA or KGB). All that was required for a person to be arrested, was for them to be 
accused of spying for these agencies three times.456 The purge was fueled by the 
perception that society was filled with enemies of the regime. Elizabeth Becker recounts, 
“According to Komphot, a banker who escaped the northern zone, ‘people were killed 
one by one – there were no mass killings. The first to go were a dozen New People, 
people who were suspected of having been soldiers, and so forth. During the first two 
years about a tenth of them were killed, one by one, together with their children. I don’t 
know how many died in all.”457 If you were fortunate enough to survive deportation from 
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Cambodia’s bountiful lands to its harsh periphery, your ultimate existence greatly 
depended on the level of suspicion you brought about yourself and your daily activities. 
Simply put, no one was safe from the state’s seemingly erratic ideological persecution.    
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CHAPTER V 
STATE-SOCIETY COALITIONS: THE HOLOCAUST AND RWANDA 
 
“The Moldovans… were the people who helped the Germans, they burned houses and 
people… The Moldovans were worse than the SS.”  
– Jewish Survivor458 
Introduction 
State-society coalitions have been the second of two primary perpetrators of mass 
political violence since the beginning of the 20th century. I distinguish this perpetrator 
model from that of state perpetrators – as discussed in the preceding chapter – by the 
substantial role organized social units play in the implementation of violence against a 
target population. Table 3.2 in Chapter three best summarizes key differences between all 
four categories of perpetrators. There are two central commonalities between state 
perpetrators and state-society coalitions. The first resides in the role of government 
agents as a leading perpetrators of violence. Under both categories, formal military units 
or institutionalized paramilitary forces (e.g., the Schutzstaffel or SS) are leading actors in 
the evolution of violence against a target population. The second commonality between 
these two categories is that both possess a substantial amount of resources to sustain 
killing over time. In both these instances, the full weight and resources of government are 
utilized in the implementation of violence. As such, this aspect, nearly ensures 
perpetrators retain a high degree of sustained killing capacity – absent exogenous 
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interventions. Despite these two commonalities, there remains one crucial difference. 
Under state-led mass political violence episodes, society in the form of organized social 
units (e.g., militias) is not a threat to the target population. The only societal form of 
violence that occurs is in vigilantism or bandwagoning onto government violence, so that 
individuals can settle local grievances. By enlarge society writ large is absent as an active 
participant. In state-society coalitions, societal actors are not only involved in the 
development and implementation of violence, but they are explicitly co-perpetrators 
alongside government forces – hence the name “state-society coalition.” State-society 
coalitions are the second major primary perpetrator in this model of mass political 
violence.  
State-society coalitions are just as common as state-led mass political violence 
episodes. In this chapter I examine the Nazi genocide against the Jews in Europe during 
World War II and the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda during 1994.459 Both of these 
episodes reflect key characteristics of the state-society coalition model. Despite the 
exceptionally violent nature of these two episodes, the 20th century is home to other 
examples, including the Armenian genocide of 1915-1918 in the Ottoman Empire as an 
example of where a state-society coalition sought a “total domestic genocide,” meaning, 
the destruction of all Armenians and other “foreign” groups within the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire.460 The Indonesian genocide between October 1965 and March 1966 is 
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another example of both substantial societal involvement in the political killings of 
victims and of vast state and military planning that internal top-secret government 
documents “describe…as an “Annihilation Operation” (Operasi Penumpasan).”461 
Ethiopia between 1976-1979 is yet another example, where the army and state security 
apparatus joined by civilian “defense” squads slaughtered 10,000 victims.462 Finally, 
from 2003 to 2005, the Sudanese military coordinated its campaign of terror and 
destruction with Arab militias, the Janjaweed, to expel, starve, and massacre tens of 
thousands of Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleit, and other non-Arab groups from Sudan’s western 
province Darfur. These are just some of the 20th century’s most devastating examples in 
state-society coalitions enacting mass political violence.  
Given the prevalence of state-society coalitions, why choose the Holocaust and 
the Rwandan genocide in lieu of Darfur or Indonesia? There are four reasons for this 
particular case selection. The first is, the Holocaust and Rwanda are universally 
recognized as two of the 20th century’s prototypical cases of genocide. In the immediate 
aftermath of both tragedies the international community uttered the phrase “Never 
Again.” Despite our collective inability to live up to this two-word phrase, the Holocaust 
and Rwandan genocide represent core case studies in Genocide Studies. My decision to 
write about Nazi extermination efforts of European Jews and Hutu hard-liners’ struggle 
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to annihilate all Tutsi in Rwanda is, in part, based on the severity of these cases and their 
profound influence on our discipline’s understanding of mass political violence. The 
second justification for using these two cases resides in their vastly different stages in 
development, yet similar experience in forming a state-society coalition for the purpose 
of obliterating a victim population. In many ways, Nazi Germany was a development 
marvel. Richard Evans cutely writes, “The German economy was the most powerful in 
Europe, German society the most highly developed. Capital enterprise had reached an 
unprecedented scale and degree of organization…”463 Rwanda on the other hand was in 
comparatively worse shape. Structural adjustment had bankrupted many state enterprises 
and contributed to the disruption in the administration of public service.464 The economy 
started to decline in 1986-87 when coffee prices fell from 14 billion to 5 billion Rwanda 
francs.465 Following the decline in revenue, Rwanda’s trade deficit soared and its debt 
began to stack up.466 Therefore, Rwanda’s economic experience prior to genocide could 
not have been more different than Nazi Germany’s. As such, this case comparison 
presents a hard test for my model of state-society coalition perpetrators.  
The third reason for this case selection stems from the fact that both episodes 
embody and highlight different aspects of the state-society coalition model. While each 
case’s perpetrators fit squarely within this category, the Holocaust epitomizes the role of 
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state perpetrators while Rwanda illustrates society’s role. This chapter and dissertation is 
not the end of my analysis but a first step. Future research will expand to include other 
case studies in mass political violence. This comparative analysis is just a start in this 
long endeavor.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. In the next section I 
describe the dynamic structural approach to state-society coalitions. Section three and 
four applies this approach to the Holocaust and Rwanda. In the final section I discuss 
preliminary conclusions of this perpetrator model.  
 
A Dynamic Structural Approach to State-Society Coalitions 
While state perpetrators of mass political violence can emerge at any time – 
irrespective of their probability of success – state-society coalitions require particular 
conditions for their emergence. Society, in the form of large organized social units (i.e., 
militias, sub-state factions, mobs, or gangs) must be ready, willing, and able to partake in 
many of the crimes committed during mass political violence episodes. The societal 
component of state-society coalitions can be either self-mobilized in the form of “civilian 
defense squads” or government instigated and sanctioned. The basic argument here, is 
that societal actors may muster from direct or indirect government actions. Once their 
units mature, they will become a pseudo-equal partner in the coalition to murder victim 
populations. The extent they are controlled by government agents greatly depends on 
their initial formation and its relation to the state security apparatus. Under these 
circumstances society is largely cooperative to government ideology (e.g., Nazism or 
Hutu Power) and many of its persons indoctrinated by dehumanization campaigns (e.g., 
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antisemitism, Aryanization of Europe, or the Hutu Ten Commandments). As will be 
shown, ideology and dehumanization programs is one aspect that makes state-society 
coalitions particularly dangerous for relatively small ethno-religious-national groups in 
society controlled by another larger socio-political group.  
The old adage, “a problem shared is a problem halved” rings true when state and 
societal perpetrators deem a minority group to pose a threat to their way of life, 
governing system, or mere existence threatens the very nature of the state. In these cases, 
when state-society coalitions form they are dispersing the pressures of mass political 
violence across an array of organizations, thus increasing their likelihood of success by 
sharing the burden of command. Figure 5.1 presents the model of mass political violence 
episodes for state-society coalitions.  
Figure 5.1: State-Society Coalition Perpetrators 
 
In state-led mass political violence episodes, only a society’s appetite for violence 
is low. Under state-society coalitions, all three antecedent variables in existing polity 
structure are rated as “high.” These episodes typically have strong charismatic leaders in 
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charge of a hierarchical regime that is able to wield personal political power both inside 
and outside the administrative state. Moreover, the state shares its monopoly over the use 
of force with approved, vetted organized social units. This dispersed authority to enact 
violence gives each co-perpetrator wing of the coalition a distributed lethality and sense 
of ownership over the speed by which violence is pursued. The level of state capacity in 
these episodes remain strong, as was the case with state perpetrators. The only substantial 
difference in these three variables is the shared responsibility over the monopoly of force 
within the state and the presence of a strong, cooperative segment in society that is 
inclined to partake in mass political violence against an opposing victim group.  
Once again the model (Figure 5.1) on the process of mass political violence 
begins with a question: does any ethno-religious-national groups pose a threat? The 
logical follow up to this question is, “threat to whom?” In the case of state perpetrators, it 
is easy to conclude any threats to the government or regime by a domestic group qualifies 
as sufficient for mobilizing perpetrators. In the instance of state-society coalitions, is the 
threat perceived by government agents or across society or both? I argue that the 
government’s perception of threat from domestic audiences is the driving factor. This 
does not mean that threats to the government necessarily exclude those to society. 
Government after all is composed of individuals from society with specific ideologies, 
prejudices, stereotypes, animosities, or biases. As will be shown in the following case 
studies, perceived threats by governments in each se are deemed to affect both the former 
and society writ large very existence. Once the state-society coalition reacts to a single or 
collection of threats from target group or groups, the cycle of violence begins, as shown 
in Figure 5.1. 
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Therefore, what types of threats – perceived or otherwise – could unite state 
organs and armed organized social units to band together against a target population? A 
full accounting of motivations – as discussed in greater detail in chapter three – is too 
ponderous of a tangential discussion for this section. That said, we can highlight several 
of the common culprits cited in the literature. At the macro level, there are two types of 
threats that require mentioning. The first type of unifying threat comes against the 
government, where a domestic group threatens the domestic power structure with 
possible overthrow of state institutions. This can be seen when a minority group attempts 
to gain access to the levers of power. The second macro threat can stem from widespread 
political upheavals.467 There are many forms of political upheaval, including: an abrupt 
change in political party politics or even in the redrawing of state boundaries.468 Both of 
these threats to the national government can spur the creation of a state-society coalition.  
At the meso and micro levels, there are four central motivations that can be 
determined as threatening to potential perpetrators. Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley 
delineate these four motives in their influential book, Why Not Kill Them All? “Of course 
the most basic condition for [mass political violence] is that one group has an 
overwhelming superiority in power.”469 Chirot and McCauley aptly note, such cases of 
one group possessing immense power over another is far more common in history then 
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are cases of mass political violence. Therefore, what motives reflect this frequency 
mismatch? According to Chirot and McCauley, the implementation of mass political 
violence is derived from: revenge, convenience, simple fear, and fear of pollution.470 
State-society coalitions may form as a result of these perpetrator motivations. 
Perpetrators may be incensed by the perceived “treachery” of a domestic group, and as 
such, seek “revenge” – either retaliatory or preemptively – in the embodiment of mass 
political violence. For convenience as a motive, perpetrators make a simple calculation. 
When all else fails, the simplest tactic in the minds of perpetrators throughout history has 
been to forcibly remove “the problem” group from perpetrator controlled lands. There are 
many episodes throughout history where perpetrators have turned to mass political 
violence as a convenient means of vanquishing an oppositional group: 
 Julius Caesar ordered many ethnic cleansings of Germanic tribes during his 
conquest of Gaul in 1st century B.C.E.471  
 William the Conqueror’s “cleansing” of Yorkshire in 11th century England.472 
 Cherokee removal by U.S. Government agents because the Cherokee and other 
Indian populations “were inferior human beings who needed to be removed [from 
lands recently discovered to have gold deposits] for their own protection” in 19th 
century America.473 
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 Tsarist Russia in the late 19th century waged war on Muslim Circassians because 
they could not be subdued due to their being “savages” and “bandits.”474  
 U.S., Britain, and Soviet bombing of German occupied cities during the Second 
World War. (The Anglo-American bombing campaign accounts for between 
300,000 and 600,000 German civilian fatalities. It is unknown how many died 
from the Soviet Red Army’s shelling and air strikes of cities.475) 
The third and fourth motives Chirot and McCauley denote deal with the emotion 
Fear is an opaque emotion. It can make emotionally strong people quiver with anxiety or 
drive the weak to act courageous in spite of insurmountable odds. Chirot and McCauley 
view fear as a motivator in two distinct ways. The first is “simple fear,” meaning, one 
group takes violent action toward another because they fear no action may result in their 
own annihilation this operationalization of simple fear mirrors our lay understanding. The 
second perspective is one’s “fear of pollution.” This understanding of fear comes from 
one group’s view that the very existence of another ethno-religious-national group 
threatens their very way of life. The Nazi view of Jews and Hutu hard-liners’ opinion of 
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182 
 
Tutsis are prime examples of this fear – particularly of one that could “pollute” the gene 
pool of another group.  
Taken together, it is difficult to say which – macro, meso, or micro level – 
motivation is “more deadly” than the next. What we can say is that some grievances like 
“fear of polluting” one’s group gene pool is nearly insurmountable than other motivations 
like convenience or simple fear. Simple fear of one group against another can be 
addressed in various forms of confidence building measures. But, fear of pollution from 
the group’s very existence, cannot be overcome. This motivation is greatly linked to 
propaganda and dehumanization campaigns employed against a victim population. 
Though any modern perpetrator of mass political violence can employ these two tactics, 
state-society coalitions are much more inclined to pursue these policies. This may be 
because of the substantial commitment on the part of regime and society to defame, 
dismiss, disparage, and ultimately erase a target population from the socio-political 
environment. John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond explore the origins of race-
based ideology and the dehumanization of indigenous groups in Darfur, Sudan. They 
empirically demonstrate that these pernicious campaigns operate in a dynamic and 
interactive way: macro-micro-macros processes that continuously reinforce and fuel 
intergroup enmity.476  
There has been and can be many tomes written on the use of German National 
Socialism and Hutu propaganda campaigns. That said, the following case studies will 
address these topics, but could not perform a comprehensive assessment of each 
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episode’s use of propaganda and dehumanization. Simply put there is too much to 
discuss. The following case studies explore the process of mass political violence from a 
national level. Additional research is needed to unpack these episodes at lower levels.  
As will become apparent by the end of this dissertation, every modern perpetrator 
ideal type – state actors, state-society coalitions, state-sponsored groups, and non-state 
actors – employ and rely on an ideology for unifying their principal perpetrators and 
accomplices in achieving their desired goals and objectives. That said, perhaps state-
society coalitions rely the most on an ideology to maintain cohesion of forces between 
state and societal perpetrators. It goes without saying, perpetrators in the Soviet Union 
and Cambodia relied on an all-encompassing ideology – which in both instances sought a 
radical transformation of the state. I will argue that in fact their use of Communist 
ideology appears to be the mold that kept perpetrators together. But, in most cases the 
regime’s power was just as important a factor as their ideology. In the Holocaust and 
Rwanda, ideology served as an essential ordering principal before, during, and 
presumably after the atrocities finished. Recalling Figures 4.1 and 5.1, for comparison 
ideological cohesion and dehumanization campaigns were employed by perpetrators for a 
significantly longer time during state-society coalitions than for state-led mass political 
violence. The chief reason being, that for society to be a willing partner in mass political 
violence, the use of ideology and dehumanizing the “other” group took time to imbed 
itself into the minds of the people. Therefore, the cycle of violence (see Figure 5.1) will 
take longer for state-society coalitions than state-led mass political violence episodes.  
What comes next is two case studies in state-society coalition episodes. Nazi 
Germany and 1994 Rwanda are two extreme examples of how deadly mass political 
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violence can be when state and organized social units collude for the purpose of 
reordering society but eliminating rival groups.  
  
The Holocaust 
“In order for a house to burn down, three things are required. The timber must be dry 
and combustible, there needs to be a spark that ignites it, and external conditions have to 
be favorable – not too damp, perhaps some wind…. Hitler’s Nazi regime in Germany 
provided the spark that set off the destruction we now call the Holocaust, and World War 
II (1939-1945) created a setting conducive to brutality.”  
– Doris L. Bergen, 2009477 
 
There are two conceptual distinctions I must make before delving into the details 
of Nazi genocidal atrocities. The first distinction is in terminology. Generally, the term 
“Holocaust” is applied to all Nazi genocidal acts in Europe between 1933 and 1945.478 
The historian Waitman Wade Beorn segregates Nazi and their collaborators actions into 
two categories. Beorn uses the term “Holocaust” to explicitly reference the systematic 
marginalization, persecution, and mass murder of European Jews.479 He then employs the 
phrase “Nazi genocidal project” to discuss all other mass atrocities against the Roma and 
                                                 
477
 Doris L. Bergen, War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust, Second Edition (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), p. 1.  
 
478 Saul S. Friedman, A History of the Holocaust (London and Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2004), p. 
x.  
 
479 Waitman Wade Beorn, “The crimes of the Wehrmacht and the Alt Right in American Reenacting,” 
(presentation, Florida International University, Miami, FL, February 16, 2017). 
 
185 
 
Sinti peoples, the mentally and physically handicapped, homosexuals, political 
opponents, prisoners of war, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.480 It is clear from the historical 
record that European Jews experienced explicit and the most severe horrors of any group 
described above. The breadth and depth of planning that went into their systematic 
extermination surpasses all other targeted groups. It is for this reason that I accept and 
follow Beorn’s conceptual distinction. That said, both categories are included in my 
conception of mass political violence. Therefore, when I use this term in the case study I 
am referencing both of Beorn’s concepts of extreme violence. Where analysis permits, I 
will employ his refined categories for clarity.  
The second distinction is the determination of the dates for describing the Nazi 
efforts to implement mass political violence. Many scholars and organization begin 
analysis of the Holocaust in January 1933, when the Nazi party came to power. Perhaps 
most notably by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. There is good reason to 
begin the analysis here. Principally because, soon after obtaining political power, the 
Nazis moved to end democratic rule in Germany.481 Moreover, within two months the 
first concentration camp opens at Dachau, Germany – it was used to house political 
opponents of the regime.482 There is a difference between concentration camps and 
killing centers. By 1945 there were only six killing centers, but these six were responsible 
                                                 
480 The Holocaust: A Historical Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1997), p. 
1.  
 
481 Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. Within two months Nazi s passed “The 
Enabling Act” which suspended “individual civil liberties and freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, 
giving Hitler absolute power.” See Eve Nussebaum Soumerai and Carol D. Schultz, Daily Life During the 
Holocaust (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. xvii.  
 
482 The Holocaust, p. 25. 
 
186 
 
for millions of murders.483 Though legal, political, and “safety” restrictions were placed 
upon the Jews in 1933, most of the killing began after the Nazi invasion of Poland in 
1939. This delay in mass murder has led to some scholars in Political Science to begin 
analysis here.484 Because I am concerned with state-society relations before, during, and 
after societies in the midst of mass political violence, I will discuss the entire time period 
between 1993 and 1945. I will note, that from 1933 to 1939 as a preparation for war 
phase and 1939 to 1945 as the implementation of war period for the purpose of 
clarification. Though this debate seems arcane, it is important to acknowledge the 
differences within Holocaust and Genocide Studies.  
 
Existing Polity Structure 
When the Nazi party came to power in 1933, Germany, had only been a “united 
nation-state” for little over 60 years. Beth Griech-Polelle writes, “for many historians, the 
lateness of German unification led to an identity crisis. What did it mean to be “a 
German,” who belonged in the Second Reich [Imperial Germany, January 1871]?”485 
Antisemtism played a powerful role in answering the question “who belonged and who 
did not” in a unified German nation-state. “Modern German anti-Semitism was the 
bastard child of Christian anti-Semitism with German nationalism.”486 Beginning in the 
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1920s and persisting for decades after Adolf Hitler’s death, rumors circulated about his 
so-called “Jewish blood” as one possible reason for Nazi enmity toward the Jews. This 
claim that Hitler possessed Jewish heritage is false.487 According to legend, because 
Hitler did not know his paternal grandfather, rumors circulated that he may have been of 
Jewish ancestry. Doris Bergen summarizes these falsehoods for us: 
Those allegations were unfounded, in fact there were no Jews in the town where 
Hitler’s grandmother lived, because Jews were prohibited from living in that part of 
Austria at the time. Nor are the rumors that Hitler was secretly homosexual or that he had 
only one testicle. (Both of those common allegations, to the best of anyone’s knowledge, 
are false as well). Such claims reflect a desire to find easy explanations for historical 
processes that in fact have many complicated causes.488 For mass political violence to 
occur on a scale such as the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal projects, Germans and 
their conquered peoples had to accept that certain members of their community as 
“enemies” that needed vanquishing so that the righteous German Third Reich could 
survive and thrive.489 
 The Nazi party and its subsequent regime was an incredibly strong, energetic, 
authoritative, force able to accomplish – in many instances – unthinkable deeds (both in 
their mobilization capabilities and in future atrocities). There are many direct and indirect 
preconditions that led to the rise of the Nazi party. Antisemitism, racism, xenophobia, a 
desire for strong nationalist pride after Germany’s defeat in the First World War can all 
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explaining, in part, the temptation and rise of National Socialism in the 1920s and 
1930s.490 One reason the Nazi party became a dictatorial force was due to Hitler’s 
preoccupation with total loyalty.491 One way Hitler achieved total loyalty was to award 
trusted subordinates with more power, and privileges than their compatriots.492 At the 
same time, if any individuals grew too powerful in the Nazi party, “he [Hitler] found 
ways to clip their wings, even if it meant temporarily weakening the Nazi party’s base of 
support.”493 This desire for unwavering commitment led to the “Führer principle,” 
derived from a German term “der Führer” that means “the leader.”494 The Führer 
principle meant all person must possess resolute commitment to Hitler’s incontestable 
leadership. After this principle had been implemented, Hitler need not issue specific 
orders to subordinates. According to Bergen, “In the words of one Nazi functionary: “It is 
the duty of every single person to attempt, in the spirit of the Führer, to work towards 
him.”495 As long as Hitler’s wishes were known, no specific orders were necessary. 
Subordinates would take it upon themselves to implement such wishes into public policy. 
This benign leadership style would have devastating outcomes during the Holocaust.  
Hitler’s centralization of power began in the Nazi party and quickly spread to all 
levers of the German state after 1933. Next to Hitler, Heinrich Himmler would become 
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the second most powerful man in Germany. Himmler was the head of the Schutzstaffel 
(SS) from 1929 to 1945; and by 1936 he was also the head of all German police 
organizations.496 Richard Breitman called Himmler the “architect of genocide.”497 The 
regime’s power was further bolstered by Reinhard Heydrich who was chief of the 
Gestapo, a secret German intelligence service.498 Himmler’s tens of thousands of SS 
commandos were instrumental in achieving mass political violence. The SS reported 
directly to the Nazi party and was a check on the official institutions of the German state. 
The loyalty of SS troops became so powerful that Hannah Arendt would later refer to this 
dichotomy as the “dual authority.”499 Hitler’s efforts to centralize power received an 
unexpected boost in 1934. In August, President Hindenburg, the same who had appointed 
Hitler to the position of chancellor, died.500 In light of this unexpected event, Hitler 
seized the opportunity and combined both offices – the presidency and chancellery – into 
one under his own leadership. Beyond ceremonial distinctions, there were tangible 
consequences to this power grab. “According to the German constitution, still officially 
in force, the president was the supreme commander of the German armed forces.”501 
Having combined both positions, Hitler subsequently mandated that all members of the 
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armed forces swear an oath of personal allegiance to him.502 All of these actions were 
buttressed by a 1933 law called “The Malicious Practices Act,” that “banned remarks that 
offended or subverted Nazi authority.”503 Fear of prosecution under this law led to what 
some called the “German glance,” a quick turn of the head to check for prying eyes 
before a conversation.504 This is yet another sign of the regime’s growing power.  
In recalling the hierarchy of perpetrators in chapter three (see Figure 3.1), we can 
observe a clear chain of command. Many, if not most of the perpetrators were true 
believers in Hitler and Nazism. This is supported by the fact that Germans were not 
forced to partake in mass political violence. “Those who refused to participate were given 
other assignments or transferred. To this day no one has ever found a single example of a 
German who was executed for refusing to take part in the killing of Jews or other 
civilians…”505 Momentarily setting aside the role antisemitism played in fueling 
perpetrators to kill, some perpetrators simply took it upon themselves – as part of the 
Führer principle – to seek new ways of enacting Hitler’s wishes. Adolf Eichmann is one 
such example where (perhaps) careerism played the deciding role in his motivations for 
enacting draconian policies against the Jews. Eichmann led the Central Office for Jewish 
Emigration in Vienna and later directed the Reich-wide Central Office.506 Eichmann was 
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an ambitious mid-level bureaucrat who took it upon himself in 1939 – with no formal 
authorization – to “facilitate” the mass deportation of Jews from Vienna to the General 
Government territory, even though no perpetrators had been made on the receiving end 
for how to handle these Jewish deportees.507 Eichmann’s 1939 project led to his 
advancement with the Nazi bureaucracy and thus provided other German officials with a 
template for promotion. In essence, German officials could not do wrong, insofar as they 
took their own initiatives against people that the Nazi regime deemed to be inferior.  
Turning to state capacity, it is self-evident to any reader of Holocaust literature 
that the Nazi government possessed an incredible amount of power to exercise control 
“over persons, activities, and resources within their government’s jurisdiction.” 
Eichmann’s ability to mobilize resources on his own for the purpose of the mass 
deportation of Jews in 1939 is one example of Nazi state capacity. The second is the 
Nazi’s ability to coerce Jews in German occupied territories to dwell in overpopulated 
ghettos. The Germans established at least 1,000 ghettos in Germany, Poland and other 
occupied Soviet territories alone.508 The ghettoization of Jews in 1939-1940 were deemed 
a temporary measure for handling the logistics and fate of European Jews.509  
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The third and most destructive example of German state capacity was the 
concentration camp system and its killing centers. These two versions of camps “were an 
integral component of Nazi Germany’s governing system and a tool for achieving its 
political aims.”510 The Nazis did not invent nor “pioneer” the concentration camps 
system.511 The first German concentration camps were built in German Southwest Africa 
(modern day Namibia) on December 11, 1904.512 Similar to Nazi actions during World 
War II, German colonial concentration camps were divided into two categories: those 
that were designed for the purpose to kill and camps where prisoners were forced to work 
in harsh, malnourished conditions that often led to death.513 The German colonial policy 
of Vernichtung, or annihilation against the Herero in Southwest Africa, provided the 
Nazis with mechanical (i.e., the concentration camp system) and public policy (i.e., 
Vernichtung) precedent in dealing with the Jews and other “inferior” groups.514 This is 
demonstrated by the Third Reich’s camps at Buchenwald and Dachau are loosely based 
on the Second Reich’s colonial work camps in Namibia.515 In total, between 1933 and 
1945 the Nazis and their collaborators set up more than 40,000 camps, prisons, and other 
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“incarceration sites.”516 This striking statistic alone, reflects the strength of Nazi regime 
power and state capacity.  
Another is, Operation Reinhard, the codename for the Nazi plan to exterminate all 
Jews in Poland – provides a snapshot of the regime’s ability to organize and mobilize 
mass numbers of people.517 Under Operation Reinhard over 2.2 million Jews who resided 
in hundreds of ghettos were rounded up and transported via the railway system to the 
death camps.518 Unlike Eichmann’s experiment of 1939, Operation Reinhard (1941-1943) 
required coordination between SS authorities and civilian staff at the destinations to 
prepare for sudden mass arrivals of the Jews.519 Despite the railway system being heavily 
burdened by military logistics at the time, SS authorities were able to coordinate train 
times, the massive number of freight cars required, and timetables for travel and their 
supplies in an orderly manner.520 All of which supports the regime’s strong state capacity.  
The sheer amount of German manpower is another strong indication of the Nazi 
regime’s power and state capacity. The SS (protective squads and the Nazis private army) 
were a quintessential part of Hitler’s ability to enforce edicts and achieve total control 
within the so-called thousand-year Reich. In the months and years after Hitler 
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consolidated power, the SA and Gestapo went door-to-door looking for Hitler’s 
opponents and rivals.521 These units were so successful in their mission that the SS and 
SA established temporary “camps” in warehouses, factories, and other abandoned 
buildings to house all of Hitler’s political enemies.522 Despite the overwhelming success 
of these organizations in enforcing Hitler’s will upon German society, the “best” example 
of German power lay ahead. After the invasion of Poland in 1939, and the Soviet Union 
in 1941, Hitler formed special units called Einsatzgruppen, or mobilize killing units.523 
There were four Einsatzgruppen, containing a total of 16 command nits with 
approximately 3,000 men.524 Wherever the Einsatzgruppen went, they carried out the 
systematic murder of Jewish civilians.525 Despite their relatively small size (i.e., 3,000 
personnel) the Einsatzgruppen murdered more than 1.5 million Jews before the death 
camps and their gas chambers opened.526 A catholic priest, Father Patrick Desbois, would 
subsequently call this the “holocaust of bullets.”527 
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As raised earlier, the crucial aspect that differs in state-society coalitions from 
mass political violence episodes that are solely state-led, is the role of organized social 
units in the preparation and evolution of violence against a victim population. Jared 
Diamond writes, “It is safe to assume that few people would willingly identify 
themselves as potential mass murderers or ethnic cleansers… [And we would like to 
believe that nice people don’t] “Commit genocide, only Nazis do.”528 Unfortunately, the 
Holocaust is one example where Nazis and German civilians worked together in 
exterminating targeted populations. The opportunities for civilian participation in 
violence greatly varied by War Theater, region, country, and locality. Diana Dumitru 
quotes a Jewish survivor as saying, “Ukrainians were extraordinary people… [They] 
helped me to survive in the camp,” while another Jewish survivor told Dumitru “The 
Moldovans were worse than the SS.”529 Civilian participation was vastly different across 
Europe. In some areas, such as Poland, the German forces (Einsatzgruppen, SS, 
Wehrmacht, and their allies) relied on Polish police units, railroad personnel redeployed 
as guard to temporary ghettos and ensured an uninterrupted process of deportations that 
took many Jews to the killing centers.530  
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Civilian participation – in the state-society coalition – varied as well. In some 
areas individual Poles identified, denounced, blackmailed or chased down Jews who were 
in hiding.531 Other collaborators, particularly those who lived in small towns in eastern 
Poland actively participated in pogroms and mass murder of their own Jewish neighbors. 
The pogrom in the town of Jedwabne in 1941 is a well-documented case. Steve Hendrix 
writes about this mass murder: 
In the summer of 1941, the small Eastern village of Jedwabne was occupied, as 
was all of Poland, by a contingent of German police. On a blistering July day, a group of 
Polish men from in and around the town began rounding up Jewish male residents. The 
Jews, led by the local rabbi were forced to pull down a statue of Lenin532 that was left 
over from the soviet occupation of the region. Then, with the Germans looking on, they 
were taken to a barn and clubbed and stabbed to death by their fellow townsmen… The 
carnage didn’t end there. The raids widened as the day wore on. More and more Jews of 
both sexes and all ages were packed in the barn. With a crowd of townspeople and 
German police looking on, the structure was set alight. The next morning a grisly pile of 
burned and asphyxiated corpses lay amid the smoldering ruins.533  
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The Jedwabne massacre shows how organized social units took it upon 
themselves in certain localities to prosecute Jews for their “crimes.” Their punishment 
was almost always death. These organized social units worked in conjunction with, 
sometimes in support of Nazi agents, and sometimes in parallel to them. Nonetheless 
these two halves of the state-society coalition continued to work toward a unifying goal – 
that being the total extermination of European Jewry. 
 
The “Ordinary Men” or “Willing Executioners” Debate 
At this point in discussing civilian participation in Nazi mass political violence, 
we reach a hotly contested and occasionally “harsh and bitter” debate over whether 
civilian participants were “ordinary men” or “willing executioners.”534 Up until this point 
I have used the term “civilian participation” in lieu of associating my research with one 
of these scholarly camps. It would be helpful to summarize key questions in this debate 
before I situate my research within the field.  
The first question is, why might otherwise “ordinary” human beings condone, 
engage, or participate in extraordinary, devious, or reprehensible behaviors as the 
Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities? I use the word ordinary in this instance to 
reference people who are not clinically defined as sadists. It is easy to blame the actions 
of all perpetrators as crimes only committed by persons who are psychologically 
predisposed to violence. It is much harder – as an individual reflecting on his/her own 
actions or as a society – to come to grips with the reality that most perpetrators of mass 
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political violence are “ordinary” in this psycho-social sense. Roy F. Baumeister writes, 
specifically within perpetrator groups that, “the sadists are typically a fairly small 
number, such as 5 or 6%.”535 This figure is based on a theoretical model of sadistic 
pleasure applied to perpetrator experiences. Christopher Browning’s seminal work 
Ordinary Men notes various accounts of perpetrators in German Reserve Police Battalion 
101 (men who partook in cold-blooded murder of Jews in Poland) that its men reported 
higher anxiety, “night mares,” “gastrointestinal distress,” and other negative reactions to 
killing were common at first. Thus these men (at least initially) were not sadists, they 
experienced various negative physical-psychological repercussions to their heinous 
actions. This distraction between sadists and ordinary people is crucial. Neither category 
excuses the actions of individuals, nor lessens their legal, moral, and human 
responsibility, but it sheds light into how willing people are to commit such atrocities.  
This distinction produces a second question, were perpetrators in Nazi Germany 
“ordinary men” or part of “Hitler’s willing executioners?” This question has spurred 
fierce debates within Political Science, History, and Holocaust Studies writ large. The 
two central belligerents in this controversy are Christopher Browning and Daniel 
Goldhagen. To understand Browning and Goldhagen’s arguments we must explore 
competing theories on the role of antisemitism in pre-war Germany. This debate has 
renewed interest in establishing antisemitism as either a “deep underlying cause of the 
evitable Nazi genocide of the Jews and as a specific motivating factor among the 
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perpetrators.”536 Bergen writes, “Hitler and the Nazis did not invent antisemitism – hatred 
of Jews – nor were they the first to attack Sinti and Roma (Gypsies) or people considered 
handicapped. Their hostilities toward Europeans of African descent, Slavic people, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals were not new either. The Nazis were extremists in 
the lengths to which they went in their assaults, but they were quite typical in whom they 
attacked.”537 Despite some scholar’s unwavering assertion that antisemitism played a 
critical role in Nazi policies (see Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against Jews, 1933-1945), 
it was commonplace until the 1970s to interpret antisemitism as “merely a consequence 
of more profound socio-cultural and political developments” like fascism and 
totalitarianism.538 Following these two schools of thought, scholars emphasized structural 
factors like economic hardship, Hitler’s personality and charisma, popular support for a 
project of “national salvation” after Germany’s defeat in World War I, the role of 
bureaucracy in the evolution of violence, and rationalization of perpetrator motives.539  
It wasn’t until Goldhagen’s critically acclaimed book Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners that antisemtism was placed as a “monocausal explanation of the 
Holocaust.”540 The scholarly debate over Goldhagen’s thesis has garnered extraordinary 
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attention in recent years that there is no point in summarizing his argument at length here. 
Goldhagen persuasively argues with great detail that modern German antisemitism was 
the fundamental cause of the Holocaust. According to Goldhagen: 
That their [perpetrators] approval derived in the main from their own conception 
of Jews is all but certain, for no other source of motivation can plausibly account for their 
actions. This means that had they not been antisemites, and antisemites of a particular 
kind, then they would not have taken part in the extermination, and Hitler’s campaign 
against the Jews would have unfolded substantially differently from how it did. The 
perpetrators’ antisemitism, and hence their motivation to kill, was, furthermore, not 
derived from some other non-ideational source. It was not an intervening variable, but an 
independent one. It is not reducible to any other factor.541 
Leon Wieseltier remarked – at a passionate and at times bitterly worded 
symposium hosted by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum – “After Goldhagen, the 
causal relation between ideas and genocide will be impossible to deny.”542 In Europe, the 
Jews have consistently faced hostile political and socio-cultural environments according 
to Goldhagen, throughout their tenure in Germany, Jews were perceived as a “foreign 
entity.” This intergroup enmity of “traditional” antisemtism eventually merged with 
modern German ideas of nationalism and racial superiority. It was this aligning of idea 
that Goldhagen claims formed the basis of German “eliminationist antisemitism,” that 
being a mind-set, ideology, or temperament that tended towards exterminating European 
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Jews. It was only after the collective demise of European Jewry that “true” Germans 
could survive and thrive as a “superior” race. Goldhagen goes on to note that when 
German perpetrators killed Jews, the vast majority did so with “gusto”, enjoyment and 
“fun”, and they “killed for pleasure.”543  
Critics of Goldhagen argue that his thesis discounts and downplays the 
bureaucratic nature of the Holocaust and the diversity of attitudes in German society 
towards the Jews. Not all Germans – his critics argue – possessed this extreme version of 
antisemitism. We tangentially see this contention in the intentionalist-functionalist debate 
over how the German state initially treated the Jews (prior to their full extermination). 
Goldhagen’s assertion that eliminationist antisemitism was the motivation and calling of 
all “ordinary Germans” and not just Nazi perpetrators has stirred much controversy in 
academia and German society. Raul Hilberg, a staunch opponent, has declared 
Goldhagen’s work as “simply a bad book” and “worthless.”544 Hilberg is generally 
referenced as one of the first historians to emphasize the “bureaucratic aspects of modern 
genocide.”545 In contrast to Goldhagen, Hilberg is criticized for undervaluing the impact 
of antisemitism on the evolution of the Holocaust. In The Destruction of the European 
Jews, Hilberg narrates anti-Jewish policies from fourth century Rome to modern 
Germany. He catalogues enmity toward the Jews, hostilities, and period violent episodes. 
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His work argues that the Nazi policy of extermination was “a direct continuation 
(although not an inevitable outcome) of a long-term European antisemtism.”546 Hilberg 
highlights for the reader how Nazis – similar to the concentration camp system – did not 
invent but borrowed from past antisemitism policies, they merely refined and brought the 
full weight of the German bureaucratic state to bear in the genocide.547  
Many of Goldhagen’s critics protest his assertion that German antisemitism was a 
rare form of eliminationist antisemitism, that categorically regarded the Jews as an 
inferior race. The principle critique here is that Goldhagen unwittingly overlooks or 
actively discounts (depending on the critic) the diversity of attitudes, beliefs, views, 
temperament, and types of antisemitism pertaining to German and European Jews. Gitta 
Sereny wrote of Goldhagen’s book that it is “a hymn of hate to the Germans.”548 The 
second main criticism of Hitler’s Willing Executioners is that in his explanation of 
German eliminationist antisemitism at the societal and grassroots levels – Goldhagen 
ignores the structural complexities of modern German society. In his own defense 
Goldhagen described his intentions in an interview as having “…tried to return the focus 
of our attention and understanding of the Holocaust back to the people who were the 
actual killers of European Jewry. Much of the literature of the Holocaust is devoted to the 
discussion of structures and institutions and the leadership and pays very little attention to 
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the people who deported Jews to their death.”549 Perhaps Goldhagen’s most prominent 
critic, and the object of his own work, is the aforementioned Christopher Browning. 
During the now infamous debate between these two titans of Holocaust Studies. 
Browning read excerpts from a letter sent to him from a Jewish survivor which, I’m 
paraphrasing, said he encountered a police company that in his own view could not enact 
such crimes as Browning and Goldhagen wrote about in their respective books.550 In 
response, Browning said to the audience in attendance that he believed if this police unit 
had been instructed to kill Jews, they most likely would have complied with these orders 
“…and some probably would have behaved with gratuitous and unspeakable cruelty. But 
I [Browning] doubt that most would have killed willingly and enthusiastically, motivated 
by the lethal and demonological antisemitism uniformly attributed to such ordinary 
Germans by Goldhagen.”551  
The theory developed and put forward in this dissertation argues that some forms 
of mass political violence – principally state-society coalitions – rely upon a ground swell 
of societal support for a “punishing,” marginalizing, and/or murdering members of a 
target group en masse. The main distinction my theoretical framework makes is in 
unpacking different types of perpetrators of mass political violence, from those with little 
societal involvement in the killing process to episodes with vast communal backing. Is 
Goldhagen or Browning’s perspective of German antisemtism correct? The truth 
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probably lies somewhere in between these scholarly camps. To some extent, this debate 
is less important for the purpose of my research. Both sides agree that antisemitism 
played a substantial role in the evolution of twentieth century’s most quintessential 
example of one group’s effort – and near success – at exterminating an entire population. 
It is also undeniable that a large portion of German and European society participated in 
pogroms and the systematically of mass murder. Irrespective of the type of antisemtism 
or other motivating factors like careerism, opportunity, greed, or grievance, my theory of 
state-society coalitions is supported.  
 
The Cycle of Violence 
As shown in Figure 5.1 the Nazi cycle of violence begins with threat perception. 
In this case we can see at minimum three clear threats Hitler and the Nazi party acted on. 
The first threat Hitler was concerned with was the poisoning of the Aryan “master” race 
by the “inferior” Jewish “disease.” Hitler’s thinking on this issue was solidified long 
before he became chancellor of Germany. In his autobiography Mein Kampf Hitler wrote, 
“Blood mixture and the resultant drop in the racial level is the sole cause of the dying out 
of old cultures; for men do not perish as a result of lost wars, but by the loss of that force 
of resistance which is contained only in pure blood.552 Hitler’s Weltanschauung, or 
worldview, saw politics and life as struggle between races, though Hitler “denied that the 
Jews were one [meaning, a race].”553 Therefore the threat Jews posed to the Aryan race 
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was not similar to others, but viewed by Hitler as an incurable disease that the master 
race must be inoculated against. This ideological, psychological, and ecological fear on 
behalf of Hitler and his accomplices eventually led too fierce (one-sided) intergroup 
violence for which we now call genocide. 
The culmination of Hitler’s worldview can be seen in his advocacy of 
Lebensraum, or living space for Germans. Browning defines Lebensraum as “a long-term 
process of racial consolidation in the incorporated territories.”554 In other words 
Lebensraum was the fusion of Hitler’s racist politics with German territorial expansion. 
Hitler delivered a speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939 in which he said,  
Once again I will be a prophet: should the international Jewry of finance 
(Finanzjudentum) succeed, both within and beyond Europe, in plunging mankind into yet 
another world war, then the result will not be a Bolshevization of the earth and the 
victory of Jewry, but the annihilation (Vernichtung) of the Jewish race in Europe.555 
Three years later, to the day, Hitler proclaimed again: 
We should be in no doubt that this war can only end either with the 
extermination of the Aryan peoples or with the disappearance of Jewry 
from Europe. [Hitler went on…] For the first time, the ancient Jewish rule 
will now be applied: ‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth!’ Thereupon 
messianic ardor took hold of the Nazi leader: World Jewry should know 
that the more the war spreads, the more anti-Semitism will also spread.556 
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I find myself in agreement with Martin Broszat and particularly Christopher 
Browning, that Hitler’s ideology was indicative of his “goal-setting” behavior. Similar to 
his leader style, Hitler would make his racist ideology a center piece and his subordinates 
need only look to this worldview for “guidance” in who to attack in aim of securing 
career advancement or Hitler’s favor. 
The second and third threats pale in comparison to the aforementioned struggle 
between races, but are important for understanding Hitler’s actions. The second area 
Hitler was uneasy about was potential challenges to his authority. As illustrated above, 
Hitler eliminated any political rival inside or out of the Nazi party that could pose a threat 
to his leadership. This threat was entirely personal to Hitler as compared to the 
cataclysmic struggle between the Aryan race and the Jews. The final threat was an 
extension of the former, and was twenty years in the making. It was between Germany 
and her former rivals who had relegated Germany under the Treaty of Versailles to 
subordinate state. This was an external threat between Germany and the rest of the world 
(e.g., western powers, Bolshevism, and European Jewry). Together these three threats 
embody the bulk of Hitler’s motivations for starting World War II and the mass murder 
of millions.  
The formation of a state-society coalition began soon after Hitler took office in 
1933. Hitler launched a policy called Gleichschaltung, meaning total coordination and 
uniformity.557 Gleichschaltung was a blatant attempt to homogenize society in the “name 
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of national unity.”558 Emerging Nazi organizations like the German Labor Front forced 
out old trade unions and new Nazi organizations for “farmers, women, boys, girls, 
writers, and artists absorbed associations of people in those categories.”559 Coupled with 
this fusion between Nazism and society, came all kinds of programs designed to boost 
Hitler’s and the Nazi party’s image. This included a massive public relations campaign, 
public works programs, and other job creation efforts.560 Popular culture also played an 
important role in solidifying this state-society coalition. The introduction of the Hitler 
salute in 1929 and carried through until his death in 1945 “played an important role in the 
symbolic struggles of the 1920s and 1930s…”561 This public expression of loyalty to 
Hitler and the Nazi cause oscillated between symbolic statements of unity to political 
violence. The Hitler salute was often used as a “first step in street battles of the late 
Weimar Republic.”562 The mere act of saluting Hitler demonstrated two things. First a 
person’s clear obedience or at minimum submission to Hitler, and two, his/her 
recognition of a cause greater than the individual. 
Gleichschaltung also permeated popular culture songs. Perhaps the most famous 
Nazi anthem was “Horst Wessel Lied.”563 This song was named after a Nazi 
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Stormtrooper who died in a fight between Nazis and Communists in 1930. The lyrics 
called for “unity against the foe, and praised the comrade-heroes who had died for the 
cause.”564 Early on in the process of forming their state-society coalition, the Nazis 
learned two central lessons. First, it was easier to attack groups who had been 
marginalized from society Martin Niemöller, a protestant pastor and outspoken critic of 
Hitler summarized this step-by-step process famously wrote: 
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out –  
Because I was not a Socialist. 
 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out –  
Because I was not a Trade Unionist. 
 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out – 
Because I was not a Jew. 
 
Then they came for me – and there was no one left to speak for me.565 
 
And, second, they learned through (violent) trial and error tactics that “members 
of the general public were more likely to participate in or at least tolerate attacks on 
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minorities if they stood to gain rather than to lose from such initiatives.”566 In any event, 
a state-society coalition did not require full social participation, but merely some active 
collaboration and for the rest of the population to remain indifferent or docile to Nazi 
actions. 
Hitler’s interwar escalation of hostilities between the Jews and the rest of German 
society is just as much, if not, more important than his actions during the war. At least in 
terms of explaining how society became accustom to the viewpoint that the Jews were to 
blame for all of Germany’s misfortunes. They became a convenient scapegoat for Hitler 
and his accomplices to rail against. Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers Party 
(otherwise known as the Nazi party) was one of the strongest political parties in interwar 
Germany.567 Despite their relative popularity, the Nazi party was only capable of 
obtaining a plurality victory (33 percent of the vote) in the 1932 elections.568 It was not 
long after taking power that Hitler moved to end democracy in Germany. Using his 
charisma, charm, and powers of persuasion, Hitler convinced his cabinet to invoke article 
48 of the constitution, an emergency provision that allowed the government to suspend 
individual freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly.569 The Nazi SS, SA, and Gestapo 
forces arrested or murdered political opponents in the Communist, Socialist, and Liberal 
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political parties and ensured Hitler could wield his dictatorial powers without fear of 
internal competition.570 
German prewar and interwar years are pocketed by near constant legal constraints 
on the Jewish population. In the same year Hitler was elected, new German laws 
mandated that all Jews quit their “civil service jobs, university and law court positions, 
and other areas of public life.”571 Soon after, a boycott was started that targeted Jewish 
businesses. From 1933 to 1935 Nazi scientists advanced Hitler’s racist Social Darwin 
ideology and advocated for eugenics, or selective breeding to “improve” the human 
race.572 During the same time frame laws were passed to cull the human race of so-called 
genetically inferior persons, by forced sterilization programs. Tragically, about 500 
children of African-German racial backgrounds and between 320,000-350,000 physically 
and mentally handicapped persons were surgically or through radiation procedures made 
infertile.573 By 1937 there were new laws that segregated Jews from public schools (or 
banned them outright), movie theaters, vacation resorts, housing areas, and even barred 
them from walking in certain areas of German cities.574 Jews were systematically forced 
from the formal economy sector. Nazis either seized Jewish businesses and properties or 
coerced Jewish owners to sell their holdings greatly below market prices. All of which 
culminated in November 1938 when German SA units and Hitler Youth attacked German 
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and Austrian Jews, destroyed countless synagogues, Jewish properties, arrested Jewish 
men, and murdered others in a pogrom that has become known as Kristallnacht, “night or 
broken glass” or “night of crystal.”575  
This mobilization of German paramilitary units and Hitler Youth was a precursor 
to the eventual perpetrators of Nazi mass political violence. Let me take a moment to 
describe the perpetrators of the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal crimes. First, there is 
a myth that the German military (Wehrmacht) was innocent of crimes perpetrators in 
what we call the Holocaust. For years the myth propagated by retired soldiers was that 
the Wehrmacht fought Germany’s enemies abroad and the Nazi paramilitary 
organizations waged war within German borders. This is simply false. Beorn 
painstakingly chronicles the crimes of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front. Beorn writes: 
The actions of this company [6th Company, 727th Infantry Regiment] in Slonim 
(and of other 727th soldiers in surrounding areas) are emblematic of an escalation in 
Wehrmacht collusion in the Holocaust. German soldiers no longer merely assisted in 
killings in towns in which they found themselves while advancing. The units in the 
following cases lived side by side with the Nazi administration and its Jewish victims for 
extended periods and found themselves involved in far more than just killing. The 
behavior of German army units in Slonim and Novogrudok demonstrates the depth of this 
cooperation, in particular how the army negotiated its role in the Nazi genocidal project 
and the extent to which that role became routinized.576 
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For a variety of reasons, the Wehrmacht’s crimes on the eastern front tended to be 
neglected by the Nuremburg Military Tribunals in lieu of other high-level SS 
perpetrators, the Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads), and the atrocities committed by 
members of the German medical establishment.577 What we know beyond the shadow of 
a doubt, is that German military personnel were not forced to be cold-blooded killers (of 
civilians).578 Anyone who declined to participate in the killing were transformed or given 
other duties. “To this day no one has ever found a single example of a German who was 
executed for refusing to take part in the killing of Jews or other civilians…There were 
enough willing perpetrators. For the most part coercive violence could be reserved for 
those deemed enemies.”579  
What about societal participation in the Holocaust? Among historians and 
political scientists, there has been a renewed interest in the question of popular 
participation in the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal crimes.580 The violence against 
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targeted populations were carried out in concentration camps, killing centers, or 
“dedicated sites of annihilation.”581 German perpetrators, particularly the Einsatzgruppen 
were supported in their dedicated task of mass murder by Ukrainians, Latvians, 
Lithuanians and “other east Europeans who were as murderous or worse.”582 Even some 
captured Soviet Red Army soldiers were recruited as “willing helpers” and subsequently 
saved from the horrors of German prisoner of war camps.583 Abram De Swaan argues in 
his book The Killing Compartments that when regimes engage in “mass annihilation” (his 
term) they only do so after society has been conditioned and under gone “advanced 
compartmentalization, a separation of the regime’s people from the target group in every 
sense and at every level.584 This compartmentalization process has been written about by 
other authors in terms of dehumanization tactics or intergroup polarization (c.f., Gregory 
Stanton’s “The 8 Stages of Genocide” and Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley’s Why Not 
Kill Them All?). Compartmentalization is not sui generis to state-society coalitions. We 
may see this stratagem employed by any perpetrator category. That said, what is unique 
about this category is that through much of society “maintains its pacified ways” there is 
significant proportion within popular society that is allowed to organize and participate in 
mass political violence.  
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The Jedwabne model is prototypical of popular participation during the 
Holocaust. The main thesis of Jan Gross’s book Neighbors: The Destruction of the 
Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland is that the local population killed their Jewish 
neighbors without coercion. They organized themselves without the assistance of German 
units and did so willingly and energetically.585 During the prelude to murder, the Jews 
were guarded by almost the entire village and not German forces. The local population 
also took it upon themselves to dig pits and mobilize into groups for the purpose of 
murdering their Jewish neighbors. Eyewitness accounts recall cases of extreme brutality 
toward the Hews in Jedwabne. These were committed anti-Semites who relished the 
opportunity to punish their neighbors and cleanse the town of their “sins.” The Jedwabne 
model gruesomely highlights the society component of the Holocaust’s state-society 
coalition.  
Before turning our attention to decision points in the Holocaust, I must say a few 
words on perpetrator agency versus situation. There are few – if any – laws in social 
science. One long held consensus across the fields of political science, history, sociology, 
political and social psychology, and Genocide Studies is that mass political violence 
perpetrators are not distinct from society at large. It is situations that allow people to 
become perpetrators. This is not to say we collectively agree on the causal relationship 
between situation and the removal of individual prohibitions that allow them to become 
genocidal killers. I argue that potentially all people are perpetrators, but few perpetrators 
are capable of being “masterminds” or “leaders” in this odious crime. This distinction 
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between the potential of individual persons to be perpetrators and those capable of 
leading such campaigns is a vital one. This is not to say that social situations excuse 
individual actions – even in time of war, famine, conflict, crisis, or chaos. A person’s 
moral code also plays a definitive role. “Many of the direct perpetrators are usually not 
simply forced or pressured by the authorities to obey. Instead, they join leaders and 
decision makers, or a movement that shapes and guides them to become perpetrators. 
Decision makers and perpetrators share a cultural-societal tilt,” argues Ervin Staub.586  
 
Decision Points 
We cannot know if Hitler had a master plan that begun in 1933 or earlier, that 
sought for the total extermination of European Jewry. We can only rely on historical 
accounts from these years to estimate Hitler’s intentions vis-à-vis mass political violence, 
because he did not survive the war and face prosecution and an investigation for his 
reasons. With this limitation in mind, I will draw our attention to two decision points that 
are publically available. Perhaps other decision points exist between Hitler and his 
collaborators, but we cannot definitively say. The first decision point to overtly engage in 
mass political violence is inextricably tied to Hitler’s decision to invade Poland in 
September 1, 1939 – thus triggering the Second World War. We know that all major 
killing episodes of Nazi victim populations took place after the start of the war in 1939. 
The seven years prior to this event were characterized by increasing legal restrictions of 
Hews and periodic acts of violence. However, by far the vast amount of death and 
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devastation that would be endured at the hands of the Nazis was far from over this point 
in 1939.  
It is difficult to know if the decision to murder – en masse – the Jews and other 
marginalized populations came substantially earlier than 1939 (e.g., 1938, 1937, or even 
1930). Because of the limitations in the historical record, I will use September 1939 as 
the arbitrary date for Hitler’s first decision point to commit mass political violence – 
though recognizing it may have been weeks, months, or possibly years in the making. 
Despite this limitation, there are benefits to using the start of the war as a first marker of 
violence. The first group to be murdered in mass was not the Jews but so-called people 
who had “lives unworthy of living,” the mentally and physically handicapped. In spring 
1939 Hitler authorized Dr. Karl Brandt and Philipp Bouhler to begin a children’s 
“euthanasia” program, where children who fit this description were sent to “special 
clinics where medical personnel starved them to death or gave them lethal injections.”587 
This relatively small program was later expanded after the beginning of the war to 
include adults with physical and mental disabilities. The program was codenamed “T-4,” 
which was the address of the program’s leadership offices in Berlin, Tiergartenstrasse 
4.588 This class of victims was the first group to undergo the transformation from that of a 
marginalized and persecuted group to the targets of mass murder. 
The second decision point I will elucidate surrounds the Wannsee Conference in 
January 1942. This is a somewhat fungible marker as well, but one that represents the 
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formalization of Nazi plans to exterminate Jews and other victim populations. By 1940 
and 1941 the Nazi establishment was under an increasing amount of pressure in finding 
space for the Jews in German territories and refuges. Adolf Eichmann declared on 
December 4, 1940 “that Jews were going to be moved to an unnamed location as a 
preliminary to the final solution of the Jewish problem.”589 Hitler and other senior Nazi 
leaders like Herman Göring, Martin Bormann, Hans Lammens, Wilhelm Keitel, and 
Alfred Rosenberg used Stalin’s orders of July 3, 1941 to Red Army personnel to “start 
partisan warfare behind the German lines as one more favorable development…” that 
gave the Nazis a green light to destroy anything and anyone who stood in their march 
across the Russian steppe – including innocent Jewish men, women, and children.590 A 
year and five days later, Eichmann scheduled a meeting of more than a dozen high 
ranking Nazi party and German government officials to discuss the “final solution.”591 
This now infamous meeting was delayed and rescheduled January 20, 1942 in Wannsee, 
a suburb of Berlin.592 Though gassing operations at Chlemno, one of six killing centers, 
began one day after the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific naval fleet based in Pearl 
Harbor, the Wannsee Conference formalized the Nazi policy of total extermination.593 
The SS planned to slaughter some 11 million Jews believed to be in German-controlled 
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lands.594 To be emphatically clear, it was Nazi policy since 1939 to murder in droves 
several national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, and sexual minority groups. The 
Wannsee Conference merely marks the formalization of this process from mass shootings 
carried out by mobile killing squads in the east to institutionalized concrete, and the mass 
infrastructure of killing centers. Michael Berenbaum has described this transformation 
from mass shootings to gas chambers as, a change in tactics. Initially perpetrators sought 
out victims, they quickly realized this tactic was inefficient and costly, thus they decided 
to bring the victims to the killers, rather than the other way around.595 Mass shootings 
were both inefficient and “physically and psychologically difficult… [as it required Nazi 
agents and collaborators] to shoot people all day long at close range.”596 
Your chance of survival depended on where you lived. Wherever Jews fled they 
could expect the Nazi war machine to follow. This constant fear of death followed Jews 
no matter where they went in German-controlled territories. But, the behavior of local 
gentile populations “whom Hews lived [with] functioned as a separate factor, that, while 
not decisive, increased or decreased the chances of Jewish survival.”597 Populations in the 
east were generally more hostile towards the Jewish people, though there were instances 
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where local groups offered shelter, food, and refuge. One key difference between the 
Holocaust and the Soviet Union and Cambodian case studies is that “the Germans carried 
out their systematic murderous activities with the help of local collaborators in many 
countries and the acquiescence or indifference of millions of bystanders.”598 Popular 
participation took many forms of collaboration including as principal perpetrators, 
accomplices, and beneficiaries of mass political violence. Hitler’s axis partners at the 
state level was vast. In some allied states the “fascist paramilitary organizations 
terrorized, robbed, and murdered indigenous Jews, either under German guidance or on 
their own initiative.”599 The Hlinka Guard in Slovakia, the Iron Guard in Romania, the 
Ustasa in Croatia, and the Arrow Cross in Hungary were responsible for the deaths of 
thousands of Jews in their home territories.600 Government officials in Hungary, 
Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Vichy France also assisted in the deportation of Jews and 
the administration of Nazi policy. There was also vast societal support in those territories 
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as well. Spontaneous and voluntary “partisan” and “self-defense” groups formed in 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, and Ukraine where they were responsible for killing 
hundreds of Jews and so-called and card carrying Communists.601 These groups were 
later purged and reorganized by Nazi SS and police units. These local auxiliaries were 
notorious for their savagery and brutality towards Jewish people and other enemies of the 
state. Finally, in addition to direct participation in violence, many locals created or spread 
propaganda against the Jews in hope of legitimizing their actions and mustering 
additional support from the masses.602 
Finally, like in other episodes of mass political violence, perpetrators increasingly 
relied on euphemisms for describing and advocating for mass murder. Whenever Nazis 
and anti-Semites discuss the “Jewish question” they were referencing the status and ill-
treatment of the Jews, from persecution in the 1930s, to ghettoization and later 
extermination. Most communicate in coded language Hitler and his Nazi perpetrators 
attempt to exterminate all European Jews. This was their answer to the “Jewish 
question.” Jeffrey Herf references Goebbels use of the term “Jewish war,” which reflects 
Hitler’s ideological beliefs that the Nazis were engaged in a war between races.603 This 
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dehumanization of Jewish persons continued with many in German society attributing 
vile terms to Jews, such as calling them “vermin,” a “virus,” or “parasites.”604 There was 
also coded language used by SS and military personnel in official reports to make their 
barbaric actions towards seem legal or mundane. Whenever an official wrote they 
performed an “evacuation from the east,” this meant they were exterminating Jews after 
January 1942, or deporting them to killing centers.605 If the perpetrators wrote “shot 
while trying to escape,” it was a euphemism for cold blooded murder.606 One order read, 
“All male Jews between 17-45 years of age convicted of looting are to be executed 
immediately,” Richard Rhodes notes, “Since the battalions conducted neither 
investigations nor trials, the word “convicted” was a fig leaf and a euphemism for 
killing.”607 Those who performed the killing were written about as conducting “special 
tasks” or “executive measures.”608 Such euphemisms did not stop with the Jews. Nazis 
also used the terms “euthanasia” and “mercy deaths” to disguise their blatant killing of 
those considered to be “idiots,” “crazies,” and “cripples.”609 The use of euphemisms are 
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both attempts to justify perpetrator behavior and obfuscate their actions from the public 
(and historical) record. 
 
The Victims 
The Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal crimes has had profound effects in the 
way we view one-sided violence against a civilian or noncombatant population. European 
Jews were the primary victims of Hitler’s Germany and its collaborators throughout 
Europe, North Africa, and Asia Minor. Of the 11 million Jews targeted for extermination, 
Nazi perpetrators butchered more than half the Jews (approximately six million men, 
women, and children) were not the only group in Nazi-controlled lands to face the iron 
fist of Hitler’s henchmen and women. The Roma (or Gypsies) and Sinti peoples were 
regularly targeted, the Poles endured many years of German occupation and terror, other 
religious minorities like Jehovah’s Witnesses were placed on Hitler’s enemies list, sexual 
minorities (LGBT+ persons) were systematically persecuted and killed, political 
dissidents and Soviet Red Army prisoners also endured brutal conditions in the camps, 
and of course those deemed a drag on society and possessing “life unworthy of living” 
were “euthanized” or more accurately put to death within days of the German advance 
into Poland. The Nazis began their campaign of cultural genocide, en effort to destroy 
Polish culture and enslave them as they were deemed “sub-human.”610 The first wave of 
atrocities targeted “university professors, artists, writers, politicians, and many catholic 
priest,” in essence the core socio-political groups in Polish society.611 This was essential 
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to the German plan, as Poland was eventually to be a new living space, Lebensraum, for 
the superior German people. As such, Polish territory would become a “laboratory for 
experiments in spatial expansion and racial ideology.”612 
The T4 program, so-called euthanasia program, began in secret with Hitler 
ordering medical staff to kill those who were “incurable.”613 Here special commissions 
(ones that people could argue were real death panels) reviewed questionnaires completed 
by all state run hospitals and made the final decision to kill or spare patients.614 Once a 
patient was placed on the kill list, they were transferred to one of six institutions in 
Germany and Austria that were designated as killing centers for the T4 program.615 There 
were specially constructed gas chambers established at these six killing centers to handle 
the influx in “patients.” After some public outcry and protests to the program in 1941, the 
Nazi continued the program in secret and killed babies, small children, and others 
through lethal injection or forced starvation.616 There is still a debate over the precise 
motivations for implementing T4. Michael Burleigh argues that T4 was used as a policy 
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to “clear the decks” in advance of war.617 This is a somewhat programmatic view of why 
the Nazis targeted the mentally and physically disabled. Henry Friedlander asserts that 
Nazi motivations were much deeper. He argues that this extermination policy was a 
logical extension of Hitler’s racial ideology. In this vein the Nazi genocide against the 
mentally and physically impaired was part of Hitler’s race war to cull the biologically 
inferior from the herd so that the Aryan race remained genetically superior to all 
others.618 Perhaps both Burleigh and Friedlander are correct about Nazi motivations. 
Under T4 about 200,000 patients were killed.619 To prove T4 was a precursor to other 
Nazi killing centers, Dr. Imfried Eberl, a psychiatrist with direct involvement in T4 at the 
Brandenburg facility, became the first commandant of the Treblinka death camp, where 
he modeled the killing center after his own experiences in T4.620  
During the war, the Nazis and their collaborators constructed ghettos, transit 
camps, labor camps, and concentration and death camps to house and ultimately slaughter 
Jews, Roma and other victim populations.621 Like Warsaw, Lublin, and Krakow, Jews 
were essentially imprisoned in ghettos. The harsh conditions and perpetual influx of new 
arrivals led to starvation diets, overcrowding, and rampant outbreaks of contagious 
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diseases that claimed thousands of lives. As the war progressed the Nazis began to 
systematically deport Jews from the approximate 1,000 ghettos to the newly established 
death camps.  
The six sites for Nazi death camps were chosen specifically for their proximity to 
major railroads lines.622 These killing centers were located at Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, 
Chelmno, Majdanek, and Auschwitz-Birkenau. The first camp to begin mass executions 
was Chelmno. The camp’s perpetrators pumped gas into mobile vans, a crude and 
barbaric step toward the ultimate path of constructing gas chambers. Between December 
1941 and March 1943, and between June to July 1944, about 320,000 people were 
massacred.623 At Belzec, between May 1942 and August 1943, more than 600,000 were 
killed in mobile gas vans and later gas chambers.624 In Sobibor, up to 200,000 people 
were dispatched via gas. Treblinka was physically the largest of the killing centers. It 
opened in July 1942 and closed 17 months later; at minimum 750,000 persons were killed 
in this facility.625 In Majdanek, many of the 275,000 people who were killed died from 
either gassings or malnutrition, brutality at the hands of guards, or disease.626 Finally, 
Auschwitz-Birkenau was the camp where the most European Jews and Roma were killed 
in. More than 1.25 million people were killed here, with nine out of 10 of them Jews.627 
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Most victims of the death camps were murdered soon after their arrival. Those who 
survived this deadly initiation to camp life were forced to endure the most unthinkable 
living conditions. Primo Levi, an Italian-Jewish chemist, writer, and Auschwitz-Birkenau 
survivor wrote, “Dying was easy,” however, “To live was much more difficult and 
dangerous.”628 To highlight for the reader how fast the Nazi regime and its accomplices 
formalized the extermination process, Bergen writes that “at the beginning of 1942… 75 
percent of the Jews who would be murdered in the Holocaust were still alive. By the 
beginning of 1943, 75 percent of the approximately 6 million who would be killed were 
already dead.”629 As the war gradually turned again Germany in the East, West, and 
Southern (Italian) fronts, the SS began evacuating the death and concentration camps 
closest to invading armies in hope of maintaining their secrecy from outside eyes. Many 
prisoners who had survived in the concentration camps to this point died during the long 
forced marches.630  
There is much to say about gender and mass political violence. Men and women 
faced both similar and different circumstances during the Holocaust. The title of Myrna 
Goldenberg and Amy Shapiro’s book sums up the disparity Different Horrors, Same 
Hell.631 During the first two years of the war Jewish men were more likely to die in 
Polish forced labor camps, but from 1941 to 1942 women were more likely to be 
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deported to killing centers.632 Upon arrival this disparity continued. Men were more 
likely to be consigned to physical labor tasks while women – especially those pregnant or 
accompanied by small children – almost always were sent directly to the gas chambers.633 
Joan Ringelheim interviewed 20 women survivors for her 1985 article on “Women and 
the Holocaust.” Ringelheim says,  
They spoke of their sexual vulnerability: sexual humiliation, rape, sexual 
exchange, pregnancy, abortion, and vulnerability through their children – concerns that 
men either described in different ways or, more often, did not describe at all. Almost 
every woman, referred to the humiliating feelings and experiences surrounding her 
entrance to the camp (for my [Ringelheim] interviewees, this was Auschwitz): being 
shaved all over – for some being shaved in a sexual stance, straddling two stools; being 
observed by men, both fellow prisoners and SS guards… some women remember the 
ways in which sex was used as a commodity in the ghettos; sexual exchanges for food or 
other goods involved Jewish men at least as often as, perhaps more often than, they did 
Nazi authorities.634 
The negative psycho-social effects of Nazi perpetrators were particularly 
pronounced in childhood survivor stories. Those who had experienced sexual assault, 
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physical abuse, kidnapping, terrorism, or starvation reported a (sometimes lifelong sense 
of terror and vulnerability.635  
All told, Nazi perpetrators and their collaborators killed about 250,000 Roma, 
including many children.636 Thousands more underwent forced sterilization to prevent 
them from “infecting” the “master race.” Himmler, the SS leader, viewed the Roma 
(Gypsies) as did many Nazi leaders as racially inferior. Himmler’s perverse fascination 
with the Roma people went so far as to propose the construction of a human zoo, where 
some Roma people could live and be preserved for future research by German 
scientists.637 These so-called “experts” estimated that only three to four percent of the 
Roma people would fall into this category; but Himmler subsequently abandoned the idea 
all together.638  
Finally, I will say a few words about the homosexual experience in World War II. 
Something Günter Grau calls the “hidden holocaust.” By the time the war started, there 
was about 1.5 to 2 million homosexuals living in Germany.639 Hitler had persecuted 
homosexuals throughout his tenure in office. Between 1933 and 1945, the Nazi regime 
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had arrested and convicted 50,000 men with charges related to homosexuality.640 Gay 
men were a particular threat to Nazi racial ideology, because from their perspective, gay 
men refused to take part in procreating children for the fatherland.641 By wars end, about 
5,000-7,000 of these “deviants” perished, with about half of them in concentration camps. 
There is little research on the lesbian experience during the Holocaust. According to 
Günter Grau: 
…It is not clear how many women had to undergo the horror of a 
concentration camp because of their homosexuality; most lesbians were 
spared that fate if they were prepared to conform. What is certain is that 
there was no systematic prosecution of lesbian women comparable to that 
of male homosexuals.642 
Even within the concentration camp system homosexuals were at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy. Rüdiger Lautman notes: 
The prisoners with the pink triangle were burdened with the general 
stigmatization of homosexuality; this reduced from the outset their 
influence on the internal communication and power structures of the 
camps…the individualistic, as opposed to collective, strategy of seeing to 
their own interests, which was already imposed on the in the outside 
world, could work only further against them in the camps.643 
 
 One problem of Holocaust and Genocide Studies is how to deal with the 
enormous number of perpetrators, victims, locations, documents, and information. The 
main goal in this case study is to apply the core theoretical framework of my research to 
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Nazi Germany’s persecution and mass murder of millions. Inevitably, this application of 
my theory to the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities limits the overall analysis 
and depth of my study. Much has been written on the Holocaust and there remains much 
to be said. This case study moves our analytical understanding of the conditions before, 
during, and after the Holocaust, but more is needed. 
 
The Rwandan Genocide 
Rwanda is a beautiful mountainous country, often called the jewel of Africa. 
According to her colonial masters, Rwanda was “inhabited by slender, giant Tutsi, stocky 
Hutu, and dwarf-like Twa.”644 The Tutsi were primary cattle herders and emigrated to 
Rwanda in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries.645 The Hutu population was traditionally 
agriculturalists and emigrated from the central African region. There is general consensus 
that the Hutus made up roughly 85 percent of the national population, the Tutsi were 
about 14 percent, and the Twa approximately one percent prior to the 1994 genocide. 
These figures should be taken with a grain of salt because scholars continue to debate 
whether the Hutu government consistently underreported Tutsis in the 1991 national 
census.646 Therefore, the Tutsi population on April 6, 1994 cold have been anywhere 
between 8.4 and 14 percent, based on scholarly estimates extrapolated from the most 
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recent pre-genocide census.647 Rwanda was a German colony in 1894 used primarily for 
economic exploitation.648 After Germany’s defeat in World War I, Belgium seized 
Rwanda through a League of Nations mandate in 1918. According to W.M. Roger Louis,  
Belgium’s acquisition of Ruanda-Urundi [Rwanda and Burundi] is surely one of 
the greatest ironies in the history of Africa. For her statesmen did not want it. They 
intended to use Ruanda-Urundi as a pawn to gain the southern bank and mouth of the 
Congo-river, which they considered as indispensable for the security of their colony… 
The Belgians thought it regrettable that they would not be allowed simply to absorb 
Ruanda-Urundi into the Congo.649 This lackluster management style and active 
resentment of the indigenous population would prove neither beneficial for Rwanda or its 
population. 
 
Existing Polity Structure 
In discussing African politics, it has become natural to use the phrase “state 
power,” in describing a regime’s ability to govern its territory. This term is insufficient 
and broad. It is for this reason that I have separated this term into two parts: regime 
power and state capacity. Remembering from chapter three, regime power is a function of 
public and private sector support for senior political and military elites; while state 
capacity is the degree state agents possess over all persons, activities, and resources 
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within their territory. A traditional explanation of the genocide by scholars partly blame 
state weakness or state collapse (c.f., Storey 2001; Collins 1998).650 In fact this is a 
misnomer, Rwanda possessed one of Africa’s strongest regimes. According to Scott 
Straus, the Rwanda state had “unusual depth and resonance at the local level, which 
meant, that by controlling the state, the hardliners [and advocates of genocide] had the 
capacity to enforce their decisions countrywide.”651  
On July 5, 1973 Major General Juvénal Habyarimana directed the army to carry 
out a bloodless coup against fellow Hutu president Grégoire Kayibanda.652 Habyarimana 
ruled Rwanda until his death on April 6, 1994. As president, Habyarimana had the ability 
to garner vast amounts of regime power, and he did. As head of the army, Habyarimana 
held the allegiance of about 7,000 troops, of which about 1,200 were gendarmerie, or 
national police. He was also supported by elite Presidential Guard units, which would be 
crucial in the early hours of the genocide. These elite troops totaled between 1,000 and 
1,300.653 Habyarimana enjoyed support from outside the military too. He could regularly 
count on the heads of Rwanda’s parastatal corporations (e.g., of gas, water, electricity, or 
bus transport) to rally to his side when needed.654 He could also count on the heads of 
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hospitals, university professors, and the Catholic Church for support. Though the 
Catholic Church initially endorsed the Tutsi elite, they saw the coming 1959 Hutu 
revolution and preemptively switched sides. Habyarimana benefited greatly from the 
church’s support, especially since 62 percent of Rwandans identified as Catholic.655 He 
was less popular among protestant churches. There was “no unified position towards 
Habyarimana,” but the Anglican and Baptist churches generally supported his reign.656 
As you can see, Habyarimana possessed substantial military, political, economic, and 
moral power and authority during his tenure.  
With respect to regime power, Rwanda was a unique case in itself. Both 
Habyarimana and his wife wielded significant political power. Habyarimana’s wife, 
Agathe, directed a small organization initially called “le clan de Madame,” and later the 
Akazu, or “little house.”657 The Akazu was an elite, special circle of friends and relatives 
of Madame Habyarimana that supported her husband and in some cases pushed him 
towards more radical policies. “When necessary, this group drew on military officials, 
like Col. Théoneste Bagosora, Major Lenard Nkundiye, and Captain Pascal 
Simbikangwa, to ensure their continued hold on power.”658 Moreover the Akazu 
exacerbated the regional north-south conflict in Rwanda’s ruling elite. Most of its 
members were from Habyarimana’s home town and region (the north). This special circle 
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of leaders exercised control over state-sponsored rural investments to maintain patronage 
networks and personal loyalties.659  
Gérard Prunier found three reasons the Akazu played an important role in 
Rwandan politics. First, Habyarimana relied on these supporters as “his ears and eyes” 
who were outside the official chain of command, to provide him with information and 
“unequivocal devotion.”660 The second reason is that, at least initially, Habyarimana did 
not have faithful followers inside government, because he initiated a coup against the first 
president, who was a southerner. There were even rumors propagated that Habyarimana 
was not Rwandan, but born in Uganda or Zaire. Therefore, these Mafiosos provide him 
with additional muscle. Finally, Madame Agathe was a descendant from an elite family 
who ruled northern principalities till the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.661 
She became so powerful that her nickname was Kanjogera, a brutal mother of King 
Musinga, and supposedly “the real power behind the throne.”662  
Furthermore, the Rwandan state possessed “unusual depth and resonance at the 
local level.”663 When the genocide unfolded, it was greatly enabled by the strong 
administrative state already established. One example of the state’s strength was the 
policy of umuganda, mandatory unpaid communal labor for all able bodied adults.664 
                                                 
659 Linda R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide (London and New 
York: Zed Books, 2000), p. 42.  
 
660 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 85. 
 
661 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 86. 
 
662 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 86. 
 
663 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 8. 
 
664 Desforges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 38-39. 
235 
 
Habyarimana’s political party, the MRND, required people to participate in umuganda 
and perform manual labor tasks, such as, repairing or constructing roads, clearing brush, 
“digging anti-erosion ditches” that benefited the community.665 The benefits were two 
fold. First, through monthly mandatory physical labor projects, economic and community 
development advanced. Second, the government demonstrated its ability to mobilize 
mass populations for its own aims. During the genocide, the task was not road repair but 
extermination of the Tutsi.  
The strength of Rwandan institutions and state capacity date back to the reforms 
of the 1920s. These reforms had three effects on the development of Rwanda’s state 
capacity. First, power was transformed from the Mwami, or monarch to chiefdoms at the 
local levels. Second, accompanying this power shift was a reorganization of local 
authorities that systematically stripped away local, vertical accountability measures and 
all internal checks and balances to chief’s powers by the governmental bureaucracy. The 
final effect of these reforms resulted in the radicalization of local government; a 
precursor to intergroup hostilities of the 1950s and beyond.666 All of which led to the 
eventual strengthening of the local administrative state. The same state apparatuses that 
would prove essential in the spread of genocide from Kigali outward. Another aspect of 
colonial reforms that would provide decisive in how perpetrators carried out genocidal 
acts was the introduction of national identification cards by Belgian colonial overlords. It 
appears that Belgian colonial officials issued identity cards in Rwanda, in the 1930s, for 
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the primary purpose of implementing the host nation’s policy during the interwar 
years.667 According to Timothy Longman, a top authority on state-society relations in 
Africa, “…it does not appear that the cards were issued for the express purpose of 
registering ethnic identities. Rather, registering ethnicity was merely one component of a 
broader program to increase the regulation of Belgian subjects.”668 This seemingly banal 
regulatory policy transformed identity cards into “death warrants for many Tutsi in 
1994.”669 Both the reforms of the 1930s and the introduction of identity cards supported 
the expansion of the Rwandan state and enabled a vast bureaucracy that was later used to 
propagate unspeakable crimes in 1994.  
Now let me turn to the most compelling aspect of state-society coalitions – 
popular participation in mass political violence. René Lemarchand writes, “Tempting 
though it is to portray all ‘grass-roots killers’ as zombies mechanically responding to 
orders from above, the realities on the ground tell a more complex story.”670 Many 
bystanders and international observers remarked in response to the genocide, that it 
seemed like “a people gone mad.”671 However, within this “madness” there was 
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organization, collective action, planning, and deliberate acts designed to murder all Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus who stood in the way of national “progress.” There were “hundreds 
of thousands” of people who actively chose to participate in the genocide or were coerced 
under fear, punishment, threat of punishment, or peer-pressure to aid in this national 
effort. For the ideological zealots, murder was easy. With each swing of the machete they 
were cleansing Rwanda of this so-called “foreign” presence. But for those bullied into 
participation they “had to decide repeatedly whether or not to participate, each time 
weighing the kind of action planned, the identity of the proposed victim, the rewards of 
participating, and the likely costs of not participating.”672 Because Hutu hardliners took 
control of the state immediately after Habyarimana’s assassination, any person who 
waivered in partaking in the violence could reassure themselves that participation was 
legally acceptable because genocide was sanctioned by the state. This formal nod to 
perpetrators gave each Rwandan a license to kill. Finally, if the legal endorsement of 
violence was not sufficient in motivating people to murder, there was also moral backing 
from churches. Whatever the individual reason for participation, churches played a key 
role in making popular participation in the genocide morally acceptable.673 Moreover, 
church leaders, personnel and “lay leaders” were implicated in the genocide by their 
cooperation with perpetrators and active participation.674  
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There are several explanations offered in the literature for why ordinary 
Rwandans participated in the genocide. Omar McDoom calls the traditional view that 
ordinary Rwandans blindly obeyed state institutions during the genocide. McDoom 
argues that political and communal dynamics at the sub-national and local levels were 
essential to grassroots participation in the killing.675 In his work “Rwanda’s Ordinary 
Killers” McDoom highlights variation in popular participation between north and south 
provinces. The MRND carried out many of the massacres led by its militia, the 
Interahamwe, in direct response to the assassination of their leader, Habyarimana. This 
means northern perpetrators were ideological zealots committed to the cause and required 
little to no encouragement to kill. However, for the south, they were far removed from the 
war with the RPF and genocidaires here were “social intermediaries” who coerced 
grassroots participation while encouraging others to take advantage of the opportunity, 
their racist views, or ideological propaganda to kill.676  
The second explanation of ordinary Rwandan participation was advanced by Lee 
Ann Fujii who found support for McDoom’s analysis of southern motivations for murder 
also present in some northern and central principalities.677 Building on McDoom’s 
analysis that questions the overarching narrative from the state and individual obedience, 
she argues that four motives were major triggers of participation: social-group dynamics, 
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volunteerism, coercion, and individual grievances coupled with family rivalries as 
motivating factors. Straus found support for these explanations and argued that ordinary 
Hutus were aided in their killing of Tutsis because they viewed all civilian Tutsis as 
“guilty by association.” Straus calls this “collective ethnic categorization,” where 
perpetrators viewed Tutsi neighbors who held no affiliation with the RPF as rebel spies or 
co-conspirators. This collective association rationalized killing of these civilians in the 
eyes of many Hutu perpetrators.678 Finally, Jean-Paul Kimonyo compares mass 
participation by ordinary Rwandans to the concentration camp system used in the 
Holocaust. In contrast to the Holocaust, Rwandan perpetrators used “a large part of the 
general Hutu population… [As] responsible for blocking Tutsis escape.”679 In essence, 
Kimonyo argues through widespread mass participation, perpetrators transformed the 
entire country into one big concentration camp.  
 In pre-genocide Rwanda the state was linked to society, in part, through political 
parties. Facing domestic and international pressure, Habyarimana began to open the 
political space in July 1990. Within eleven months Habyarimana had allowed a 
constitutional amendment that opened the political system to multiple parties. However, 
seeing the writing on the wall, some political parties began forming before this 
constitutional amendment. In all 15 were created. This one act by Habyarimana led to 
“…a brash and exuberant rush to publicize their cause and to recruit new members, party 
activists sporting caps and shirts with the party colors held demonstrations and 
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meetings… Local leaders flew the party flag on poles outside their homes or businesses, 
proud to be identified as the key persons for mobilizing adherents in that area.”680 These 
political parties organized youth wings which inevitably engaged in violence against their 
opponents.  
The MRND’s youth group was the infamous Interahamwe, the Kinyarwanda 
word for “we fight together.”681 The radical MDR formed its youth wing, the Inkuba, or 
“thunder,” and along with the Abakombozi, or “the liberators” of the PSD harassed 
MRND supporters.682 The CDR formed the Impuzamugambi, or “those with a single 
purpose,” who also partook in the violence.683 The French had provided training to the 
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi and was secretly supporting the CDR.684 The MDR 
attempted a broad approach to politics. They tried to recreate former president 
Kayibanda’s Paramehutu party structure – thus igniting further north-south tensions with 
Habyarimana’s MRND.685 Overall, the development of multiparty politics in Rwanda 
fueled societal tensions and provided the ground work for the transformation of youth 
wings into militias and ultimately genocidaires.  
French military instructors were responsible for training the Rwandan military. 
They were reportedly “very lax” in screening the candidates they trained at military 
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installations. Prunier writes, “…the result was that, possibly without realizing it, the 
French trained MRND(D) and CDR militiamen, the notorious Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi who were later to organize and lead the April-May 1994 genocide.”686 
This charge, which the French have always denied, gained tremendous momentum in 
Rwanda. So much so that French president Mitterrand was nicknamed 
“Mitterrahamwe.”687 The army was secretly providing more and more weapons to the 
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who in turn were using these weapons to kill Tutsis, 
rival opponents, and settle personal grievances.688 The Rwandan military was receiving 
regular deliveries of arms and munitions. Rwandan service members were selling these 
on the local black-market so much that Prunier personally came across grenades for sale 
at a public market next to avocadoes and mangoes in June 1993.689 The Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi largely recruited from the poor who resided in or near the capital. These 
militias relied heavily on “street boys, rag-pickers, car-washers and homeless 
unemployed. For these people the genocide was the best thing that could ever happen to 
them. They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful 
people as long as these were on the wrong side of the political fence.”690 In addition to 
taking orders, the extremist and hardline elements of the Interahamwe were freelancing 
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on their own.691 Settling scores and bringing violence on any who crossed them. And, 
during the genocide these perpetrators even murdered Tutsi women married to Hutus. 
According to one survivor’s accounts, “The administration forced Hutu men to kill their 
Tutsi wives before they go to kill anyone else- to prove they were true Interahamwe.”692 
The sad truth is that everybody participated – men and women. Men partook in the killing 
while “cheering their men [on, women were] participating in auxiliary roles, like the 
second line in a street-to-street battle.”693 
The main perpetrators of the genocide were ordinary Rwandan peasants. There 
were varying degrees of coercion exercised against ordinary Rwandans, but all efforts 
centered on one goal: to “kill the enemy Tutsi.”694 To explain the extent of Rwanda’s 
state-society coalition, we need to look no further than the wives of Interahamwe. This 
coalition was so vast that even these wives “had been reported to hit and beat Tutsi 
children on their way to fetch food and water.”695 It is clear that even the wives of 
Interahamwe militiamen accepted Straus’s idea of “collective ethnic categorization.” In 
tying this all together, the final element that sealed the state-society coalition was the 
birth and ferocity of the Hutu Power movement. Hutu Power was a fringe movement in 
the 1980s but rose to prominence and became a mainstream ideology in the early 
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1990s.696 The idea of Hutu Power can be traced back to the 1959 social revolution where 
the notion of a “Hutu nation” emerged.697 These ideas gradually drifted away under 
Habyarimana’s “reconciliation” government of 1973.698 As Habyarimana’s tenure 
endured and his prestige steadily declined Hutu Power filled the gap. Hutu Power 
advanced an age old génocidaire belief that Tutsis were “foreign” and “a race alien to 
Rwanda, and not an indigenous ethnic group.”699 We have seen the same ideological 
beliefs propagated by the Nazis against the Jews and Roman, by the Turks against the 
Armenians, and the Burmese against the Rohingya Muslims. This movement eventually 
culminated with the publication of the Hutu Ten Commandments on December 10, 
1990.700 These Ten Commandments forbade marriage, friendship, and the employment of 
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Tutsi women. They argued that Tutsis only sought ethnic supremacy of Hutus and should 
not be trusted. And, banned Tutsis from positions of power, the education sector, and the 
armed forces. In all this ideology empowered ordinary Hutu men and women to take 
action against Tutsis in their neighborhoods and watered the ground in preparation of the 
genocide. 
 
Cycle of Violence 
There are two approaches to examining Rwanda’s cycle of violence. There are 
pros and cons to each. The first method takes historical Hutu-Tutsi intergroup conflict 
and violence into account. This approach draws on historically important periods in 
Rwandan history, such as the 1959 social revolution, the 1963 Tutsi pogrom, 
Habyarimana’s ascension to power in 1973, and the 1990-1994 civil war and subsequent 
genocide. The second approach is more refined and merely begins analysis with the 1990 
civil war. I prefer the former approach as it establishes the context in which Rwanda’s 
mass political violence evolved.  
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Unlike Nazi Germany’s hatred of the Jewish people which remained relatively 
consistent (and comprehensive) over time, anti-Tutsi sentiment “has never been a 
constant in Rwandan history.”701 As illustrated above, the 1959 social revolution was a 
generational high point that reignited long standing intergroup tensions.702 The Bahutu 
Manifesto called for ethnic solidarity and was aimed at promoting a collective Hutu 
image.703 Any opponents of the social revolution were linked to “foreign enemies.” This 
meant the Tutsi in Rwanda were viewed as enemies of the revolution and by extension 
the state while linked to Tutsi diaspora as spies (ibiyetso). This period also saw the 
elimination of moderate voices in the socio-political space, which further radicalized 
domestic politics.704  
For all Habyarimana’s faults, illegal actions, and ultimate contributions to 
genocide in Rwanda, when he seized power in 1973 he immediately worked to bring 
“peace and stability” to Rwanda.705 He outlawed political parties and subdued but not 
eliminating intergroup mass violence. At no point were Tutsis considered equal citizens 
or even permanent residents of Rwanda. Tutsis were forced from public and military 
service. Discriminated against in vast sectors of the economy. But, good “governance 
was conditioned on the ability of the Tutsis to submit to Habyarimana’s rule and in 
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exchange they received a minimum level of security in lieu of state-directed violence.706 
To be crystal clear, this was not an enjoyable or ideal situation for Tutsis. That said, it 
was nominally better circumstances then what they experienced a decade previously.  
Between 1961 and 1966 there were as little as ten raids into Rwanda from Tutsi 
guerrilla fighters based in Burundi, referred to as inyenzi, or cockroaches by the Hutu 
regime.707 In 1962, after two successful raids which resulted in the death of three 
policemen, two public servants, and one Hutu civilian, the regime launched a reprisal 
attack and killed between 1,000 and 2,000 Tutsi men, women, and children, buried them 
in mass graves, and raided their homes and set them ablaze.708 The most successful 
“inyenzi” raid brought the fighters within 20 kilometers of Kigali. Sparkly widespread 
fears, the Hutu response was immediate and severe. This invasion, known today as the 
Bugesera invasion between November-December 1963, generated immediate reprisals by 
Hutu gangs and resulted in about 10,000 Tutsis massacred.709 Tensions remained between 
Hutus and Tutsis but were minimized under Habyarimana’s rule until the late 1980s.  
The Rwandan Patriotic Front launched its invasion from Uganda on October 1, 
1990. By the time of the invasion Habyarimana was losing political influence and 
popularity among Rwandans but did not see the RPF as a major threat.710 Despite 
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Habyarimana’s private confidences, he and his regime publicly exaggerated the RPF 
threat as a means of solidifying his domestic power base.711 Along with the invasion, 
Habyarimana linked domestic Tutsi residents – who had no connection to the RPF other 
than ethnicity – as “ibyitso,” or accomplices.712 This led to the further singling out of 
Tutsi through legal measures and social discrimination. Rwanda’s population was and is 
overwhelming rural. In most villages residents knew who were Hutu, Tutsi, or of mixed 
heritage. In these small, close knit communities no perpetrator needed to examine one’s 
identity card. They already knew who was to be targeted and killed.  
Habyarimana’s reconciliatory tone of the 1970s had disappeared by the end of 
1992. In its place he instigated attacks, and spurred the advancement of anti-Tutsi 
propaganda. Through his political savviness he was able to further drive a wedge between 
Hutu and Tutsi.713 As his fear of the RPF solidified he encouraged his supporters and the 
RTLMC radio station to attack the Tutsi “enemies” endorse Hutu Power propaganda. In 
response to the assassination of Rwanda’s sister nation’s president to the south – Burundi 
– in late 1993, the RTLMC took advantage of the Tutsi led assassination and presented 
similar fears to Rwandan audiences.714 Also during 1993 some of Habyarimana’s 
subordinates worries that the Interahamwe were becoming unmanageable and proposed 
the development of a “civilian self-defense force.”715 These militias were recruited 
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through the administrative channels and not through the party, like the Interahamwe was. 
These new recruits received training by former soliders and police officers “who would 
direct them in attacking the enemy in their communities.”716 Col. Théoneste Bagosora, 
chief of staff in the defense ministry at the time of the genocide, instructed all “civilian 
self-defense forces” to be given inexpensive arms like machetes, because supplying them 
all with firearms was deemed too costly.717 It was this decision by Bagosora that led to 
the much reported gruesome nature of Rwanda’s genocide. 
 
Decision Point 
Similar to the Holocaust, the decision point in Rwanda begins prior to the start of 
the genocide. In Rwanda, the assassination of Habyarimana on the evening of April 6, 
1994 was the triggering event that sparked his minions and the Akazu into action. 
However, these agents of the genocide had a plan in place prior to April 6 that allowed 
for them to initiate at a moment’s notice. Preparations for mass killing were well 
underway for some time by April 6. Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire was the UN 
Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 
1993. Dallaire sent a now infamous cable to the UN Peacekeeping Headquarters on 
January 11, 1994 which has been retroactively termed the “genocide fax.” In this fax 
Dallaire informed UN headquarters staff that he was “…put in contact with [an] 
informant by very very important government politician [who was] … a top level trainer 
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in the cadre of Interahamwe – armed militia of MRND.”718 Dallaire went on to say that 
the informant had admitted to training 1,700 Interahamwe militiamen in Rwandan 
military camps, just outside Kigali. He informed Dallaire that this contingent had been 
divided into groups of approximately 40 each and scattered throughout the capital. 
Dallaire subsequently informed New York that the primary mission of the Interahamwe 
was to register all Tutsi in Kigali and the informant suspected “…it is for their 
extermination. Example he gave [Dallaire speaking in reference to informant] was that in 
20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis.”719 With this cable alone, we can 
conclude that future perpetrators have planned on exterminating Tutsis for at least three 
months before Habyarimana’s assassination, we still do not know who fired the missile 
that took down his airplane on the night of April 6. Some have suggested that the RPF 
organized the assassination but there is little evidence to support this accusation.720 
Others have claimed it was Hutu extremists that organized the plot so they could use the 
ensuing crisis to launch their extermination campaign. Regardless of the exact culprits, 
what remains clear is that Hutu hardliners in the military and political space seized power 
and ordered one of the 20th centuries most swiftly executed genocides.  
By late March 1994, elite Hutu hardliners had announced their intentions to mass 
murder all Tutsis and any moderate Hutu politician and citizen that opposed 
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Habyarimana and the Hutu Power ideology.721 This pronouncement when acted upon 
would break the Arusha Accords and allow for a re-ignition of the civil war with the 
RPF. Alison Desforges eloquently summarizes the final preparations for mass murder:  
They had soldiers and militia ready to attack the targeted victims in the capital 
and in such outlying areas as Cyangugu in the southwest, Gisenyi in the northwest and 
Murambi in the northeast. But elsewhere they had not completed the arrangements. In the 
center of the country, they had successfully disseminated the doctrine of Hutu Power, but 
they were unsure how many ordinary people would transform that ideology into action. 
In other areas, particularly in the south, they had not won large numbers of supporters to 
the idea, far less organized them to implement it.722 
At approximately 10:20pm on the evening of April 6 word had spread from 
UNAMIR personnel at Kigali International Airport that “there has been an explosion.”723 
Dallaire had initially thought his weapons cache had been blown up but soon learned the 
explosion was from a plane crash. It was assured and eventually confirmed that the plane 
was Habyarimana’s own and ironic twist of fate had crashed into his very own 
presidential compound at Kanombe Camo located in the suburbs of Kigali.724 As news of 
the plane crash was broadcast on the RTLMC radio station, presidential guardsmen and 
Interahamwe loyalists lashed out in anger, “they headed straight for the homes of political 
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opponents of the president’s party and started mass killings.”725 The assassination of 
Habyarimana sparked an immediate call for mass murder of Tutsis in Kigali, which over 
the next few days quickly spread outwards to Rwanda’s provinces Moreover, this crisis 
reignited the civil war with the RPF, who had a battalion stationed in Kigali to protect 
their politicians during the Arusha process.  
Col. Bagosora, the army chief of staff, quickly stepped forward into the power 
vacuum created in the aftermath of Habyarimana’s assassination and formed a crisis 
committee which oversaw the mass killings and construction of road blocks throughout 
Kigali. The RTLMC immediately began broadcasting hate speech and calls to 
deliberately kill Tutsis “to avenge the death of our president.”726 As RTLMC had gained 
wide popularity in the preceding months, thousands of Rwandans heard these calls to 
action, and many answered. Politicians and local elites had previously disparaged 
RTLMC because: 
The station was rowdy and used street language, there were disc jockeys, 
pop music and phone-ins. Sometimes the announcers were drunk, 
particularly Noël Hitimana, whose jokes became offensive, vulgar and 
crude. RTLMC was designed to apple to the unemployed, the delinquents, 
and the gangs of thigs in the militia.727 
 
After April 6, no diplomat, politician, or bystander doubted the influence of 
RTLMC had over mobilizing Interahamwe and other perpetrators to kill. Announcers on 
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RTLMC regularly said the war against the RPF and by extension all Tutsis could not be 
won by the military alone, “…it required the participation of the entire Rwandan 
population. In one telling broadcast after the genocide had started, an announcer said: 
‘Stand up, take action… without worrying about international opinion.’”728 Just like 
Dallaire’s informant warned, death lists were widely distributed to future perpetrators, 
including the presidential guard, Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi, and others.729 It is clear 
from the historical record and eyewitness accounts that these murders were not 
spontaneous outbursts in response to Habyarimana’s death but part of a pre-planned 
effort to exterminate once and for all the Tutsis from Rwanda. 
This mass political violence episode was not a product of “ancient tribal hatreds” 
as some have argued. Nor were perpetrators exclusively driven by poverty and economic 
collapse.730 This genocide was the result of a “deliberate choice of a modern elite to 
foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power.”731 Like the leaders at the top, the 
managers, principal perpetrators, accomplices, and beneficiaries of the genocide were not 
sadists, monsters, or demons but simply put, “they were people who chose to do evil.”732 
While individual motivations vary (see Straus 2006 for more details on perpetrator 
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motives) perpetrators relentlessly sought out Tutsis and murdered them en masse until the 
RPF drove them from power.733  
We do not know the exact number of perpetrators who took part in the killing 
during 1994. There have been several attempts to estimate this figure. Straus conducted 
formal and informal interviews with perpetrators and senior government officials after 
the genocide. These government officials claimed there were three million 
perpetrators.734 Philip Gourevitch’s book We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be 
killed with our families, also supports this claim with his own interview of a presidential 
advisor.735 This figure likely over estimates the total number of perpetrators (including: 
leaders, managers, principal perpetrators, accomplices, and beneficiaries). According to 
UN and World Bank statistics, the population of Rwanda in 1994 was about seven 
million.736 If correct, this means about four out of every ten people were perpetrators in 
the genocide. Other observers have estimated that the real figure lies in the hundreds of 
thousands range.737 Jones argues that possibly only tens of thousands were implicated in 
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killing.738 Jones performs a rudimentary calculation. If the low estimate of victim is 
correct (i.e., 500,000 killed) and each perpetrator on average killed 10 people, then over 
the course of the genocide there was likely 50,000 perpetrators. To date, Straus in a 
separate article from his seminal book goes through painstaking detail to systematically 
estimate how many perpetrators there were. He concludes that the number is most likely 
between 175,000 and 210,000 people.739 We may never know the precise number of 
perpetrators, but we do know that most of them were overwhelming ordinary Rwandans 
who chose to do evil things to Tutsis and any Hutu who stood up for them.  
 
The Victims 
Within one hundred days of Habyarimana’s plane crash, about 75 percent of 
Tutsis in Rwanda were murdered.740 This would prove to be the twentieth century’s most 
swiftly executed genocide. Most of the Tutsis who died were killed within the initial days 
and weeks of the genocide. Just within Kibuye Precture, located in the west and 
bordering Lake Kivu, we saw 2.5 percent of all people killed during the genocide, 
murdered within the first 24 hours.741 There was also variation in violence across 
provinces. By enlarge “the percentage of Tutsis killed in a prefecture as a function of all 
Tutsis killed is similar to the percentage of Tutsis living in a prefecture as a function of 
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all Tutsis in Rwanda.”742 Moreover there was fluctuations in when the violence occurred.  
In some principalities Hutus began immediately and in others the perpetrators waited one 
to two weeks.743 We may never know the exact number of people killed. Initial estimates 
placed the number at about a half million killed.744 Many scholars have since used 
800,000 as a general marker of the civilian death toll, while others including the new 
post-genocide government placed the total death count closer to one million.745 Whether 
the number is 500,000 or one million the devastation left in the wake of perpetrator 
actions has been one of history’s worst atrocities. We should not gage our outrage by the 
top-line number of civilian deaths but by the actions of perpetrators. Victims endured 
such cruelty, torture, and savagery that scholars like Mamdani have documented: 
About forty-eight methods of torture were used countrywide. They ranged from 
burying people alive in graces they had dug up themselves, to cutting and opening 
wombs of pregnant mothers. People were quartered, impaled or roasted to death… 
[Quoting a survivor] ‘In some cases, victims had to pay fabulous amounts of money to 
the killers for a quick death.’746 
Most analysis of the genocide that focus primarily on the national level tend to 
overlook regional variations (like Straus uncovered) and the gendered dynamics of 
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violence. By the time of the genocide, there were over a dozen newspapers that had 
exploited intergroup animosities.747 These newspapers had a relatively small readership 
that was mostly confined to the capital district. Transient workers from the countryside 
would bring these papers to their home communities over the weekend. The periodicals 
regularly “printed graphic cartoons to portray Tutsi women using their supposed sexual 
prowess on U.N. Peacekeepers… and [sic] moderate Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana in various sexual posts with other politicians.”748 When the genocide 
began rape of Tutsi women was widespread, in part, because of these gendered and ethnic 
stereotypes that portrayed Tutsi women as “beautiful and desirable, but inaccessible to 
Hutu men whom they allegedly looked down upon…”749  
We may never know the exact number of women who faced widespread rape and 
abuse, but some observers believe that almost every woman who had survived the 
genocide was subject to this weapon of war.750 Rwandan culture, like many states around 
the globe stigmatizes sexual victimization and as a consequence this has kept women 
from reporting these incidents.751 According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda 
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René Degni-Segui, “rape was the rule and its absence the exception.”752 Christopher 
Mullins had identified three types of sexual victimization that occurred in 1994. The first 
were opportunist rapes, where individuals took advantage of the war and chaos. The 
second form was sexual enslavement, where women were held captive and repeatedly 
raped over an extended period of time. The third category of sexual violence was 
genocidal rapes, masses of perpetrators were ordered (or at minimum encouraged, teased, 
and pressured) to rape, humiliate and in some most gruesome encounters mutilated their 
victims. For those who protest the idea that rape can be used as an organized weapon of 
mass political violence, I highly suggest you read Carrie Sperling’s article “Mother of 
Atrocities.” In this influential work she notes that hundreds of patients in hospitals with 
AIDS were released and sent to rape women as “to cause slow, agonizing, painful 
deaths.”753 She reports that about two-thirds of genocide survivors are estimated to be 
HIV-positive from this organized sexual assault campaign.  
Not only were women’s experiences as victims of the genocide largely neglected 
by national accounts of the violence. So too was female involvement as perpetrators. 
Women played an active role as perpetrators in the genocide, but they have often been 
removed from the national discussion.754 Female perpetrators have been “depicted as 
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deviant anomalies and stripped of their gender and humanity.”755 Women were involved 
in direct and indirect means of violence. Jean Hatzfeld interviewed a prisoner after the 
genocide who said that “there were even healthy men who sent their wives to replace 
them for a day on the expeditions, but that didn’t happen often because it was 
illegitimate.”756 Beyond these cases, women were also implicated in indirect means of 
violence, that being, they exposed Tutsis in hiding, stealing, or looting for food.757 There 
was also “gender-specific mobilization” that fueled female perpetration of violence. One 
of the most influential mobilizing factors came from fear. For instance, Sara Brown 
reported, “One witness noted the sexual threat that Tutsi women represented led Hutu 
women to celebrate and encourage their mass killing: ‘now these [Hutu] ladies were 
saying now we have husbands because these [Tutsi women] will be killed.’”758 Another 
form of female perpetration of violence was a number of instances of women raping 
young Tutsi boys. One male victim of female-perpetrated gang rape recounted being 
drugged, stripped naked, undergoing sexual enslavement and being repeatedly raped by 
four women over the course of three days.759 This male survivor stressed that he was not 
alone in his suffering, but due to Rwandans’ notion of masculinity, this crime has gone 
grossly underreported.  
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Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was a high-profile female perpetrator. Pauline was 
associated with Madam Agathe Habyarimana, who supported her rise through the 
bureaucracy.760 After Habyarimana’s assassination, Pauline was sent to Butare Prefecture 
to organize the genocide there for the interim government. She frequently incited Hutus 
to exterminate Tutsis and Hutu “accomplices” and provided these militias with the 
weapons to do it.761 It has even been reported that she had her son drive her around the 
prefecture and announced from a loud speaker that Tutsi men should be killed and their 
women raped and murdered.762 The role of women in Rwanda’s 2994 genocide was 
complex. Women were both victims and perpetrators.  
Let me conclude with a brief discussion of the only organized Tutsi defense 
during the genocide. This resistance took place in the hills surrounding Bisesero, which is 
a particularly mountainous area in western Rwanda. The killings took place between 
April and June 1994. The chance of survival for Rwandan Tutsis was extremely low, but 
because of Bisesero’s high mountain ranges and organized defense, Tutsis in this area 
stood the best chance of survival. The first skirmishes took place within three days of 
Habyarimana’s plane crash. The Hutu belligerents were largely peasants armed with 
traditional weapons.763 As the resistance stiffened Hutu genocidaires called in 
reinforcements who were from the army, Presidential Guard, militias, and other local 
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people.764 The attackers knew the victims by name and would call out to them as a form 
of verbal terrorism. They would also chant “Tubatsembatsembe,” which translates to 
“eliminate them all.”765 Because Bisesero was the only area of Rwanda with organized 
ad-hoc collective resistance, the perpetrators made Bisesero a top priority. They wanted 
to deprive the Tutsis of a pyric victory and avoid embarrassment from their inability to 
defeat this collective civilian force. After all these Tutsis were not trained for combat. 
They fought for weeks armed with rocks and stones. One survivor described the battle as 
“the war of stones against bullets.”766 The Tutsi employed a tactic called “merging,” 
where they would lay flat on the ground and rise up at the very last minute to close ranks 
with the enemy so that the perpetrators could not use heavy weapons without fear of 
striking their own soldiers.767  
Genocidaires became so incensed with the elusive nature of the Tutsi in Bisesero 
that when they captured and killed members of this group they would at times behead the 
victim o take to the local prefect, “so [he could] receive his reward.”768 As the genocide 
wound down, there was a moment of hope for the approximate 2,000 survivors. Near the 
end of June, the French launched Operation Turquoise which on paper was to provide a 
“humanitarian protected zone” in south-western Rwanda. In reality the killing continued 
in this so-called protected zone. When French troops arrived at Bisesero, local militias 
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were attempting to convince the French that this location was already safe.769 Then Tutsi 
survivors rushed too French and put forward their French translator to convince the 
soldiers that they were in danger. They showed their wounds and the corpses of dead 
neighbors.770 Either unconvinced, under orders, or out of neglect, the French 
reconnaissance force left the area and returned four days later. By the time they had 
returned, of the 2,000 survivors, only about 1,000 remained alive.771 At the beginning of 
the genocide about 50,000 men, women, and children gathered in the hills a top of 
Bisesero. By the end of major hostilities only 1,000 survived. Unfortunately for these 
survivors their nightmare was not over. Even once killing had largely seized French 
soldiers grew irritated with any Tutsi who wishes to return to RPF held territory. One 
survivor wrote, that after a French soldier heard his request to transfer “…the attitude of 
the French soliders immediately changed, they became angry. They refused to give us 
any more food.”772 Operation Turquoise should be a warning sign of the dangers in 
allowing state’s with a vested interest in the domestic politics of a former client to 
conduct so-called “humanitarian” operations. No doubt lives could have been saved if 
humanitarian intervention took a different form. 
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Conclusion 
The Holocaust and Rwandan genocides represent one of history’s largest 
examples of mass political violence. Though each event is unique in its own right, they 
share similar conditions, tactics, and stratagems. There are four important conclusions 
that can be drawn from these two case studies. First, anti-group propaganda played an 
important role prior to the outbreak of mass violence. In each case periodicals were 
created to disperse disinformation about the target population. This distorted reality 
served to indoctrinate regime personnel and the masses. When the time came to 
exterminate all members of the victim group, individual perpetrators could rely on 
propaganda for encouragement and rationalization of their evil acts.  
The second element used in these two state-society coalitions was an extensive 
dehumanization campaign. Both the Jews and Tutsis were viewed as “foreign” 
populations to the host country. Each group were compared to sub-human creatures like 
cockroaches or vermin. In both episodes’ dehumanization came from the regime and 
from private organizations in society, thus giving the illusion of control in the 
dissemination of anti-group propaganda. Research shows that when individuals are 
exposed to dehumanized rhetoric overtime from a supra-individual entity (i.e., the state, 
military, or militia) and “feel controlled, they often respond by behaving in a less 
civilized, more antisocial manner.”773 Moreover, research shows that dehumanization 
denies both perpetrator and victim an individual sense of identity and community.774 
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When perpetrators de-individualize their neighbors as was the case in Jedwabne, Poland 
and Bisesero, Rwanda, the victimizers are exceedingly more likely to enact violence and 
cruelty on their neighbors, because they are not viewed as equals (i.e., human beings) or 
individuals worth mercy.  
A third important take away is the variation in how each state employed its 
regime power. Both Nazi Germany and Habyarimana’s Rwanda were strong states. 
Germany was a totalitarian state. There were no limits on the power and authority of 
Hitler and his henchmen and women. Rwanda was not a totalitarian state, but it was 
strongly authoritarian. The distinction is important. While Habyarimana, the Akazu, the 
MRND, and the military had supreme rule, it was not absolute. A second variation 
between these two case studies is how the regime applied its power. In Germany, 
particularly towards the beginning of the war, mid-level bureaucrats retained a great deal 
of authority in how they accomplished the regime’s goals. Eichmann’s 1939 deportation 
project is one such example. It was neither approved by his superiors nor coordinated 
with local civilian authorities. Eichmann candidly took it upon himself to organize this 
experiment in savagery. In Rwanda genocidaires did not employ initiative in the same 
way as Eichmann. The order of the day was essentially to “search and destroy” all Tutsis. 
No mid-level bureaucrats changed or experimented in this gruesome task. The irony here 
is that while Germany maintained the stronger state system, its perpetrators were granted 
more unilateral authority than those in Rwanda. 
Finally, there were also disparities in popular participation. When organized 
civilian militias or mobs engaged in violence against the Jews they did so with little 
attention or support of German forces. In these cases, it was relatively clear that the local 
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Jewish populations posed no direct threat to the perpetrators and as such German officials 
allowed local peoples to brutally murder their neighbors. The societal support here was 
auxiliary and complimentary to German forces. In Rwanda, popular participation was 
essential to the effectiveness of the genocide. Without organized societal support the 
genocide would not have been nearly as catastrophic. In this case the social appetite for 
violence was equal to if not more important than the levers of the state in carrying out 
mass political violence.  
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CHAPTER VI: HIDDEN TRENDS:  
STATE-SPONSORED GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
Introduction 
So far I have assessed the two dominant and historically prevalent types of mass 
political violence perpetrators – state perpetrators and state-society coalitions. These two 
categories have caused the most destruction of civilian populations in modern history. It 
is because of their severity in violence, that many, if not most Genocide Studies scholars 
have chosen to focus on these cases at the active or passive exclusion of lesser-known 
episodes of violence. Chapter six explores the final two categories of mass political 
violence perpetrators: state-sponsored groups and non-state actors. These groups may 
seem similar or even identical from an outsider’s perspective. However, they are in fact 
conceptually and empirically distinct types. Section two unpacks the theory underpinning 
state-sponsored groups, which is followed by its application to three case studies. Section 
three assesses the dynamic structural approach to non-state actors and subsequently 
applies this theory to three relevant case studies. What follows is a discussion of 
historically marginalized and “hidden trends” in Genocide Studies research, that are 
becoming ever more important in the modern world.  
 
A Dynamic Structural Approach to State-Sponsored Groups 
Compared to state actors and state-society coalitions, state-sponsored groups have 
been a historically understudied topic within Genocide Studies. There has been much 
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written about so-called “state-sponsored mass murder.”775 However, most authors use the 
term “state-sponsored” to reference mass violence that is primarily enacted by the state. 
Here I use the phrase “state-sponsored groups” to note mass political violence that is 
conceived by the state but carried out by sub-state or non-state armed groups (i.e., ethnic, 
religious, or political groups). These designated social groups implement violence on 
behalf of the state. These perpetrators may use a variety of tactics, including, mob 
violence, looting, slash-and-burn methods, or vigilantism against the regime’s opponents. 
The primary difference in this category from state actors is that, the government lacks the 
appropriate resources or political will or determination to carry out violence on its own. 
Therefore, the government seeks assistance from social groups to kill on its behalf. This 
does not mean government soldiers will not partake in the violence. They are not the 
primary aggressors.   
What is the existing polity structures of societies willing and able to use state-
sponsored mass political violence? Regime power is ranked from moderate too high. In 
these instances, the regime may control the capital, city, suburbs, and key municipalities 
across its land but it cannot exercise complete control over the population and territory. 
Therefore, regime power is moderate too high but geographically constrained to major 
municipalities. State capacity in these contexts is low. This is indicative of the fact that 
the regime is limited to specific areas. However, the restrictions of regime power and 
state capacity are aided by substantial support from organized social units. These social 
groups exist and support the regime’s goals. They are eventually used as frontline 
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perpetrators in the mass political violence of the regime. They may support the regime for 
a variety of reasons: a transactional association with the regime, perhaps an offer of 
greater regional autonomy post-conflict, or these groups may be ideologically aligned 
with the goals and objectives of the state. Regardless of the specific motive, what is clear, 
is that these social groups will become a central part of the ensuing violence.  
Why might a government subcontract social groups to kill on its behalf? Beyond 
the limitations of its own authority and power, government agents may seek to preserve a 
semblance of anonymity or distance themselves from this state-orchestrated violence. 
There are many examples of states employing this clandestine military strategy. For 
instance, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered elite Russian military units to capture 
the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in March 2014.776 These troops were called “highly 
organised local “self-defence groups” or “little green men.”777 According to the Russian 
government, these “self-defense groups” were organized by locals who took it upon 
themselves to purchase uniforms and hardware from “a shop.”778 By ordering these 
Russian soldiers to remove all insignia from their uniforms and to deny any association 
with the government, Putin’s regime was able to distance themselves from this act of 
aggression. In this case the clandestine nature of the regime was not sufficient in 
distracting the international community and media from the true culprits. That said, it is a 
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prime example of why regimes distance themselves from groups. Secondly, Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and use of “little green men” were in fact government troops. 
When we apply this strategy to state-sponsored mass political violence, the “little green 
men” would be from a social group and not the national military.  
Where would we see this kind of mass political violence? To reiterate and clarify, 
there are at minimum three specific circumstances that are conducive to state-sponsored 
groups. First, states where governmental and regime power has limited to no ability to 
govern all territorial provinces under its control. The second circumstance is in fragile, 
weak, or collapsed states experiencing conflict and violence. Finally, state-sponsored 
groups are likely to be used when the regime wishes to maintain an aura of international 
prestige and innocence and aims to side step public outrage and blowback from the 
principal perpetrators of violence.  
What is the likely sustained killing capacity of state-sponsored groups? Due to the 
limitations explained above, I argue that state-sponsored groups as perpetrators of mass 
political violence are likely to be less severe in absolute terms of victim body counts, 
compared to state actors and state-society coalitions. The limitations on coordinating 
groups of perpetrators, inter-perpetrator group communication, and supply problems, and 
the clandestine nature of this type of violence all contribute to this moderate killing 
capacity.  
Finally, who exactly are the perpetrators of mass political violence? The state and 
its regime elites remain the leaders in the hierarch of perpetrators (see Figure 3.1). The 
leaders are responsible for orchestrating and planning the actions of frontline personnel. 
The managers – the interlocutors between leaders and frontline perpetrators – are from 
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the local groups who will enact violence. Finally, the principal perpetrators are from local 
or regional social, ethnic, political, religious, or mercenary groups. These frontline 
“troops” may be supported and/or directed by government forces. However, government 
troops are relegated to a supportive or coordination role.  
 
Brief Case Studies: State-Sponsored Groups 
Massacres of Armenians in Ottoman Empire 
The first case study in state-sponsored groups took place in the Ottoman Empire 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the regime 
used a variety of tactics and methods of mass political violence. This example is confined 
to the 1894-96 and 1909 massacres. The Ottoman socio-political system was divided into 
two “…antiethical entities: the ruling nation (millet hâkime) and the subject nation (millet 
mahküme).”779 Central to this superior-inferior dichotomy was the Ottoman Islamic 
belief that the faithful (i.e., Muslims) were superior to the “infidels” (i.e., non-
Muslims).780 This religious belief was ingrained in Ottoman law. Armenians were the 
dominant non-Muslim minority in Asia Minor. Their inferior and precarious status was 
exacerbated by the absolute denial of the right to bear arms.781 Finally, Ottoman 
minorities – the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks – operated many of the empire’s 
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businesses and farms. Despite their essential function, “many of these populations were 
also subject to conditions tantamount to slavery on farms and plantations.”782  
At the national level, tensions between the Ottoman Turks and Armenians 
stemmed from “maladministration, mark by blight and ineptness,” which increased the 
Armenians distressed conditioned.783 Outside interventionist responses “from Russia, 
England and France furthered the tensions.”784 However, it was during these outside 
interventions that the Armenians were able to “jar themselves loose from the Ottoman 
yoke.”785 Contrary to their sister groups in the Balkans, the Armenians initially did not 
want independence from the Sultan, but rather greater local autonomy. This call for 
greater local control over their lives grew into a nationalist-independence movement.786  
Abdul Hamid II was the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was known as the 
“Great Assassin.”787 Hamid consolidated power in the executive branch (his seat of 
power) within the constitutional monarchy.788 The weak institutional constraints on 
Hamid’s monarchy “largely dissolved themselves” which soon gave way to an 
“unfettered autocracy” and eventually pure “despotism.”789 Hamid did not intervene on 
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behalf of the Armenians during the massacres of 1894-1896. In fact, he implemented new 
Armenian policies that endorsed anti-Armenian persecution and state sanctioned 
violence.790 In the wake of these efforts the Armenian reform movement emerged and 
confronted the Ottoman regional and central governments.791  
In anticipation of more conflict with the Armenian minority, Hamid established 
“an irregular force of pro-government Kurdish horsemen called the Hamidiye.”792 By 
1899 their numbers swelled from 33 to 63 regiments.793 These quasi-official regiments 
received ranks, uniforms, regimental badges, firearms, and with them, the license to 
intensify the level of persecution of the unarmed and highly vulnerable Armenian 
population…”794 These regiments played a key role in the 1894-96 massacres. Hannibal 
Travis compares the Hamidiye of Ottoman Turkey to the Janjaweed horsemen in Darfur, 
Sudan circa 2003-2005, an analogy worth noting.795 Many Kurdish leaders benefited 
from authority and public offices in the Ottoman regime. These elders used their official 
powers to “prey upon and oppress the country people,” and inflict “innumerable 
oppressions and wrongs upon the Armenians and Assyrians.”796 French Ambassador Paul 
Cambon wrote the Ottoman government had “for the last few years, been pursuing its 
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goals of gradually annihilating the Christian element… giving the Kurdish chieftains 
carte blanche to do whatever they please to enrich themselves at the Christians 
“expense.”797  
Sultan Hamid II initiated an empire-wide plan to massacre Armenians that lasted 
two years (circa 1894-1896). This vast effort claimed between 250,000 and 300,000 lives 
from both direct and indirect methods of violence.798 The perpetrators used “special 
cudgels or sticks that were fitted with a piece of iron” to inflict great bodily trauma on 
their victims.799 There was also organized popular participation in these massacres that 
were led by Mullahs on Fridays during “special religious services.”800 Moreover, in some 
towns convicts were temporarily released from prison “for massacre duty” against 
Armenian civilians.801 These massacres were clearly orchestrated by agents of the state. 
Nearly all perpetrators were spared legal prosecution and punishment, thereby confirming 
once again the nature of state-sponsored mass political violence.  
In addition to the 1894-1896 empire-wide massacres, the 1909 Adana massacre of 
Armenians is yet another example of state-sponsored groups mass political violence. 
Adana was a major city of the Vilayet in southern Turkey.802 Some 25,000 Armenians 
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fell victim to this bloodbath of violence.803 Dinah Shelton writes, “…the level of 
fiendishness and ferocity of which exceeded those of all other episodes of mass murder 
against the Armenians, including the World War I genocide.”804 What factors led to this 
hellish nightmare that so many Armenian men, women, and children faced? One 
contributing factor was the wealth accumulated by Armenian survivors of the 1894-1896 
massacres served as a catalyst for intrepid perpetrators in 1909.805 Some Armenians 
espoused “aggressive” nationalist rhetoric which contributed to the polarization of 
Ottoman Turks and Armenians. This rhetoric fueled intergroup conflict and fed national 
narratives. Finally, there were large numbers of people who identified with the monarchy, 
local religious and military leaders who enthusiastically joined in the violence once it had 
begun. Their personal and socio-political bonds to perpetrators helped to swell their ranks 
and recruit likeminded “soldiers” for this intense massacre.  
There is no question that the massacres of the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
were “centrally directed” by Sultan Hamid II and the subsequent Young Turks.806 The 
key question here is what makes these mass political violence episodes conceptually and 
empirically different from state-led mass political violence? One crucial element is the 
reliance on third-party organizations to implement and carryout these savage massacres 
of Armenians. The use of third-party organizations for this purpose is further flushed out 
in the next two case studies.  
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The 1960s “Congo Crisis” 
 As witnessed in the Ottoman Empire, state-sponsored groups can take the form of 
organized militiamen who are given military rank, uniforms, and a quasi-official status. 
However, this avenue of state-sponsored group perpetrators requires more than a little but 
not quite substantial recruitment, coordination, oversight, and planning by governmental 
officials. There is another approach available to regimes in this predicament. It is less 
expensive, at least in terms of direct government oversight. States may hire mercenaries 
or as we have come to call them “private security companies” to do their bidding.807 
Patrick Baker writes, “Mercenaries have existed as long as organized armies have 
existed, they have been despised and denigrate. Aristotle wrote of them, as did 
Machiavelli.”808 Baker is correct, mercenary armies were the mainstay in antiquity where 
standing and ad-hoc armies would be comprised of individuals seeking financial or 
personal gain. The benefit of these “armies” to the state lie in their ability to assemble 
quickly and support the usually meager internal security forces.  
 There are two types of mercenaries. The first is a traditional soldier, individual or 
group that is for hire. They may be hired to supplement existing standing armies. They 
might be hired for their expertise in a given area. Or, they may be hired to preserve 
anonymity and plausible deniability on behalf of the state. The second type of mercenary 
is what some may call “the soldier of fortune.” These soldiers belong to a well-organized, 
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hierarchical structure, unified and run as a corporation. In fact, they are legally registered 
corporations. Academi is one such company, though most know them by their former 
name, Blackwater. Erick Prince, a former navy seal team member, founded the company 
in the late 1990s. Blackwater was heavily criticized for its role in the 2003 Iraq War. But 
there are many companies around the globe that can perform the same duties (and 
deserve the same attention) as Blackwater. For example, ICTS International N.V. is an 
Israeli owned and operated company; Northbridge Security Group is registered in the 
Dominican Republic but operates branch offices in the U.S., U.K., and Ukraine; AEGIS 
Defense Services is a British private security company; so is KBR, however KBR has 
expanded its focus to also include engineering and construction services and is based in 
the U.S.; and the list goes on and on. It is no surprise that corporate security forms hate 
being lumped in with “traditional” mercenaries. From their perspective private security 
corporations provide “vital services in conflict, post-conflict, and disaster relief 
operations.”809 For clarity in understanding, I use H.C. Burmester’s conceptualization of 
mercenaries: “…A mercenary [is] a volunteer who, for monetary reward, enters into an 
agreement to fight for the armed forces belonging to a foreign state or an entity 
purporting to exercise authority over a country or people or a part thereof.”810  
 The so-called “Congo Crisis” is an example of state-sponsored groups as 
mercenaries. On June 30, 1960 Congo-Kinshasa gained independence from Belgium. 
Soon after independence, Congo experienced severe socio-political chaos, which has 
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become known as the “Congo Crisis.” Lazlo P.C. Passemiers eloquently defines the 
“crisis” as “…a power struggle over who was most suitable and entitled to administer and 
control Congo, and what political model and ideological trajectory the newly independent 
state should follow.”811 The crisis began as “sporadic bursts of localized violence and 
protest” during the immediate aftermath of independence.812 This localized violence 
snowballed into widespread chaos that led to the secession of Katanga Province and 
South Kasai. Beyond national domestic violence, Congo was soon to be another proxy 
battle of the Cold War rivalry. A U.N. peacekeeping mission was authorized after 
Congo’s first democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated. 
This mission led to “the emergency of the popular Kwilu and eastern rebellions; and the 
enlistment of a large contingent of foreign white mercenaries.”813  
 The secession of Katanga Province was a major milestone in the escalation of 
violence. Katanga’s governor Moïse Tshombe declared independence from Congo on 
July 11, 1960. Tshombe earned immediate support from the Katangese Mining Company 
and Belgium.814 During this two-year long uprising, Tshombe relied on three sources for 
armed support. He used rural youth groups in north Katanga, gendarmerie, and beginning 
in “January 1961 [Tshombe] had reinforced [these troops] … with white mercenaries 
from Belgium, France, South Africa, and Rhodesia.”815 As hypothesized, Tshombe relied 
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on mercenaries – principally from South Africa and Rhodesia – as a last resort.816 
Tshombe lacked the resources to wage this violence and secessionist movement on his 
own. As Passemiers notes, Tshombe was well aware of the political repercussions in 
using (white) mercenaries to do his dirty work, but his view was that he had no other 
choice than to risk damaging his public image.817 There was vast intergovernmental 
exchanges between Western and African nations over the question of supporting 
Katanga. The U.S. approached Belgium to enquire if they would send troops to calm the 
situation and provide security. Belgium ultimately declined to send frontline troops but 
did increase its military technical advisors.818 Tshombe reached out to the governments in 
Senegal, Ethiopia, and Nigeria for assistance but his overtures were rebuffed. Once these 
avenues were closed he was “forced to rely on a white mercenary force. Brussels and 
Washington supplied the necessary finances and equipment to make this force 
operational.”819  
 There has not been extensive scholarly analysis of the mercenaries involved in the 
Congo Crisis. According to Passemiers most of the literature has been rooted in “un-
academic” and “biased” approaches. The majority of work on this topic has relied on the 
personal accounts of ex-mercenaries to describe the conflict – thus undoubtedly skewing 
the reporting in favor of them.820 The decision to use mercenaries as a state-sponsored 
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group beholden to Tshombe was a decision made out of principally domestic factors. 
That said, the government of South Africa allowed its citizens to be recruited and 
funneled to Katanga so that “Pretoria… [could] test international reactions as well as its 
own capacity to fill the vacuum which had resulted from the withdrawal of the European 
powers.”821 Stephen Clarke argues that the use of South African mercenaries was a 
“symbolic marker” used by the South African government to preserve white apartheid 
role over the region.822 It is clear Tshombe’s decision to use mercenaries had exogenous 
effects and benefited other countries, but that does not minimize their use in Congo.  
 The government of Katanga made three types of requests to South Africa. 
Tshombe wanted South Africa and other (African and non-African) nations to recognize 
Katanga’s independence, engage in commerce and trade, and with special emphasis on 
South Africa to supply arms and munitions.823 Katanga used South Africa as a 
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commercial hob for importing goods and disguising weapons as goods for delivery.824 
There were reports of non-sanctioned aircraft flying to and from Katana-South Africa. It 
is speculated that these likely carried goods that were meant to stay off the political radar 
and support Tshombe’s movement. However, South Africa was not a complete “open-
border” ally for Katanga. Despite much arms begin sent to South Africa and funneled to 
Katanga via Angola, the South African government did intervene to stop several 
“questionable material” in transit.825 It is likely the government performed these 
interdiction measures to combat international accusations by U.N. member states that 
linked South Africa to Katanga rebels.826 Therefore, secrecy was key on behalf of both 
parties.  
 We understand Tshombe’s goals vis-à-vis the regional hegemon. Why might 
South Africa choose to support and aid or at minimum allow those within their borders to 
support and aid Katanga? Just briefly, there may be three such reasons. First, South 
Africa remained an apartheid state and as such did not support the decolonization of 
Congo. The white minority government wanted to avoid “the emergence of a black 
Congolese government.”827 Belgium and South Africa did not enjoy amicable diplomatic 
relations before decolonization, and the governments had no such hope of improvements 
after independence. Tension with former colonial overlords and now independence 
African states were a constant source of frustration and anxiety for South Africa. The 
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second possible motive of support would be to minimize refugee/migrant flows 
southward.  
There were concerns that a considerable number of refugees on the copper 
belt would want to immigrate to South Africa, but [South Africa’s High 
Commissioner in Salisbury, Harold Taswell] warned that many of them 
were not of the most desirable type. These undesirable refugees were 
mostly Greek, Maltese, Cypriot, and Italians, noting that many of them 
look like the real ducktail type.828 
 
Finally, as has been the motivation for many decades, if not centuries, the government 
wanted access to Katanga’s rich mineral reserves.829 All considered, these are three 
possible motivations behind South Africa’s track-two support for Tshombe’s secessionist 
government.  
 Based on the available record, the first point of contact between Katanga and 
South African mercenaries dates back to August 1960.830 Further mercenary recruitment 
occurred in January 1961 – which sought support in France and Belgium.831 And, 
recruitment picked up in March 1961, with many South Africans joining the call. As 
discussed, the government in Pretoria was not directly involved in the recruitment 
process but “it was certainly well aware of it.”832 According to the literature, there is no 
record of any instance where the South African government prevented an individual from 
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joining the Katanga mercenary force.833 These men would eventually form the bulk of V 
Commando that was deployed in the northern Katanga region.834  
 The “Congo Crisis” was not confined to Katanga. There were rebellions in the 
east too. First, the Mulelists uprising and revolt was led by a former minister of the 
deceased prime minister’s cabinet, Pierre Mulele.835 Mulele initiated his revolt after 
returning from Communist China in 1963. The Mulelists would not achieve any “major 
military victory” but nonetheless have caused between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths.836 A 
second rebellious group called the Simbas, launched a revolt in July 1964. On July 21 the 
Simbas took the city of Kindu and then captured Stanleyville, Congo’s third largest city, 
on August 4.837 In a shocking surprise to all, the Simbas gained control of more than one-
third of Congo.838 The Simbas were largely composed of random groups of fighters who 
were not trained soldiers.839 These men were “…especially ill disciplined. Acts of 
fetishism and witchcraft were widespread in their ranks, and as their defeats accumulated 
their previously good relations with local population[s] deteriorated.”840  
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 Let me briefly say another word on external involvement in the Congo Crisis. 
Piero Gleijeses quotes Carl Rowan, a former director of the U.S. Information Agency in 
his article “‘Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!’” as writing in a memorandum to the 
president:  
A real danger that in saving the present situation in the Congo we… could 
lose the longer range struggle for all of Africa. I am particularly concerned 
about the damaging implications of possible press reports that United 
States’ planes are hauling Belgian guns to be used by South African and 
Southern Rhodesian mercenaries to kill Africans and to protect Tshombe 
and European financial interests.841 
 
The U.S. Ambassador to Congo said of the mercenaries, “… [they are] an uncontrollable 
lot of toughs… who considered looting or safecracking fully within their prerogatives.”842 
Finally, there is no record of any U.S. official disagreeing with Katanga’s use of 
mercenaries. They only noted that their deployment in Congo would constitute a “pyrrhic 
[victory] if it caused a backlash in Africa or at home.”843  
 By 1963 Tshombe’s effort to secure an independent Katangese state had 
collapsed. In 1964 Tshombe became prime minister in Congo under a nationally unified 
government. Here Tshombe “looked to recruit [again] a mercenary force to bolster the 
military position. Under the direction of South African Mike Hoare, a mercenary army 
was rapidly assembled.”844 Whether leading the Katanga independence movement or 
Congo writ large, Tshombe was an advocate of state-sponsored mercenary groups. So 
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much so that by mid-1964 Hoare’s mercenary force had recruited dozens of South 
African, Rhodesian, Belgian, Italian, and German fighters.845  
 Recall that the Simbas captured Stanleyville for an extended period of time. After 
111 days of occupation, the Congolese mercenaries launched an operation to retake 
control of the city, called “Operation Red Dragon.”846 The attack was two-pronged. 
Belgian paratroopers were flown in and dropped over the city while the mercenary force 
named “Ommegang,” or the parade, charged over land.847 There are many stories of the 
Ommegang’s brutality, including rape and murder.848 The Observer publication covered 
the atrocities. Ludo De Witte writes, “One image shows [in The Observer] a group of 
mercenaries arguing about who was going to hang two Africans. Other images showed 
executions by firing squad and hangings of prisoners. Some African prisoners were even 
used for target practice.”849 When the final attack commenced, the Belgian troops seized 
control of the city center and Ommegang approached from the exterior. Once Ommegang 
entered the city, “a massacre ensued.”850 The victims of these atrocities did include the 
Simbas, rebels writ large, Mulelists, and other insurgents, “but in reality the victims were 
very often ordinary inhabitants of the city.”851 Belgian press reported on this nightmarish 
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situation, saying “the inhabitants of Stanleyville are going into hiding and they are right 
to do so. Black citizens that dare to show themselves in the streets risk their lives. Simbas 
or not, any and all Africans were targeted.”852 There was undoubtedly a racial 
component. To celebrate their “victory” mercenaries committed crimes, looted, 
plundered, and raped the city. The perpetrators were nearly all white.853  
 Despite all the atrocities endured during the capture of Stanleyville, the real 
horrors came a week later. After Belgian troops left, any restraint that had been exercised 
over the Ommegang evaporated. It was upon their Belgian compatriots’ departure that the 
mercenaries began to systematically “cleanse” the city.854 In a blatant effort 
demonstrating their plans, mercenaries’ setup a perimeter around the city to establish a 
secure killing zone.855 Victor Nendaka, who had previously formed “security squads” in 
1960, used these troops to assist the mercenaries in their killings. There were 50,000 
people who had gathered in a stadium. The perpetrators systematically identified Simbas 
and their supporters. According to reports, the actions of perpetrators were so gruesome 
that most personal accounts did not go into the details. Here the Nendaka “security 
squads,” more accurately termed “killing squads” performed the vast amount of violence 
while the other white mercenaries “relieve[d] the wounded from their suffering by 
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finishing them off while the Congolese took great satisfaction in seeing their opponents 
suffer and die slowly.”856 
 The Congo Crisis is somewhat a misnomer, it should be named the Congo Crises 
to better explore the multifaceted, complex nature of violence. Beyond the assassination 
of Congo’s first democratically elected prime minister, casualty figures include the 
various secession movements and rebellions. There is a combined estimate of between 
138,045 and 264,800 deaths attributed to all crises.857 Establishing clear victim thresholds 
is difficult. However, one can reliably conclude the victim casualties were greater than 
10,000 within a 12-month period. And, mercenaries were an instrument used by both 
domestic and international actors. It is clear that their involvement in Congo contributed 
to a higher death toll.  
 
Mass Political Violence and Genocide in Darfur 
 At the time of the Darfurian rebellion and mass political violence, Sudan was the 
largest country in Africa. Darfur has long been a marginalized province. The Darfurian 
people were neglected long before Sudan became independent. This policy of neglect 
dated back to British colonial rule. In January 2003, the Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched attacks 
on crucial military outposts.858 The SLM and JEM insurgencies ignited a war for 
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independence and autonomy. By the middle of 2003, the Government of Sudan, led by 
president Omar Hassan al-Bashir, responded to the Darfurian rebel movements by 
ordering “a massive campaign of killing and expulsion [that was] carried out both by 
regular army troops [primarily in a support capacity] and by a proxy force known as the 
Janjaweed.”859 Right from the beginning Khartoum’s policy was one of death and 
destruction. There would be no negotiation, no truce, the Sudanese government would 
conquer and subdue the people of Darfur by any means necessary. This genocide is a 
classic example of “how a dominant center manages its peripheries.”860  
 Darfur had a history of armed movements vis-à-vis its internal relations and 
neighbors. In the 1980s to 1990s, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had 
tried to “provoke an uprising in Darfur.”861 One reason the SPLA wanted Darfurians to 
rebel was to create a unified front against the politicians in Khartoum, who had embraced 
an ideology of Arab supremacy over the western and southern Christians.862 Darfur’s 
relative deprivation expounded with a drought and subsequent famine in the mid-1980s. 
As s these challenges were not enough, the Zaghawa, a Muslim ethnic group, had toppled 
the Chadian government in 1990 but were also very reluctant in directly confronting 
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Khartoum.863 The immediate problem for the Zaghawa was fighting the Awlad Zeid Arab 
nomads who had fought the Zaghawa for years. Darfur’s history of violence and restraint 
from attacking forces aligned with and of the government of Sudan was wearing thin by 
the early 2000s.  
 The modern Darfur rebel movement began to organize itself in 2001, just two 
years prior to the start of the rebellion. These small militia groups had “little more than 
weapons… for personal defense.”864 Violent clashes between the Zaghawa and Awlad 
Zeid forces reached a point of no return in May 2001 when the latter group killed more 
than 70 Zaghawa at an important watering hole.865 In the aftermath, government forces 
deployed to the area forced the Zaghawa people away from this vital natural resource. 
This incident convinced many Zaghawa that their fight was not only with other local 
tribes but with the national government. Between 2001 and 2003 all competing rebel 
forces met and agreed to fight under a loose coalition.866 This confederation did not last 
long nor achieve much success. It was riddled with infighting and backstabbing. 
Eventually by 2002 the organizational structure was cemented. A member of the Fur 
group would be named chairman, a Zaghawa was to be the chief of staff, and a Masalit 
was the deputy chairman.867 Once the conflict reached a boiling point in 2003, the SLA 
and JEM led separate but sometimes coordinated attacker on the state and its state-
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sponsored groups. The SLA was typically less funded and supported than the JEM.868 
The JEM also benefited from a more disciplined hierarchical structure. Despite these 
differences the rebel movements continued to fight on.  
 How did the violence against Darfurian civilians unfold? Once fighting erupted, 
the rebels achieved quick success. They killed nearly 700 police officers, destroyed more 
than 80 police buildings, and had wounded another 500 persons.869 The rebels claimed 
responsibility for these attacks and blamed Khartoum for having marginalized and 
keeping Darfur in a perpetual underdeveloped state.870 The government responded to 
these vicious attacks by formalizing and arming the Janjaweed, an irregular paramilitary 
force, to counterattack the rebels. The Janjaweed were the principal perpetrators of 
violence. However, the national army and air force supported the Janjaweed in bombing 
Zaghawa and other villages, then allowing the Janjaweed to ride in to town on horseback 
and slaughter the survivors.871 Why did Khartoum rely, in part, on local defense forces 
and irregular paramilitary units (Janjaweed) to combat the rebels in Darfur? One reason 
was that al-Bashir and his military commanders could not guarantee where the loyalty of 
individual units resided – in the national military. Some estimates placed over half of the 
Sudanese armed forces personnel as coming from Darfur.872 This created a dilemma for 
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Khartoum. Obviously the military could not rely on units to murder their own families or 
neighbors. Therefore, the Janjaweed would be more useful here. The second reason is 
that, as I have argued in other case studies, the government did not want to be connected 
to the killing of civilians. In fact, the government consistently and forcefully denied 
having any connection with the Janjaweed.873 This means the government could rely on 
soldiers to kill Darfurians because they had no personal restrictions and they could deny 
any association with the campaign to slaughter innocent civilians.  
 We now understand who the perpetrators were. Let us turn to their tactics for 
accomplishing mass political violence. Part of the reason the crisis in Darfur reached 
monumental levels, was due to Khartoum’s use of direct and indirect methods of 
violence. Al-Bashir’s government ordered the bombing of villages by the Sudanese Air 
Force. Then instructed its frontline perpetrators to burn what was left to ashes. These 
Janjaweed “devils on horseback” also murdered, raped, and systematically destroyed 
Darfurians livelihoods.874 Khartoum’s harshness did not end once violence subsided. 
After each village was bombed, burned, and broken Khartoum denied access to these 
areas to prevent humanitarian assistance. This act alone sealed the fate of survivors who 
could not receive adequate medical care or basic necessities to survive. In 2004, 
government troops and the Janjaweed launched a large scale invasion of northern Darfur 
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which forced the rebels to retreat.875 Even though an African Union force had been 
deployed, the killings, mass rape, starvation, and despair of Darfur’s population 
continued.876 The Janjaweed used rape as a particularly brutal tactic against women.877 
Because of the social stigma attached to rape survivors, the Janjaweed raped women en 
masse so that they died a thousand deaths of humiliation.  
 When we expose Sudan’s use of state-sponsored groups to carry out the 21st 
century’s first genocide, we see six distinct categories of pro-government forces deployed 
in Darfur. These six go beyond use of the national military and police force.878 These 
forces were: The Peace Force; the Nomad Protection Forces; the Um Bakha irregular 
forces; the Um Kwak attacker force; the Popular Defense Force; and the Popular Police 
Force.879 All six of the groups worked closely with the Janjaweed and the national 
military and police forces. Further supporting Darfur as an example of state-sponsored 
groups mass political violence can be found in the International Criminal Court arrest 
warrant for al-Bashir where they charged hum as responsible for coordinating the 
Janjaweed and other groups.880 The Janjaweed find their origins back to the 1970s and 
1980s. They formed out of the “local politics of Darfur and the military mobilization of 
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Chadian Arabs under Libyan sponsorship.”881 The Janjaweed were “activated” in 2001 
and 2003 as a result of certain agreements between Arab tribal leaders. As the war heated 
up, other Arab and non-Arab groups were outfitted and deployed with the Janjaweed in 
eastern and southern Darfur.882  
 The term Janjaweed is used to describe armed Arab tribes. However, this term is 
widely used by outsider groups. The “Janjaweed” prefer to call themselves “horsemen,” 
(Furson).883 As Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace wrote, these armed groups 
were truly “the devil that came on horseback.”884 The Janjaweed were an ideal state-
sponsored group. They shared Khartoum’s ideology of Arab supremacy and were willing 
agents of mass political violence.  
 The Janjaweed began in an abrupt, ad-hoc capacity. However, after several initial 
years and the evolution of the crisis in Darfur, Janjaweed forces were quickly 
regularized. They moved from an ad-hoc force into a “semi-regularized or paramilitary” 
force under direction from Khartoum.885 To put it plainly, before the Darfurian rebellion 
they were localized militias. After the rebellion and their cooptation by al-Bashir’s 
government, the Janjaweed were “official,” but unrecognized public forces of the 
national government. It is vital to note that other Arab and non-Arab militias were formed 
and used as weapons of war by the state. These competing groups were just as gruesome 
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and effective at killing.886 For instance, one such militias were the Murahalin. These 
militiamen partook in the 1987 massacre of “Dinka people in el Da’ien.”887 Having 
shown their long time willingness to resort to violence, as a military, the Murahaliin 
joined the internal conflict in Darfur at the direction of Khartoum.888 The government 
even made overtures to reconcile “intertribal” conflict so that their hand was strengthened 
vis-à-vis the rebels.889 All this demonstrates the secretive nature of the national 
government and the lengths by which Khartoum went to cover its tracks in the pursuit of 
mass political violence.  
 What were the aims of perpetrators in Darfur? There are two broad answers to this 
question. First, in a narrow view, the government sought to stabilize Darfur and halt 
further secessionist movements. One way albeit violent, was to employ Arab militias 
including the Janjaweed to carry out attacks in Darfur as a means to stabilize the 
rebellion. This goal was criticized by local tribal leaders, especially by those who were 
not on the frontlines of violence.890 These leaders accurately pointed out that by using 
Janjaweed and other militias in lieu of the professional, regularized troops enabled the 
violence to spin out of control. As argued at the time, it is difficult for irregular forces to 
follow internal norms, laws, and moral code once intertribal violence begins. They were 
simply unable to control themselves from massacring everyone in sight. Moreover, local 
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leaders correctly predicted that the use of the Janjaweed would hinder political 
reconciliation.891 The second and overarching aim of the perpetrators was to 
fundamentally alter the demography of the region.892 Through a secretive public policy, 
Khartoum could alter the demography composition of Darfur, thereby maintain its 
dominance over the province. This was a maximum goal for the use of mass political 
violence.  
 One common thread in this dissertation is that perpetrators of mass political 
violence may engage in violent acts for a specific reason, a multitude of reasons, or for no 
reason at all. The extant literature in the Darfur genocide has debated at least five main 
causes for the crisis. Because I view large-scale violence as instrumental, the overarching 
reasons are not my first concern in explaining violence. As such, I will briefly cover the 
debate over causes here. The first explanation blames ethnic and religious differences for 
fomenting the rebellion and subsequent government crackdown on the civilian 
population. The news media largely portrayed the crisis as a “tribal” conflict between 
black African villagers in Darfur and Arab militias.893 This first, popular wave of 
discourse has been questioned by scholars like Ateem Selso and Alex de Waal, among 
others who demonstrate in their research that “there is little or no racial difference 
between the language groups…” as a result of intergroup marriage over time.894 
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Nevertheless when mass political violence erupts between two “different” groups this is 
often the first explanation offered.  
 The second explanation offered is that Khartoum had a “single minded” directive 
to subjugate, marginalize, and ultimately eradicate the black African groups in Darfur and 
drive or kill them from Sudan.895 Eric Reeves argues that the government of Sudan 
directed all Janjaweed and militias to “change the demography of the area and make it 
void of African tribes by killing people, burning their villages and forms, terrorizing them 
and confiscating their property and forcing them out of the region.”896 Reeves concluded 
this from documents that were seized from Janjaweed persons. Third, more similar to the 
ethnic and racial explanation, is authors who contend that the tribal/racial conflict was not 
rooted in their identities but actually the competition over scarce natural resources.897 In 
this case the violence stems from traditional competitions over land. The fourth 
explanation, and are in which I am most inclined to associate with, places the genesis of 
violence in Darfur as a power struggle between a province and the capital.898 Darfur had 
been neglected for decades, even during colonialism the region had been marginalized by 
its governors. Authors here bring the state back in to discuss the center-periphery battle 
between Khartoum and Darfur that was fundamentally rooted in a battle over regional 
autonomy and independence. Scholars in this stream of research argue all excesses in war 
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originated from this challenge to state authority. Finally, there is scholarship that 
addresses the international dimension in the conflict. For example, where did perpetrators 
obtain their weapons? China was accused of providing some weapons to Sudan, in 
exchange for oil contracts.899 An oil for guns program, if you will. That said, China’s 
interest in the Sudanese government’s right to absolute sovereignty was another reason 
for their involvement.900 China has been a staunch defender of absolute sovereignty and 
therefore opposed to international intervention in Darfur.901 Western powers, like the 
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency were also supplying arms, munitions, and 
money to Darfur’s rebels, as they did in South Sudan.902 The U.S. engaged in this type of 
covert action because Sudan’s Islamic government was “deemed insufficiently pro-
American and too Islamic.”903 Another international dimension was the presence of al-
Qaeda in Darfur. Al-Qaeda had chosen Afghanistan as a training ground because of its 
secluded nature from global politics. Al-Qaeda was interested in Darfur because of the 
region’s lax borders and historically neglected nature in domestic, regional, and global 
politics.904 Members of the JEM rebel group also received limited training from al-Qaeda 
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instructors on logistics and guerrilla and urban warfare.905 Therefore, China and the U.S. 
used Darfur as a low-level proxy conflict, but for entirely different reasons.  
 We will never know the exact number of people who died in the Darfur region.906 
As we have seen in other cases, estimating an exact mortality rate is especially 
challenging. This is partly due to Darfur’s inaccessibility to outsiders, but estimates are 
also challenged by counting the number of victims killed by direct and indirect means of 
violence. How many Darfurians died from their inability to access clean watering holes 
that were guarded by Janjaweed horsemen? How many fled as refugees but fell victim to 
starvation or maladministration in neighboring countries? The estimates below may only 
scratch the surface of the total body count.  
 There is no doubt that the conflict in Darfur led to an enormous loss of life, 
property, culture, and dignity for locals. In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 
September 21, 2004, US President George W. Bush said “the world is witnessing terrible 
suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has 
concluded are genocide.”907 Unfortunately, by early 2005 the Bush Administration had 
backed off this definitive claim.908 For a superb discussion of “the politics of civilian 
casualty counts” see Taylor Seybolt, Jay Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff’s Counting 
Civilian Casualties book. The bulk of killing occurred between 2003 and 2005. The US 
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Department of State estimated the number of death to be between 98,000 and 181,000 
dead from March 2003 to January 2005.909 The UN has referenced the Coalition for 
International Justice who contend almost 400,000 have died.910 Eric Reeves, as cited 
above, argues that the true number could be upwards of 500,000, while the WHO counted 
50,000 in September 2004. There is a plethora of estimates that fall within this range. 
What I can definitively conclude is that the thresholds established in this dissertation 
were not only met but far exceeded. I simply cannot conclude by how much the body 
count threshold was surpassed.  
 
A Dynamic Structural Approach to Non-State Perpetrators 
 Genocide Studies is logically a reactive field. This interdisciplinary research 
enterprise has developed in response to some of history’s most severe atrocities. Eric 
Weitz argues that the 20th century should be named “a century of genocide.”911 Weitz, in 
part, labels the 20th century this way because it was host to many large-scale atrocities. 
These mass political violence episodes were most often directed by states or state-society 
coalitions. Now that we live comfortably in a new century, are that is wirelessly 
connected, perpetrators of mass political violence have evolved. The final category of 
perpetrator I discuss is non-state actors. Historically, these groups have been under 
                                                 
909 Government Accountability Office, “Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but 
Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced” (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2006), p. 1.  
 
910 Coalition for International Justice, “New Analysis Claims Darfur Deaths Near 400,000: Experts Estimates 
500 People A Day Are Dying,” 2005.  
 
911 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003).  
298 
 
theorized vis-à-vis their ability to commit genocide and mass political violence. This 
state-centric bias is demonstrated time and again. In fact, when defining the conceptual 
boundaries of what is and is not genocide, scholars like Vahakn Dadrian, Isidor 
Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski, Tony Barta, Barbara Harff, Ted Robert Gurr, Frank 
Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, Robert Melson, Irving Louis Horowitz, Levon Chorbajian, and 
Manus Midlarsky specifically defined genocide as an exclusively state-directed act. It is 
true that three of four perpetrator categories possess some form of state involvement in 
mass political violence. However, non-state actors, who operate independently of states 
also have an increasing ability to wage this type of human destruction.  
 How are non-state actors conceptually and empirically different from state-
sponsored groups? Both are considered non-state armed groups. From an outsider’s 
perspective to a conflict, each group may seem similar or act in analogous ways. 
Therefore, what makes non-actors different? The crucial distinction lies in the fact that no 
government is pulling the strings behind the scene. It may appear that state-sponsored 
groups are independent of the government, but in actuality the government is 
coordinating their supplies, issuing orders, or actively allowing the group to roam their 
territory without fear of accountability. For non-state actors there is no state-group 
connection. The only possible connection would be that a particular state government 
was so weak, fragile, or collapsed that its inability to govern gave rise to the socio-
political conditions that forms a breeding ground for non-state actors. The second 
characteristics is that violence is independent with little sustained killing capacity. On the 
contrary states can and do wage war on civilian populations for years and decades. Non-
state actors are most likely to possess limited means and ability to kill large groups of 
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people for months and years, and not decades. The time horizon is considerably shorter 
for these group perpetrators.  
 There are specific socio-political conditions that enable non-state perpetrators to 
develop. The regime’s power is low too moderate: this practically means the regime lacks 
political power and influence, control is often limited to the capital city or essential 
military installations. That said, the regime lacks a monopoly on the use of force within 
its sovereign lands. Similarly, state capacity is weak, so much so that the state cannot 
effectively coordinate, mobilize or control its population. Finally, the social appetite for 
violence is limited and there may be isolated pockets of support for non-state actors to 
emerge.  
 Non-state actors have existed as a perpetrator category long before modern states 
were formed. These groups quickly fell out of favor as states replaced kingdoms and 
monarchies as the most powerful unit. Throughout the 20th century, at least until the end 
of the Cold War, states were the far majority in terms of number of mass political 
violence perpetrators. However, as more states confront internal conflicts like democratic 
challenge, social movements, or rebellion, non-state actors once again have emerged as a 
viable alternative for enacting mass violence. Since Genocide Studies only emerged 
during the height of modern states’ power, it has almost entirely focused on cases where 
the perpetrators were members of a state. This is a bias we must change. As the world 
changes, so must our theoretical understanding. It is for this reason that non-state actors 
must be readily included into our intellectual canon. What follows is three examples of 
mon-state perpetrators carrying out mass political violence.  
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Brief Case Studies: Non-State Actors 
Pre-Communist China and Mao Zedong 
 Mao Zedong once wrote, “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, 
or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, 
so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A revolution is an 
insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows the power of another.”912 
Mao Zedong is undoubtedly the most influential Chinese leader of the last century. He 
was a student turned revolutionary, turned military genius, autocrat and mass murderer.913 
Under Mao’s leadership – before and after the civil war – China “was transformed from a 
weak, disunited country to a power on the world stage.”914 When we reflect on Mao’s 
accomplishments, we often think of his tenure as China’s Communist Party Chairman 
and not of his rebel years. This section explores the devastation in Mao’s wake that led to 
his eventual totalitarian control over mainland China. Mao’s strategy was a “socialist 
transformation through the process of political mobilization,” similar, in part, to Stalin’s 
Soviet Union and Pol Pot’s Cambodia.915 That transformation began in the “wilderness” 
when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was driven into near exile in the 1920s.916 
There is little data on this period. Historians have been able to piece together a record 
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based on “reports of observers, particularly of journalists who collected information from 
Communist leaders themselves when opportunity was particularly favorable in the mid-
thirties.”917  
 Non-state actors thrive in circumstances of social and political instability. There is 
no better way to describe China in the period of Mao Zedong’s emergence. The Chinese 
government was “corrupt” and “inept.”918 Immediately preceding Japan’s invasion of 
China, the government remained “a patchwork of regional powers.”919 There was very 
little popular support for the “national government.” Many locals were still affiliated with 
regional warlords or other factions. The CCP defined China during this period as “a weak 
semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.”920 The divide between urban residents and rural 
people became even more transparent as the imperial democracy failed in its fiscal 
responsibilities.921 Thus rural villages were “left on their own to a great extent.”922 
Chinese cities posed everything their rural counterparts lacked. They were developing 
rapidly, particularly from western influences.923 This stark divide in social politics 
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coupled with a weak national government provided Mao with an opportunity to break 
out.  
 In chapter three I argue that non-state actors typically possess little to no support 
from local populations. In China’s case, this was originally a valid claim, but as the CCP 
grew into a national social movement, its support could no longer be described as “little.” 
In this sense the CCP’s rise as a non-state perpetrator deviates slightly from the ideal 
type. That said, when assessing a group’s support, it is helpful to use both absolute and 
percentage numbers. When the CCP held its first Soviet congress in 1931, they claimed 
to represent eight to 10 million people.924 This is a large number of “supporters,” or at 
least Chinese they claim to represent. Population data is scarce for this time period. 
However, in 1932-1933 China’s population was about 429.5 million.925 Assuming both of 
these numbers are accurate – and that is a substantial assumption for the former – the 
CCP could claim about 2.3 percent societal support. In this respect their societal support 
confirms to the typology in chapter three. China is both unique and ordinary in this 
respect.926 
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 Mao grew up in a period of “intense nationalism against foreign interests in 
China.”927 In 1911 the Chinese dynasty was overthrown by a revolution.928 However, the 
new republic that filled the void continued the tradition of political maladministration. 
After the revolution and founding of the new republic, “no single national government 
achieved control over the whole of China.”929 In the next decade and a half china had 
seen “at least four different constitutions, and all of them became dead letters as soon as 
they were promulgated.”930 Mao rose from an isolated peasant with grand goals to one 
that could unite disenfranchised youth against the ineffective “national” government.  
 By the summer of 1921 delegates from far and wide came together for the First 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.931 Moscow had dispatched persons to attend 
and help steer the movement in this early stage. Right from the beginning the Chinese 
Communists resented Moscow’s attempt to influence China’s Communist movement. 
This tension helps demonstrate that the CCP was a non-state actor and not a state-
sponsored group operating on behalf of the Soviet Union. In June 1923 the CCP began its 
first United Front with the Kuomintang (National Party).932 This détente did not last long. 
The infamous Chiang Kai-Shek led a coup against the CCP three years later. The next 
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decade is characterized by Kuomintang forces solidifying control over China’s urban 
centers and the CCP moving to border regions to establish a base of operations.933 As the 
Japanese invasion of northern China intensified and World War II escalated, the CCP and 
Nationalist forces formed a second United Front in December 1936.934 It is here that the 
Communist rebels under Mao’s leadership began the process of mass mobilization.935 
The second alliance allowed the CCP to rebuild its forces, organize a stronger command 
and control system, and survive until the end of the war. After Japan’s unconditional 
surrender in 1945, Mao plotted to overthrow the United Front. Within a year’s time, all-
out civil war ensued between the CCP and Kuomintang. However, this time the 
advantage lay with the Communists.  
 Mao’s success in the late 1940s against the Kuomintang can be traced back to his 
time in the 1920s where he systematically established rural bases. After facing near 
defeat, Mao created his new strategies for winning wars and subduing populations. The 
prime lesson learned was that “political power is obtained from the barrel of a gun.”936 
By the time World War II ended, the CCP was no longer a small non-state actor. It was a 
force consisting of about two million men fully capable of fighting any known army in 
the world.937  
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 Unlike the Islamic State or the Lord’s Resistance Army today, Mao’s CCP 
conducted surveys – at least in the beginning – of social and economic life of villagers.938 
He used this information to form a national plan which would eventually be forced upon 
the same villagers he once sought guidance from. Mao gave the peasantry a voice. Once 
China’s peasantry and youth were secured in the fight for Communism, he broadened his 
goals. One of the tactics that may not be solely unique to non-state actors but at minimum 
intensified is their recruitment of youth. All three non-state actors in this section rely on 
youth support – coerced or voluntary. By 1934, the Communist youth force reached 
100,000.939 In the same year about 40 percent of the CCP’s army writ large was 
comprised of men under 23 years of age.940 The motto of the CCP’s youth brigades was, 
“You do the work at the front; we’ll do the work in the rear.”941 That said, Mao’s 
strategies went far beyond coopting China’s youth.  
 How did Mao’s leadership and strategies cause so much devastation? First, Mao’s 
doctrine was to secure and live off the rural lands. Thus he would order the full 
encirclement of major metropolitan areas and then launch attacks on these urban areas. 
This policy of encirclement and subsequent attack on cities led to widespread civilian 
casualties. Particularly when the CCP marched into town. In Mao’s own words: 
To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a 
high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances, 
and withdrawals, swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-
                                                 
938 Davin, Mao, p. 27. 
 
939 Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China: 1936-1945 (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 52. 
 
940 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p. 52.  
 
941 Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p. 55. 
306 
 
scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare depending exclusively on 
defense works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of 
defensive positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital 
strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as 
profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare.942 
  
Mao would go on to say that the “key to victory… lies in developing… a war of total 
resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final 
victory be won.”943 If any Chinese or foreign national did not endorse this strategy, then 
they fell victim to its brutality. Mao said to Lin Piao, another CCP official, “Be firmly 
determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought 
before.”944 Through his words, it is self-evident that all of Chinese society had to choose 
a side in this total war. Failure to embrace Communism meant certain death for many. 
And, even among those converts, loyalty to the party – and Mao – was prized above all 
else.  
 To highlight the power of Mao’s leadership in converting Chinese to his side, we 
can simply review the CCP’s strength and organization. In 1921 there were 57 party 
members.945 By 1925 this number increased to 950 party members.946 After a major labor 
incident and subsequent movement of May 30th, the CCP saw a massive increase in 
recruits. Within two years there were about 68,000 members and by 1933 its ranks 
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swelled to about 300,000 persons.947 Every year since, CCP party members steadily 
climbed and eventually arrived at 1.2 million in 1945, 2.8 million in 1947, and by the end 
of the Chinese Civil War possessed over 3 million.948 This evolution shows that one 
reason Mao’s CCP was able to kill and destroy much of China’s urban centers lay in his 
ability to convince Chinese to join his cause. Of the three non-state actors in this section 
Mao’s insurgency is the only one that transitioned from a ragtag insurgency to a state 
force – and eventually would become state perpetrators of mass political violence.  
 Finally, connecting Mao’s ideology and strategy to mass civilian casualties. Mao 
once said, “After our armed enemies have been crushed, there will still be our unarmed 
enemies, who will try to fight us to the death. We must never underestimate their 
strength. Unless we think of the problem in precisely those terms, we will commit the 
gravest of errors.”949 Mao turned China from a patchwork of semi-autonomous regions 
into a totalitarian state within several decades. If it was not for his ill-will towards those 
who differed slightly, this transition could have been hailed as a remarkable achievement. 
Mao ruled post-civil war China with such power that he was known as the “Red 
Emperor.”950 We can see the beginnings of his totalitarian tendencies during China’s civil 
war periods. Like all too many conflicts, the true number of deaths attributed to the 
Chinese civil war will never be known.951 The CCP killed millions of Chinese, but so too 
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did the Kuomintang, and warlord kingdoms.952 Just within the civil war period of 1946-
49, six million civilians and soldiers lost their lives.953 If we simply look at the CCP’s 
advance on Szechuan, an area with about one million inhabitants. When the Red Army 
left, “the population was reduced by half.”954 Though it will never fully by understood, 
the true devastation enacted on China’s population will go down in history as one of the 
bloodiest conflicts vis-à-vis civilian in known human history.  
 
The Lord’s Resistance Army 
 Before there was the Islamic State, there was the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
in central and east Africa. The LRA began in 1987 as an off shoot of the Holy Spirit 
Movement.955 The LRA, led by Joseph Kony, is a criminal, terrorist and non-state 
perpetrator of mass political violence. Most of the deaths attributed to Kony’s fighters 
have come from indirect means and second order effects of his violence. The original 
goal of the LRA was “allegedly [to carry out] … an insurgency against the government of 
Uganda and the Ugandan army…”956 However, the consequences of this so-called 
insurgency fell hardest on the Acholi people.957 The LRA has “brutalized” civilians 
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through “acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as 
mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements and that abducted civilians, 
including… [have been used as] fighters, porters, and sex slaves.”958  
 In the years since its founding, the LRA’s leader Joseph Kony has faced at least 
12 counts of crimes against humanity, and 21 counts of war crimes.959 Kony has claimed 
in the past to be “possessed by multiple spirits.”960 Perhaps as a way of deflecting guilt 
over his bloodthirsty acts. According to some reports, the LRS has abducted over 67,000 
youth, among which about 30,000 were and are children.961 Nearly 1.5 million people 
have been internally displaced.962 The LRA became the first non-state perpetrator to be 
referred to the International Criminal Court by a head of state – Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni.963 At the core of this conflict resides the fact that “consecutive 
Ugandan [and neighboring Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic 
governments have failed] to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimizes and 
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promotes a collective aspirations, and to wield the magnitudes and levels of power a 
modern state conveys.”964  
 Even though the Ugandan state could not adequately control its northern territory 
the LRA moved its bases around and between northern Uganda, the CAR, South Sudan, 
and Congo-Kinshasa.965 The fact that all these countries could not control their territory 
led to the rise and preservation of the LRA today.  
 The LRA has always struggled to garner popular support in any of its occupied 
territories. The “rampant atrocities undermine[d] the credibility of the LRA as a popular 
political protest.”966 This is squarely in line with the prediction of low societal support for 
non-state perpetrators of mass political violence. Some have argued that Kony’s tactics 
rise to “religious terrorism,” and not political terrorism because of his belief to rule 
Uganda in accordance with the Christian Ten Commandments and thus “purify” 
society.967  
 Kony’s LRA used the idea of “strategic fear” to paralyze Ugandan society and 
hold it hostage to his radical demands.968 Even though the LRA has received resources 
from the Sudanese government, they are not beholden to any group or nation.969 Sudan 
initially sought the LRA to open up a second front in their war against the SPLM/A in 
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southern Sudan. LRA “soldiers” used hit-and-run tactics. One solider said, “we killed 
people so that they would fear us.”970 These tactics coupled with the use of “strategic 
fear,” meaning killing people to fear the LRA, became a “force multiplier.”971 This is in 
part how a small ragtag group of gangsters consisting of no more than 3,000 at any given 
time could hold off a professional army of about 40,000 to 60,000 strong, engage in 
simultaneous battle with the SPLA, and all the “while effectively controlling millions of 
civilians in the north… an area the size of Belgium.”972  
 Why count the LRA as a non-state perpetrator of mass political violence? One 
justification is that their violence and tactics were used as “collective punishment” for the 
civilian population.973 Since the late 1980s Kony’s insurgency has forcibly “abducted 
tens of thousands of children and adults to serve as porters and soldiers.”974 Some of 
these abductees who were as young as seven years old were coerced into mutilating and 
murdering civilians and in some cases members of their own families and villages.975 
Despite president Museveni’s proclamation that 2002 “would be a year of peace for all 
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Ugandans,” the LRA attacks increased.976 By 2003 the LRA incursions had become so 
bad that the number of people residing in displacement camps was about 800,000.977 
Human Rights Watch placed their estimate at between 800,000 and 1.2 million displaced 
persons.978 The terror was such that people were called “night commuters.” They would 
flee the area at night for safety and return to their lands during daylight hours.  
 As I argue in chapter three, the weakness of a regime coupled with low state 
capacity and limited to no societal support will enable non-state actors to emerge if they 
wish to do. The post-colonial Ugandan state was “rooted in the militarization of 
society.”979 However, these recruits were often “low-skilled,” “ill-trained,” and of “poor 
discipline” to project power throughout the land. The weakness of this force allowed the 
LRA to take advantage of a political opening and maintain its campaign of mass political 
violence for decades. They have garnered additional resources from outside the territory 
and in some areas coerced or accepted local support. All told, despite Museveni’s claim 
that the LRA were puppets of the Sudanese state. I argue that it was Uganda’s own 
failures to govern that, in part, led to the LRA’s rise and persistence.  
 It is clear through the actions of LRA members and its leadership that they 
conceptually fit within the non-state perpetrator category. It is difficult to estimate the 
total and annual death tolls enacted on the region. That said, according to the UN, the 
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LRA has killed through direct and indirect means more than 100,000 people in the central 
and east Africa region.980 Death’s attributable to direct violence is likely in the low single 
to tens of thousands.981 I stress likely. However, we can never be certain. Indirect 
violence has claimed far more lives. According to  
Adults surveyed in camps… over 50 percent had been abducted at some 
point during the war, nearly 40 percent had their own children abducted, 
over two-thirds had witnessed a child abducted, nearly half had witnessed 
a family member being killed, over half had been threatened with death, 
and nearly 20 percent had been physically mutilated, maimed or injured.982 
 
Despite these gruesome accounting, the overall violence faced by persons in camps were 
much higher. The World Health Organization and the Ugandan Ministry of Health said 
that in 2005, there were an estimated 1,000 excess deaths per week.983 Though not 
directly killed by Kony’s henchmen these men, women, children, brothers, sisters, and 
fellow human beings are dead because of the LRA’s insidious campaign of terror. 
Therefore, they bear responsibility for this mass political violence.  
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The Islamic State 
 David Wasserstein says it best, “We know both too much and too little about the 
Islamic State.”984 Similar to the LRA, the Islamic State uses strategic fear and strategic 
violence to conquer land, subdue populations, and instill all-out fear into large groups of 
people in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. The Islamic State has become the poster child for non-
state perpetrators in this age. They are a truly “deadly and adaptive foe… [That] seemed 
to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest 
city.”985 Previously named the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the group advanced 
into Syrian territory in the second half of 2011.986 After consolidating its strategy, 
building on small and mid-level gains, the terror group expanded in to Iraq in 2014. 
Howard Shatz and Erin-Elizabeth Johnson write, “…instead of limiting its savagery, 
[ISIS] doubled down.”987 The Islamic State has not reached anywhere close to causing 
turmoil and destruction as Mao’s forces have, but it is not because of a lack for trying. 
 The terror group’s origins can be traced to the early 1990s. In 2004 one of the 
group’s founders had been working with al-Qaeda in Iraq.988 There had been several 
successful counterinsurgency operations led against this and other terror groups in the 
2000s. In 2010, the group’s most well-known leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took 
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control.989 When ISIS captured Mosul in 2014, al-Baghdadi victoriously renamed the 
group the Islamic State and declared publicly that he was reinstating the Islamic caliphate 
and declaring himself the Caliph.990 The Islamic State partnered with al-Qaeda in Iraq 
during the early to mid-years of the war. The terror group suffered several defeats during 
this time because of their loss in popular Sunni support.991 This support fell through, in 
part, because of their ruthless policies. Most outsiders at the time thought it would be 
“reasonable to expect the Islamic State would want to avoid another Sunni Awakening. 
But instead of limiting its brutality, the Islamic State doubled down.”992 Under al-
Baghdadi’s command, the Islamic State publically executed any person suspected of 
aiding U.S., Coalition, or Iraqi forces.993 In perhaps a first for al-Qaeda, their leadership 
very publically broke ties with the Islamic State because of the group’s “notorious 
intractability… [And] most extreme of the Islamist groups was the fighting in Syria [and 
Iraq].”994 By the end of 2017, the Islamic State controlled an area the size of the U.K. and 
a population of about eight million.995  
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 The Islamic State had a four-pronged strategy vis-à-vis its domination of Iraq and 
Syria. This included securing financial resources, defining an organizational hierarchy for 
governance, recruitment and propaganda as a means of sustaining its organizational 
needs, and finally to act with utmost speed.996 The depth and detail of IS’s strategic plan 
supports the nation that their organization has been highly effective and autonomous of 
outside cooptation. The Islamic State’s financial plan was to raise funds domestically to 
ensure their autonomy from outside state-sponsors.997 Their revenue came primarily from 
oil trafficking, extortion, the sale of high priced stolen goods and artifacts, and other 
typical forms of racketeering and criminal behavior.998  
 The Islamic State possessed a great deal of professionalism, as it pertains to 
political and military command structures. The group’s organizational strategy was based 
on security, sharia law, military preparedness, and the administration of conquered 
territory.999 In this sense the group’s structure mimicked that of a nation-state, with 
“lower-level units reporting to upper-level units.”1000 In fact, the bureaucratic 
organization became so refined that IS’s police force was issuing speeding tickets in their 
occupied territory to person’s violating motor vehicle laws.1001  
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 The Islamic State built up an intense propaganda and recruitment network. This 
was a virtual network that allowed IS to reach the furthest corners of the globe.1002 Over a 
ten-month period between 2014 and 2015 IS opponents online typically outnumbered 
their supporters ten to one.1003 With these odds we would expect IS detractors to have a 
greater online presence than their supporters. This was not the case, so much so that IS 
supporters regularly out tweeted opponents by 50 percent per day.1004 There were “more 
than 90,000 IS-affiliated twitter accounts in existence.”1005 In 2014, of this number, about 
46,000 individual twitter accounts were designated as “hyperactive users,” meaning they 
pushed a “high volume and concentrated bursts of tweets to help land ISIS hashtags and 
messages on top trending charts.”1006 All of which culminated in IS’s final strategy of 
acting fast to take as much land, resources, and people in as little time as possible. This 
strategy on the part of IS was aided by the international community’s “wait-and-see 
approach” to the crisis.1007 That said, none of this would have been possible without 
fighters. Since 2011 there have been over 30,000 foreign fighters who have converged on 
Iraq and Syria.1008   
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
“The Ethnonationalism aspirations and national-security doctrines of the major powers 
and their proxies have been deadly for millions of minority leaders, members of 
indigenous peoples, and war-ravaged communities… A new cosmopolitical order 
promises to interrupt this cycle by outlawing war and promoting the peaceful 
development of the earth.” 
  – Hannibal Travis1009  
Introduction 
 In the newly published edited volume Perpetrators and Perpetration of Mass 
Violence, Scott Straus poses the question, “Is a comparative theory of perpetrators 
possible?”1010 Answering this question was, in fact, the primary aim of this dissertation. 
The evidence in this dissertation suggests a comparative theory of perpetrators is, not 
only possible, by probable. As I have argued in chapter two, genocidal violence should be 
examined in relation to other forms of extreme violence. That is why I conceptualized 
and operationalized the term “mass political violence.” The use of this new term enables 
broader comparative analysis of mass violence episodes, by avoiding the politically 
charged application of the political-legal term genocide.  
 There are four central conclusions of this dissertation. First, when assessing the 
severity and destructive power of each perpetrator category, we must use both absolute 
                                                 
1009 Hannibal Travis, Genocide, Ethnonationalism, and the United Nations: Exploring the Causes of Mass 
Killing Since 1945 (New York and London, Routledge, 2013), p. 177.  
 
1010 Scott Straus, “Is a comparative theory of perpetrators possible?” in Timothy Williams and Susanne 
Buckley-Zistel, Perpetrators and Perpetration of Mass Violence: Action, Motivations and Dynamics 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 204-209.  
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and relative thresholds. Neither on its own is sufficient for understanding why and how 
perpetrators target and eliminate vast segments of society. Professional observers of mass 
killing will naturally ask: which perpetrator type is the most violent? Which category is 
generally the deadliest form? There are a number of avenues to answering these 
questions. First and foremost, as genocide theorist and political violence scholars, we 
should not be in the business of comparing acts of depravity based purely on death tolls, 
as if we were comparing the trivial differences among lump sum lottery payouts to 
winners. Every episode of violence, including those that claim as few as one life is 
profoundly monumental. To flatly declare one episode to epitomize evil and others to be 
of lesser brutality is problematic at the least, and insensitive at most. Nonetheless, as 
social scientists, we must establish some form or benchmark to compare violent episodes. 
Two such measures include absolute casualty counts and percentage casualty measures. 
First, as described in chapter two and reiterated in this chapter, one measure of mass 
political violence resides in establishing thresholds of violence; to distinguish between 
normal levels of political violence and extreme violence. In this dissertation, I set forth 
the lowest disciplinary threshold to date, 10,000 victims killed within a 12-month span.  
Inevitably the first manner by which we can compare the Holocaust with the 
Rwandan genocide, or Boko Haram with the Islamic State, is through counting civilian and 
non-combatant casualties. Simply counting the number of victims targeted, purged, 
cleansed, disappeared or murdered is one technique to establish quantifiable benchmarks 
for comparison. Using this metric, we can carefully conclude that state actors (category of 
perpetrator “a” see Table 3.1) are often the most lethal. Examples of these perpetrators 
include the Soviet communists and Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. When state actors partake 
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in mass political violence, they often possess the most lethal means of enacting violence 
on a large-scale. Lethality is not equivalent to severity of evil actions. This is not a moral 
claim of rank-ordering case studies. This numeric measure of lethality in terms of victim 
deaths is solely used for establishing one benchmark for scholarly comparison, and not for 
moral judgments or moral comparisons of malevolent events.  
While counting casualties is an inevitable exercise, absolute numbers do a 
disservice to violent episodes that involve substantially smaller target groups. Therefore, 
a second metric may be utilized in the instances where victim groups are a small minority 
or substantially small population; here a percentage indicator should be calculated. 
Examples where a percentage indicator is most useful would be in comparing the 
Holocaust and Rwandan genocides to that of China’s Cultural Revolution and Great Leap 
Forward. Perhaps a better reflection of Nazi genocidal impact calculating the percentage 
of Jews killed out of the total under within the Nazi reach. In this instance. The 
percentage would reflect in even more severe terms the destructive power of Hitler’s anti-
Semitic regime and associated militias. In Rwanda, the Tutsi population is not 
satisfactorily known. Nevertheless, based on quasi-accurate census data, the Tutsi 
minority population in 1994 was approximately 10-15 percent of the national population. 
The genocide against the Tutsi would nearly eradicate this ethnic minority from the 
Rwandan countryside in whole. With estimates of 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsis murdered, 
the numeric casualty count pale in comparison to those of China’s Cultural Revolution or 
the Great Leap Forward. However, this number reflects a near eradication of this ethnic 
minority group that in fact suffered a complete loss at the hands of perpetrators more than 
two decades ago. Depending on comparative analysis, genocide scholars should use 
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either a numeric or percentage indicator in assessing the seriousness of each mass 
political violence episode. Anything less would demean those who perished at the hands 
of perpetrators and undermine unbiased research into the consequences of genocide and 
mass political violence. 
The second conclusion based on the analysis in this dissertation is that we must 
question the so-called unitary role of the state. Since 1945, much of the scholarship on 
the Holocaust and genocide has revolved around the role of the state. It would be 
academic malpractice to ignore the institutional drivers of mass political violence, 
particularly, of the twentieth century’s most violent bureaucratic genocide. However, the 
extant literature has sidelined two important questions. First, what is the comparative 
influence of the state across genocides and mass political violence episodes? Existing 
scholarship, to a large degree, has lumped the involvement of the state into one category: 
primary perpetrator. By unpacking the influence, capacity, process, and function of the 
state in various cases of mass political violence, we can see how the state’s involvement 
differs. The second neglected area of research here, relies on the exclusion of non-state 
actors from analysis. Stemming from this over concentration on state actors, we have 
largely neglected the role of non-state actors in committing genocide and mass political 
violence. This dissertation addresses both these concerns. As Richard Haass argues, our 
“world [is] in disarray.”1011 In the last thirty years we have seen a global explosion in the 
number of failed and collapsed states. It is these vast swaths of territory that state-
sponsored groups and non-state actors are most likely to emerge and use heinous tactics, 
                                                 
1011 Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2017).  
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like mass political violence. Therefore, theory building and theory testing within 
Genocide Studies must evolve to include this new dimension. It is not only imperative we 
do so for historical accuracy but also in diagnosing states that are prone to extreme 
violence. 
The third conclusion is that perpetrator type implicitly limits the scope of violence 
and target group(s). Mass political violence usually stems from some form of state 
involvement but not always (see Table 3.2). When the state is the sole perpetrator of 
violence the target group is likely to be a large segment of society. State perpetration of 
mass political violence is when government agents, bureaucrats, formal institutions, and 
regime hardliners are motivated and directed to eliminate a target group that is perceived 
to be a threat. Chapter four unpacks this most devastating form of mass political violence 
in the Soviet Union and Cambodian case studies. As was seen here, state perpetrators 
enacted brutally harsh conditions on vast national and sub-national populations that were 
designed to suppress, coerce, and annihilate dissidents. This type of mass political 
violence is empirically different than what transpired during the Holocaust and in 1994 
Rwanda. When state-society coalitions engage in this level of violence they will typically 
target an ethno-religious population compared to state perpetrator’s war on society writ 
large. This is likely the case because state-society coalitions – as were present in Nazi 
Germany and Rwanda – require both governmental and societal mass mobilization. This 
dual effort is most likely to occur when the target group is used as a scapegoat for the 
nation’s ill-health. Finally, both state-sponsored groups and non-state actors are likely to 
emerge in socio-political contexts that limit their overall sustainability over time.  
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The final conclusion generated from the evidence of this dissertation is that there 
are variations between perpetrator categories (i.e., state perpetrators and state-society 
coalitions) and there is variation within each perpetrator category (see Figure 7.1). This is 
vitally important. Variation exists both between and within these perpetrator types. Tables 
3.1 and 3.2 represent mass political violence perpetrator ideal types, in an abstract form. 
When these events are witnessed in the social world, each case is, to some extent, sui 
generis.  
Figure 7.1  
Mapping Case Studies of Mass Political Violence by Perpetrator Ideal Type 
 
For instance, in both Nazi Germany and Rwanda’s mass political violence episodes 
there was vast societal support – taking many forms- for the violence enacted on target 
populations. That said, in the case of Rwanda, I argue that there was even more widespread 
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societal support and mass mobilization for killing the Tutsi minority than was seen in the 
Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities. This variation is important for 
understanding the factual record of violence and for theorizing about this perpetrator 
category. Why was it that more civilians participated in a state-society coalition in 
Rwandan than Nazi Germany? The answer may reside in the strength of governmental 
institutions for starters. Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler had become one of only a 
handful of countries in the modern world to reach a totalitarian state – a governmental 
structure where the regime, headed often by a charismatic leader, controls both the hearts 
and minds of its people. This was clearly present in Hitler’s Germany and was not present 
in Rwanda. Under Habyarimana’s regime and his successors’ Rwanda became a vast 
authoritarian state but never reached the level of governmental and social control witnessed 
decades earlier in Germany. Therefore, this single factor, among many, may lead to the 
disparities in social participation in mass political violence. What is fundamentally 
important for the reader to understand is, that yes, there are comparative perpetrator ideal 
types that reflect and exhibit similar characteristics and qualities. Second, within this initial 
grouping of case studies exists further variation that should be explored and understood on 
a deeper level, both for the purpose of theory building and historical accuracy.  
  
Why Rely on a Dynamic Structural Approach to Mass Political Violence?  
 A common theme throughout this dissertation is that mass political violence 
perpetrators may engage in large-scale violence against a target group for a singular reason, 
a group of reasons, or for no reason at all. Mass political violence, as assumed in this 
dissertation, is largely employed for instrumental means by perpetrators. To emphasize, 
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existing theories of genocide and mass atrocities revolve in some way around the 
assessment of perpetrator motivations coupled with their ability to enact violence. Helen 
Fein, Barbara Harff, Ted Robert Gurr, Donald Beachler, Vahakn Dadrian, or Benjamin 
Valentino, to name but a few prominent scholars, largely segregate episodes into categories 
based on motivations/scenarios. Valentino developed six types of mass killing episodes in 
a descriptive fashion to address the 20th century’s largest episodes of human destruction. 
While his work has greatly advanced our understanding of the “strategic” motivations of 
perpetrators it has limitations in assisting policy makers to develop early warning 
mechanisms for genocide/mass atrocity onset. My research endeavors to bridge this 
knowledge gap.  
When parsing group or individual means of violence, one cannot escape the 
perennial debate on rationality. Are individuals who enact violence against one another for 
genocidal or otherwise insidious reasons “rational”? In domestic legal systems, we have 
carved out a defense for reasons of “temporary insanity.” Similarly, authors like Christian 
Gerlach contend, this temporary fever pitch may occur at group levels too, a process he 
refers to as “extremely violent societies.” Many social scientists have weighed in on the 
debate over rationality and its applicability to the social world. As part of my “dynamic 
structuralist” approach, I make the assumption that individuals may engage in, coerce, 
participate in, or support violence for many different reasons, or simply no reason at all. At 
the same time, this approach is similar to what Benjamin Valentino refers to as the 
“strategic perspective.” Valentino argues that individuals employ mass killing when they 
perceive it to be the most efficient means of accomplishing their desired goals and 
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objectives. Additionally, Valentino argues that, because of the individual and social costs 
mass killing entails, such strategies are likely to be a last resort and not the first option.  
There are two general understandings of rationality. The first and most prevalent 
use is taken from economics. Economic rationality is used when individuals calculate the 
benefit-cost analysis of a decision, using a transactional approach to maximizing one’s 
gains. In other words, weighing the costs and benefits and making decisions based upon 
the net effect those choices provide. If leader A chooses option 1, she may endure X and 
Y costs and benefits, but if leader A selects option 2, she may obtain greater values on 
each. Most social science research in politics references, in some form, economic 
rationality, as is simplified here.1012 The second meaning/category, and my point of focus 
here, is strategic or instrumental rationality. This more nuanced perspective views an 
individual’s actions as “rational” if her actions overlap with her beliefs, ideology, or goals. 
This means, an individual may be “rational,” even if their chosen path negatively affects 
leaders in seemingly illogical ways. Perhaps the ideal case for explaining strategic 
rationality (or the strategic perspective as Valentino prefers) is the Holocaust.  
On September 1, 1939 the German Wehrmacht, armed forces, invaded Poland. By 
1942, “after three years of war… 75 percent of the Jews who would be murdered in the 
Holocaust were still alive.”1013 Within one year, of those Jews who would be mass 
                                                 
1012 For a comprehensive analysis of economic rationality read Paul Weirich, “Economic Rationality” in 
Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling eds., The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004).  
 
1013 Doris L. Bergen, War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., New York 2009), p. 182.  
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murdered, 75 percent were dead.1014 By the end of 1944, many Germans entertained the 
idea that they could lose the war. With US and Allied forces advancing in the west and the 
Soviets storming across the Eurasian plains in the east, Hitler’s “thousand year Reich” was 
beginning to feel severe pressure in the homeland. Between 1944 and 1945, the US and 
Royal Air Forces dropped 1.4 million tons of bombs on German-held territories.1015 With 
vast shortages in the German labor market, Nazis increasingly relied on forced laborers 
towards the end of the war.1016 This raises the question, why did Hitler divert vital men and 
material away from the war effort to continue his campaign of mass murder? Even once 
defeat became clear, German personnel, weapons, material, resources, and precious time 
went to killing “undesirables,” rather than trying to win the war or sue for a peaceful 
settlement of hostilities. Economic rationalists have a difficult time explaining why Hitler 
would choose to divert vital material away from winning the war in lieu of genocidal 
campaigns. One argument is that, by this point, Hitler was no longer of sound mind, and 
was behaving irrationally because of mental illness. Thereby arguing that he was no longer 
capable of making “rational” decisions, though this argument lacks evidence in many 
respects.1017  
                                                 
1014 Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 183. 
 
1015 Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 216. 
 
1016 Wolf Gruner, Jewish Forced Labor Under the Nazis: Economic Needs and Racial Aims, 1938-1944, 
trans. Kathleen M. Dell’orto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
 
1017 The reader may ask, what is the difference between “rational” and “reasonable” decisions? Both terms 
are “derived from the same noun, and designating a conformity with reason, would pose no problem if the 
two terms were interchangeable.” In essence, rational behavior is defined by one’s behavior that conforms to 
a set of principles and “chooses ends through knowledge of cause…[and] not allowing oneself to be held or 
led astray by the emotions or passions.” On the contrary, reasonable behavior can be assessed as one operating 
in accordance with common sense decisions, meaning, “…for what is acceptable in his milieu and even 
beyond it, for what should be accepted by all.” For a complex, sophisticated discussion of the many unique 
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A strategic rationalist would assert, perhaps winning the war was not Hitler’s first 
priority. Due to his severe hatred of the Jewish people and other “non-desirables,” he opted 
to devote time and resources to eradicating this “scourge” from the face of the earth 
immediately, rather than wait until the war’s conclusion. There is ample evidence to 
support Hitler’s prioritization of genocidal policies over conventional war fighting efforts. 
This prioritization of interests is “rational” if Hitler believed his highest priority was to 
wage war against domestic groups then opposing states. Even if these efforts of mass 
extermination cost Germany the war, his strategic goals were met, that being a war against 
European Jewry and other “asocial” groups. 
  As noted above, perpetrators enact violence for a variety of reasons. Most important 
is to assess under what conditions people carry out violence rather than unpacking 
individual or collective motives. Violence may be a means to an end or an end in itself. 
This distinction does not matter to victims or myself. For violence to reach a massive level 
(i.e., 10,000 victims within a 12-month period), there must be certain factors present that 
enable a transition from “normal” levels of political violence to mass political violence. 
Understanding and explaining these factors are my principal concern. 
Therefore, why a dynamic structural approach? There remains a collective 
misunderstanding of pertinent risk factors for genocide and mass political violence, which 
presents vast problems in explaining, understanding, and forecasting such events. The 
following is a summary of major non-mutually exclusive variables that have been used to 
                                                 
characteristics in each term and for analysis of the above quoted material see Chaim Perelman, “The Rational 
and the Reasonable” Philosophic Exchange 10:1 (1979), p. 29-34. 
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understand macro-, meso-, and micro-levels influences on genocide. This is not an 
exhaustive list:1018 
 Armed conflict (or) war 
 Assassinations 
 Authoritarianism 
 Convenience and opportunity  
 Deep-seated hatreds 
 Dehumanization and deindividuation 
 Discriminatory legislation   
 Economic causes (numerous) 
 Ethno-cultural elite 
 Existing discrimination against a particular group 
 Fear (simple and of pollution) 
 Fragile, weak or state collapses 
 Frustration-aggression  
 Government capabilities 
 Greed and grievance 
 High infant mortality 
 
 Ideology (exclusionary or transformative) 
 Large-scale instability 
 Low-trade openness 
 Nonviolent protests 
 Outlawing political parties 
 Percentage of GDP spent on military 
 Polarized society 
 Political and social upheaval 
 Prior genocide or mass atrocities 
 Realpolitik and risk minimization  
 Regime type (all) 
 Religious motivations 
 Revenge  
 Rigged elections 
 Sadism  
                                                 
1018 Compiled from a host of sources with special attention to the following: Scott Straus. February 2014. 
Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum; Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, eds. 2008. Preventing Genocide: A 
Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Washington, D.C: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The 
American Academy of Diplomacy, and the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace; and secondary 
attention to the following reference material: Harff, 2003, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust.”; Chirot 
and McCauley, 2006, Why Not Kill Them All?; Valentino, 2004, Final Solutions; Gerlach, 2010, Extremely 
Violent Societies; Rummel, 1994, Death by Government; Midlarsky, 2005, The Killing Trap. 
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 Size of the military 
 State capacity 
 Stockpiling weapons 
 Totalitarianism  
 Triggering events 
 Youth indoctrination  
 
As is readably apparent, we have an overabundance of control and causal variables to 
consider when assessing the complex causal mechanisms that lead to genocide and mass 
atrocities. Scholars seeking to make a contribution to this sub-field must address these 
issues and assign credibility to certain variables over others. This inherently provides a 
lacuna in our understanding of these processes and inability to narrow the field of study.  
To identify societies at risk of mass political violence (MPV), we might employ a 
criminological perspective by asking: what are the motives, means, and opportunities for 
perpetrators in a given context? Pinpointing perpetrator ideological beliefs would be one 
priority in unpacking possible motives. Harken back to pre-war Germany where society 
was imbued with notions of antisemitism that permeated nearly all aspects of life. 
Germans were taught to blame Jews for Germany’s defeat and subsequent decline after 
World War I. This scapegoating came from the administrative state and was echoed in 
many churches across the continent. National Socialisms of the 1930s took advantage of 
this particularly violent strain termed “eliminationist antisemitism” by tapping into 
preexisting beliefs, values and attitudes towards Jews. This deep ideological belief, held 
by many, could be a key motivating factor in the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal 
atrocities. That said, antisemitism by itself is not solely sufficient in explaining the 
totality of National Socialist violence. Antisemitism was indeed a unifying credo among 
many Germans. However, running parallel to this attitude was individual psychological 
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reasons for participating. Most Germans viewed the dispossession of Jewish businesses 
and property as “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” to enrich themselves at the expense of 
their Jewish neighbors. In many of these cases German proprietors may have 
sympathized with anti-Semitic attitudes but individual financial greed coupled with 
opportunity could be the tipping point to violence. Greed is just one of dozens of 
psychological dispositions that have been catalogued to encourage people to commit 
violence against another.  
Most theories revolve in some way around the assessment of perpetrator 
motivations coupled with their ability to enact violence (i.e., their means). There is often 
a confluence of motives as discussed above. Any cursory search of the academic 
literature on the causes of genocide would return thousands of hits explaining in granular 
detail ideological motivations of individuals and societies. However, investigating 
individual motives for violence can be a slippery slope. Many social scientists, including 
myself, contend human beings wield violence for a variety of reasons.  Perhaps most 
pertinent to my framework, is violence wielded in a specific, quasi-organized fashion that 
result in massive levels of fatalities. If operating from the assumption that violence is first 
and foremost instrumental, thereby tied to elite or mass goals, establishing a unified 
theory of mass political violence onset (i.e., pre-violence) based on the “strategic” goals 
of individuals is inherently difficult. As human goals may change from decade to decade 
or even week to week. Rather than asking why people kill – because such a list is never 
ending – we should ask under what conditions do people kill? Understanding the 
conditions that give rise to such extreme events will yield analytically more fruitful 
responses than scholarly attempts at unpacking the political psychology that is required in 
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predicting perpetrator motives. Therefore, isolating particular motives is not the most 
efficient way of identifying societies at risk of mass political violence. 
Because agents are largely bound by their physical and to some extent social 
environment, theorizing these constraints is vital to explaining why violence occurs or is 
prevented in any given context. In other words, rather than emphasizing “motives and 
means,” I stress the role “opportunity” plays in the development of violence. The social 
scientific term for my approach would be “dynamic structuralism.” I define dynamic 
structuralism as the need to examine both slowly changing variables – i.e., structural 
factors – like a regime’s military capacity, ideology, infrastructure and bureaucratic state 
capacity, civic tolerance, or social cleavages with dynamic processes such as 
exogenous/endogenous shocks to society as in terrorism, armed conflict, assassination, or 
economic collapse.  
Therefore, in assessing state-society relations, I use three structural variables 
combined with estimates of perpetrator tactics and stratagems (dynamic processes) to 
determine the likelihood of MPV onset. MPV can materialize during armed conflict or its 
absence, in developed or developing economies, or in heterogeneous or homogenous 
states. Thus, rather than over complicating our model of MPV onset I rely on three 
principal factors that are most likely to enable perpetrators of MPV to emerge. Savvy 
perpetrators use state and societal indicators as a means of triangulating their window of 
opportunity. Any perpetrator dead set on enacting violence can attempt so at any time, 
irrespective of these social structures. However, for violence to reach a level of 10,000 or 
more victims within a 12-month period, these structures (i.e., a) regime power, b) state 
333 
 
capacity, and c) social appetite for violence) must interact in specific ways to facilitate 
such desires. 
 
Expectations of Mass Political Violence in a 21st Century World 
 Given what has been iterated throughout this dissertation, I argue that mass 
political violence is not a random or rare phenomena. It is the result of widespread socio-
political changes that originate from a variety of state and societal involvement in the 
perpetration of violence. As our political world continues to collapse in territories 
throughout the world we will likely see more, not less, mass political violence episodes. 
State perpetrators have been and are likely to be the most common category of 
perpetrator witnessed in our global society. Separate from this, I argue that we are most 
likely to see an increase in the number of state-sponsored groups and non-state actors 
who turn toward mass political violence as a means of achieving their desired social, 
political, economic, or territorial conquests. Though bleak, the future does not look to be 
different than our most recent experiences in widespread in mass atrocities. Genocide and 
mass political violence is a one hundred percent preventable phenomenona. Unlike 
natural disasters, this human phenomenona is entirely of our own creation. Therefore, if 
we desire a world with fewer mass political violence episodes it is up to us as human 
beings to be make this utopian vision a reality.  
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APPENDIX A 
First Wave Alternative Definitions of Genocide  
Raphael Lemkin (1944)  “[Genocide is] the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group.”1019 
 
Nuremburg Trial 
Proceedings Volume 1 
Indictment: Count 3 
(1945) 
 
“They conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., 
the extermination of racial and national groups, against the 
civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order 
to destroy particular races and classes of people and 
national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, 
Poles, and Gypsies and others.”1020 
 
UN General Assembly 
Resolution 96(I) (1946)  
 
“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire 
human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live 
of individual human beings; such denial of the right of 
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great 
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other 
contributions represented by these human groups, and is 
contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the 
United Nations. … The General Assembly, therefore, 
affirms that genocide is a crime under international 
law…whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, 
political or any other grounds are punishable.”1021 
 
UN Genocide 
Convention (1948) 
 
“[Genocide is] acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group as such.”1022 
 
Pieter Drost (1959) “Deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human 
beings by reason of their membership of any human 
collectivity as such.”1023 
 
                                                 
1019 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 79. 
 
1020 The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law 
Library, Accessed April 16, 2017, URL: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count3.asp.  
 
1021 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I), Fifty-Fifth Plenary Meeting December 11, 1946, p. 
188-189. 
 
1022 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, Article 2, p. 1. 
 
1023 Pieter Drost, The Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of Persons and Peoples 
(A.W. Sythoff, 1959); Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: A conceptual analysis 
of genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 3:3 (2001) 350. 
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Vahakn Dadrian (1975) 
 
“Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group, 
vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access 
to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or 
lethal violence the number of a minority group whose 
ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and 
whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing 
to the decision for genocide.”1024 
 
 
Leo Kuper (1981) 
 
“Genocide, in terms of the perspective of this study, is a 
crime against a collectivity, taking the form of massive 
slaughter, and carried out with explicit intent. As a crime 
against a collectivity, it sets aside the whole question of 
individual responsibility; it is a denial of individuality.”1025  
 
Jack Nusan Porter 
(1982) 
 
“Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, 
by a government or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, 
tribal or political minority. It can involve not only mass 
murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and 
political, economic and biological subjugation. Genocide 
involves three major components: ideology, technology, 
and bureaucracy/organization.”1026 
 
Yehuda Bauer (1984) 
 
Bauer makes a conceptual distinction between “genocide” 
and “holocaust.” “[Genocide is] the planned destruction, 
since the mid-nineteenth century, of a racial, national, or 
ethnic group as such, by the following means: (a) selective 
mass murder of elites or parts of the population; (b) 
elimination of national (racial, ethnic) culture and religious 
life with the intent of ‘denationalization’, (c) enslavement, 
with the same intent; (d) destruction of national (racial, 
ethnic) economic life, with the same intent; (e) biological 
decimation through the kidnapping of children, or the 
prevention of normal family life, with the same intent… 
[Holocaust is] the planned physical annihilation, for 
                                                 
1024 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern Sociology 5:2., (1975) 
201. 
 
1025 Kuper, Genocide, 86. 
 
1026 Jack Nusan Porter, The Genocidal Mind: Sociological and Sexual Perspectives (University Press of 
America, 1982), 7.  
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ideological or pseudo-religious reasons, of all the members 
of a national, ethnic, or racial group.”1027 
 
John L. Thompson and 
Gail A. Quets (1987) 
 
“Genocide is the extent of destruction of a social 
collectivity by whatever agents, with whatever intentions, 
by purposive actions which fall outside the recognized 
conventions of legitimate warfare.”1028 
 
Isidor Wallimann & 
Michael N. Dobkowski 
(1987) 
 
“Genocide is the deliberate, organized destruction, in whole 
or in large part, of racial or ethnic groups by a government 
or its agents. It can involve not only mass murder but also 
forced deportation (ethnic cleansing), systematic rape, and 
economic and biological subjugation.”1029  
 
Tony Barta (1987) 
 
“My conception of a genocidal society—as distinct from a 
genocidal state—is one in which the bureaucratic apparatus 
might officially be directed to protect innocent people but in 
which a whole race is nevertheless subject to remorseless 
pressures of destruction inherent in the very nature of the 
society.”1030 
 
Henry Huttenbach 
(1988) 
 
“Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group 
in jeopardy.”1031 
 
Barbara Harff and Ted 
Robert Gurr (1988) 
 
“The promotion and execution of policies by a state or its 
agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of 
a group.”1032 
 
 
                                                 
1027 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Second Edition. (New York: Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2011) 17. 
 
1028 Ibid, 17. 
 
1029 Isidor Wallimann & Michael N. Dobkowski, Genocide in the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of 
Mass Death (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), x.  
 
1030 Tony Barta, Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia (Los Angeles, CA: 
Sage, 2008), 239-240.  
 
1031 Henry Huttenbach, “Locating the Holocaust on the genocide spectrum” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
3:3 (1988) 289-304.  
 
1032 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945” International Studies Quarterly 32:3 (September 1988) 
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Helen Fein (1988)  
 
“Genocide is a series of purposeful actions by a 
perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity through mass or 
selective murders of group members and suppressing the 
biological and social reproduction of the collectivity. This 
can be accomplished through the imposed proscription or 
restriction of reproduction of group members, increasing 
infant mortality, and breaking the linkage between 
reproduction and socialization of children in the family or 
group of origin. The perpetrator may represent the state of 
the victim, another state, or another collectivity.”1033 
 
Ervin Staub (1989) 
 
“An attempt to exterminate a racial, ethnic, religious, 
cultural, or political group, either directly through murder or 
indirectly by creating the conditions that lead to the group’s 
destruction.”1034  
 
Frank Chalk and Kurt 
Jonassohn (1990) 
 
“A form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other 
authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and 
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”1035 
 
Helen Fein (1990) 
 
“Sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically 
destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through 
interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of 
group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or 
lack of threat offered by the victim.”1036 
 
Robert Melson (1992) 
 
“A public policy mainly carried out by the state whose 
intent is the destruction in whole or in part of a social 
collectivity or category, usually a communal group, class, or 
a political faction.”1037 
 
 
                                                 
1033 OMICS International, Accessed April 10, 2017, URL: http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/ 
Genocide_definitions#cite_note-FOOTNOTEKieserSchaller2001-13.  
 
1034 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 
1035 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
 
1036 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: A conceptual analysis of genocide,” 352. 
 
1037 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust 
(University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
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Steven Katz (1994) 
 
“Actualization of the intent, however successfully carried 
out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, 
religious, political, social, gender, or economic group, as 
these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever 
means.”1038 
 
Israel Charny (1994) 
 
“Mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, 
when not in the course of military action against the 
military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the 
essential defenselessness and helplessness of victims.”1039 
 
Irving Louis Horowitz 
(1996) 
 
“Genocide is herein defined as a structural and systematic 
destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic 
apparatus [emphasis in original] …. Genocide means the 
physical dismemberment and liquidation of people on large-
scales, an attempt by those who rule to achieve the total 
elimination of a subject people.”1040  
 
Yehuda Bauer (1999) 
 
“A purposeful attempt to eliminate an ethnicity or a nation, 
accompanied by the murder of large numbers of the targeted 
group.”1041 
 
Levon Chorbajian 
(1999) 
 
“Initiated by authoritarian states, premediated, involving 
great cruelty, and bringing about large numbers of deaths in 
absolute terms and deaths as a percentage of target.”1042 
 
 
Rome Statute (2002) 
 
“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; 
(b)  Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c)  Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
                                                 
1038 Steven T. Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context, Vol. 1: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the 
Modern Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 131.  
 
1039 Israel Charny, “Toward a generic definition of genocide,” in George Andreopoulos, ed., Genocide: 
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
 
1040 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 19. 
 
1041 Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: A conceptual analysis of genocide,” 352. 
 
1042 Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, ed., Studies in Comparative Genocide (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 1999) xxi.  
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destruction in whole or in part; (d)  Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e)  Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.”1043 
 
Manus Midlarsky (2005) 
 
“Genocide is understood to be the state-sponsored 
systematic mass murder of innocent and helpless men, 
women, and children denoted by a particular ethnoreligious 
identity, having the purpose of eradicating this group from a 
particular territory.”1044 
 
Mark Levene (2005) 
 
“Genocide occurs when a state, perceiving the integrity of 
its agenda to be threatened by an aggregate population – 
defined by the state as an organic collectivity, or series of 
collectivities – seeks to remedy the situation by the 
systematic, en masse physical elimination of that aggregate, 
in toto, or until it is no longer perceived to represent a 
threat.”1045 
 
Jacques Sémelin (2005) 
 
“I will define genocide as that particular process of civilian 
destruction that is directed at the total eradication of a 
group, the criteria by which it is identified being determined 
by the perpetrator.”1046 
 
Daniel Chirot and Clark 
McCauley (2006) 
 
“A genocidal mass murder is politically motivated violence 
that directly or indirectly kills a substantial proportion of a 
targeted population, combatants and noncombatants alike, 
regardless of their age or gender.”1047 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1043 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Text of the Rome Statute circulated as document 
A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 
November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 
2002, Accessed April 16, 2017, p. 3.  
 
1044 Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
 
1045 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 19. 
 
1046 Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, Translated from the 
French by Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).  
 
1047 Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political 
Murder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 17.  
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Martin Shaw (2007) 
 
“[Genocide is] a form of violent social conflict, or war, 
between armed power organizations that aim to destroy 
civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who 
resist this destruction.”1048 
 
Jacques Semelin (2007) 
 
“Genocide is a particular process of civilian destruction that 
is directed at the total eradication of a group, the criteria by 
which it is identified being determined by the 
perpetrator.”1049  
 
Donald Bloxham (2009) 
 
“[Genocide is] the physical destruction of a large portion of 
a group in a limited or unlimited territory with the intention 
of destroying that group’s collective existence.”1050 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1048 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007).  
 
1049 Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 340.  
 
1050 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 20. 
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APPENDIX B 
Second Wave Sub-Categories of Genocide  
Auto-genocide “The curious idea of “auto-genocide” is applied principally 
to the Cambodian case. The term’s strangeness is that, 
taken literally, it suggests self-destruction: and while 
individuals often take their own lives, collective suicide is 
much rarer – and no one has suggested that this has 
happened in any genocide, including in Cambodia. The 
term has been defined instead as “mass killing of members 
of the group to which the perpetrators themselves 
belong.”1051 
 
Biological Genocide “The prevention of births within a group…broadly 
conceived as encompassing castration, compulsory 
abortion, sterilization and the segregation of the sexes.”1052 
 
Decolonization Genocide 
 
Classified as “genocide following upon decolonization of a 
two-tier structure of domination.” Leo Kuper, “Types of 
genocide and mass murder.”1053 
 
Despotic Genocide 
 
 “Genocides are typical in “new” states, among peoples 
sharing little or no common history or traditions… Upon 
independence the “strong man” from the leading tribe 
exerts his will on unwilling minorities, often using strong 
measures to preempt oppositional moves.”1054 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1051 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007) 76-77; Also see William A. Schabas, 
Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 119-120.  
 
1052 Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 3, Sixth Session, 13th meeting, at 11, 14 UN Doc E/AC.25/SR.13 (1948) 
(Mr. Ordonneau, Fr.) cited in Matthew Lippman, “A road map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4:2 (2002), 182.  
 
1053 In Israel Charny, ed., Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the 
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp 32–47. 
 
1054 Harff and Gurr, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides,” 362; Helen Fein, “Scenarios 
of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses,” in Toward the Understanding and Prevention of 
Genocide, ed., Israel W. Charny (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). 
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Developmental Genocide Are “often economically exploited, they offer little 
resistance to “progress” and are perceived as standing in 
the way of further development” both in terms of territory 
and ideology.1055 
 
Ecological (or) 
Destruction Genocide 
Described as “genocide as a result of ecological 
destruction and abuse.” Some cases include the Germany 
targeting of the Herero population in Southwest Africa, 
hole in the ozone layer, poisoning of water supplies, and 
air and nuclear pollution.1056 
 
Genocidal Massacre These are smaller scale genocides, such as in Tiananmen 
Square or Sri Lanka. Israel Charny, “Toward a generic 
definition of genocide.”1057 
 
Hegemonial Geno-/ 
Politicide 
“Mass murders which occur when distinct ethnic, religious, 
or national groups are being forced to submit to central 
authority, for example during the consolidation of power 
by a new state or in the course of national expansion.”1058 
 
Ideological Genocide Preexisting prejudices and stereotypes are exploited by the 
dominant group. Minority or marginalized groups are 
scapegoated or discriminated against, which is consistent 
with the prevailing ideology of elite rulers.1059 
 
                                                 
1055 Harff and Gurr, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides,” 362; Fein, Helen. 1984. 
“Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses.” In Toward the Understanding and 
Prevention of Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charny. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
1056 Israel Charny, “Toward a generic definition of genocide,” in George Andreopoulos, ed., Genocide: 
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p 91. 
 
1057 In George Andreopoulos, ed., Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p 91. 
 
1058 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371 on p. 363. 
 
1059 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371 on p. 362; Fein, Helen. 1984. “Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses.” In 
Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charny. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
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Indigenous Genocide Genocides enacted against indigenous populations, for 
example, during colonization the Americas, Australia, and 
Africa.1060 
 
Institutional Genocide “…was the major source of politically sanctioned mass 
murder in the ancient and medieval worlds. The massacre 
of men, the enslavement of women and children, and, 
often, the razing of the countryside, were universal aspects 
of conquest: genocide was embedded in the very notion of 
warfare.” See Roger Smith, “State power and genocidal 
intent.”1061 
 
 
Intentional Genocide Simply put, the intentional, straightforward hunting and 
murder of a population, for example, Nazi atrocities and 
genocidal campaigns against the Jews, Roma and 
homosexuals. Israel Charny, “Toward a generic definition 
of genocide.”1062 
 
Latent Genocide Whatever the scope and its intensity, latent genocide is a 
by-product or result of goals in the pursuit of which 
unintended consequences develop. Military operations, 
tactical or strategic in character, may engulf civilian 
populations. Peacetime relocations or wartime deportations 
of large segments of a minority group may exact heavy 
tolls and casualties, depleting the ranks of the affected 
group. When the dominant group persists in these violent 
efforts and refrains from obviating the adverse, unintended 
consequences, such behavior may be termed 
genocidal.”1063 
 
                                                 
1060 Leo Kuper, “Types of genocide and mass murder,” in Israel Charny, ed., Toward the Understanding and 
Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp 32–47. 
 
1061 In Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, eds, Studies in Comparative Genocide (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), pp 5–8. See also Roger Smith, “Human destructiveness and politics: the twentieth 
century as an age of genocide,” in Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski, eds, Genocide and the Modern 
Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp 23–27. 
 
1062 in George Andreopoulos, ed., Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p 91. 
 
1063 Vahakn N. Dadrian. 1975. “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern Sociology. Vol. 
5., No. 2., p. 205-206. 
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Monopolistic Genocide “Most genocide prior to the twentieth century was external 
– it was exacted of groups that lived outside one’s 
territorial boundaries. There are some important exceptions 
– most of them connected with religious persecution – but 
for the most part genocide was directed outwards: its goals 
were conquest and colonial expansion.” For example, the 
colonial conquest against indigenous peoples around the 
world. See Roger Smith, “State power and genocidal 
intent.”1064 
 
Optimal Genocide “Here, the destruction process is massive, relatively 
indiscriminate in terms of victims’ age, sex and other 
categories, is sustained in duration, and aims at the total 
obliteration of the victim group. Consequently, the scale of 
casualties is maximum and victimization is optimal.”1065 
 
Partial Genocide In these cases, mass murder is used to elicit order and/or 
alter the identity and political beliefs of a group, not 
necessarily its complete destruction.1066 
 
Repressive Geno-/ 
Politicides 
“Mass murders targeted at political parties, factions, and 
movements because they are engaged in some form of 
oppositional activity.”1067 
 
Retributive Geno-/ 
Politicide 
“…These genocides occur in the wake of decolonization or 
of war and conquest. Typically, two or more people vie for 
power in the same domain, neither accepting the other’s 
domination. One evident difference between retributive 
and despotic genocides is that in the former, ethnic 
                                                 
1064 in Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, eds, Studies in Comparative Genocide (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), pp 5–8. See also Roger Smith, “Human destructiveness and politics: the twentieth 
century as an age of genocide,” in Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski, eds, Genocide and the Modern 
Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp 23–27. 
1065 Vahakn N. Dadrian. 1975. “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern Sociology. Vol. 
5., No. 2., p. 210. 
 
1066 Beachler, Donald W. 2011. The Genocide Debate: Politics, Academics, and Victims. Palgrave Macmillan 
US; Robert Melson, ‘Modern genocide in Rwanda: ideology, revolution, war, and mass murder in an African 
state’, in Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).  
 
1067 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371 
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animosities are entrenched prior to the takeover or 
establishment of the new regime.”1068 
 
Revolutionary Geno-/ 
Politicide 
“Mass murders of class or political enemies in the service 
of new revolutionary ideologies.”1069 
 
Terroristic Genocide The authors do not use this term directly but they write, “to 
spread terror among real or potential enemies,” thus I 
termed it “terroristic genocide” to describe their definitive 
sub-category.1070 
 
Total Genocide Compared to partial genocides, the complete destruction of 
a population or group is desired, for example, as in the 
Holocaust, Rwanda or Armenian genocides.1071 
 
Utilitarian Genocide “Limited in scope because of such limited objectives as 
economic advantages, demographic considerations, 
military designs, etc. utilitarian genocide involves regional 
massacres en masse, segmental cross-country massacres, 
or limiting massacres to such categories as sex, age, 
religion, and so forth. The character of objectives is 
matched by the limited capabilities of the perpetrator vis-à-
vis a resistant prone victim, whose vulnerability is further 
reduced by internal dissension besetting the perpetrator 
group.”1072 
 
                                                 
1068 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371 on p. 362; Vahakn N. Dadrian. 1975. “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern 
Sociology. Vol. 5., No. 2., p. 207; Fein, Helen. 1984. “Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and 
Critical Responses.” In Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charny. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
 
1069 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371. 
 
1070 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp 44–45. 
 
1071 Beachler, Donald W. 2011. The Genocide Debate: Politics, Academics, and Victims. Palgrave Macmillan 
US. 
 
1072 Vahakn N. Dadrian. 1975. “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern Sociology. Vol. 
5., No. 2., p. 209. 
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Wealth Genocide The authors do not use this term directly but they write, “to 
acquire wealth,” therefore I use the term “wealth genocide” 
to capture their meaning.1073 
 
Xenophobic Genocide “Mass murders of ethnically, religiously, or nationally 
distinct groups in the service of doctrines of national 
protection or social purification which define the victims 
as alien and threatening.”1074 
 
 
  
                                                 
1073 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp 44–45. 
 
1074 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359-
371. 
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APPENDIX C 
Third Wave Substitutive Terms for Genocide 
Atrocity Crimes 
 
“…atrocity crimes [are] a grouping of crimes that includes 
genocide but is not confined to that particular crime… [and] 
atrocity crimes describe a basket of particularly heinous 
crimes that are suitable for criminal prosecution before 
international tribunals and national courts and for which 
states and certain non-state organizations and groups should 
be held responsible. Atrocity crimes also are collectively 
executed crimes of such magnitude and destructive character 
as to be particularly prominent and logically inconsistent 
with the protection of human rights and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in an increasingly 
interdependent and sophisticated global society.”1075 
 
Classicide The targeting of social classes for their destruction or 
annihilation.1076 
 
Collective Killing “This concept shares three basic premises with genocide or 
mass killing. First, the criteria for becoming a victim are not 
about deeds but rather with membership in a group. Second, 
the killing must be intentional, which is distinct from acts of 
endangerment that carry no goal of killing in the first place. 
Using torture to elicit confessions, for example, may cause 
significant numbers of deaths. Third, the number of victims 
must reach a certain level. This aspect is very much related 
to the first premise regarding membership: Individuals are 
rounded up because they are members of a particular group, 
which by definition results in a collective of victims. I 
replace the word mass with collective, for the analysis of 
units smaller than a country as a while, for example, county. 
Collective killings may occur in smaller areas without 
meeting the criteria suggested by [Benjamin] 
Valentino...”1077 
 
 
 
                                                 
1075 David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International 
Journal 1:3 (2006) 230, 238.  
 
1076 Martin Shaw. 2007. What is Genocide? Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 72. 
 
1077 Su, Yang. 2011. Collective Killing in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 13. 
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Communalism 
 
Stuart Stein references communalism in his article “Geno- 
and other cides.” Communalism generally refers to violence 
in and between localized neighborhoods, villages, districts or 
cells, though I have found no clear definition within the 
literature that has been operationalized.1078   
 
Cultural Genocide “Violence may be implied via threats to secure compliance 
with the wishes of the dominant group. However, with actual 
compliance violence becomes superfluous and thus the 
resulting minority-group behavior is in a Simmelian sense 
voluntary, the option for non-compliance not having been 
exercised. In consequence, non-violent genocide may ensue. 
Massive conversions in the religion of the dominant group, 
systematic adoption of a large category of offsprings [sic] of 
the victim group, discriminating practices to promote de-
ethnicisation, in brief, the deliberate structuring of 
preemptive assimilation may be involved.”1079 
 
Culturecide The process of denationalization or the attempt to remove 
cultural, social and political associations of one group from 
the national or local context.1080 
 
Dekamegamurders 
 
“…deka- means ten or tens; mega- means millions.” 
Rummel uses these as a category to refer to episodes where 
the victim casualties reach tens of millions of people.1081 
 
Democide 
 
“The murder of any person or people by a government, 
including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.”1082 
 
Ethnic Cleansing 
 
Can be related or overlapped with genocide but defined to a 
specific geographic territory.1083 
 
                                                 
1078 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39-63.   
 
1079 Vahakn N. Dadrian. 1975. “A Typology of Genocide.” International Review of Modern Sociology. Vol. 
5., No. 2., p. 205. 
 
1080 Stein, Stuart. 2005. "Conceptions and Terms: Templates for the Analysis of Holocausts and 
Genocides," Journal of Genocide Research Vol 7., No. 2., p. 171-203, on p. 180. 
 
1081 Rummel, R.J. 1990. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. xviii. 
 
1082 Rummel, 1990, p. 31. 
 
1083 Naimark, Norman M. 2001. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe. Harvard 
University Press.  
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Ethnocide 
 
This term first developed by Raphael Lemkin to reflect the 
killing of members who belong to a particular ethnic group, 
perhaps, a more specific term then genocide.1084 
 
Extremely Violent 
Societies 
 
“By extremely violent societies, I mean formations where 
various population groups become victims of massive 
physical violence, in which, acting together with organs of 
the state, diverse social groups participate for a multitude of 
reasons.”1085 
 
Femicide (gynocide) 
 
“…implie[s] that only one gender category, women, [are] 
targets of gender-selective killings.”1086  
 
Gendercide 
 
“…the deliberate extermination of persons of a particular sex 
(or gender).”1087 This is a gender-neutral term, meaning, 
either sex may be the recipients of violence.  
 
Holocaust (Shoah) 
 
This term is exclusively used to reference Nazi atrocities 
against the Jewish people during the Second World War and 
sometimes is expanded to include other marginalized 
populations marked for death (e.g., homosexuals, Roma, 
Jehovah Witnesses, Freemasons, and political opponents). 
The word Holocaust has become synonymous with genocide 
in many popular circles that it bears mentioning here, though 
it is not a substitutive for genocide, but perhaps may qualify 
as a sub-category of, in that is referencing a particular victim 
group. In addition to the term Holocaust, others have referred 
to this particular genocide as the “Final Solution” or 
“Shoah,” Hebrew for “catastrophe.”1088 
 
                                                 
1084 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p. 79. 
 
1085 Gerlach, Christian. 2010. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.  
 
1086 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39. 
 
1087 First coined by Mary Anne Warren, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
& Allanheld, 1985). Martin Shaw. 2007. What is Genocide? Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 67. 
 
1088 Alan S. Rosenbaum, Is the Holocaust unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press Inc., 1996); Josh Fleet, “History and Meaning of the Word ‘Holocaust’: Are We Still 
Comfortable with This Term?” The Huffington Post, March 28, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/the-word-holocaust-history-and-meaning_n_1229043.html.  
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Infanticide 
 
The systematic killing of children, particularly, infants.1089 
Man-Made Deaths 
 
Similar to communalism and infanticide, “man-made 
deaths,” to the author’s knowledge, has not been 
operationalized in the same manner as other such terms, but 
substantially used to reference the large-scale killing of 
persons by perpetrators.1090  
 
Mass Annihilation 
 
“Regimes that resort to mass annihilation do so mostly under 
conditions of advanced compartmentalization, a separation 
of the regime’s people from the target group in every sense 
and at every level. The targeted people must first be 
demarcated, they must be registered, and they must be 
isolated and made the object of a persistent campaign of 
vilification and dehumanization. The rest of the population is 
incited to hate and loathe them.”1091 
 
Mass Atrocity 
 
Some describe a mass atrocity as 5,000 civilian deaths within 
a 12-month period (Alex Bellamy) and others have lowered 
the threshold to 1,000 civilian deaths per year (Jay Ulfelder 
and Benjamin Valentino).1092 
 
Mass Categorical 
Violence 
 
Is “large-scale, group-selective violence… In particular, 
group-selective violence typically requires perpetrators to 
command effective territorial domination over target 
populations. Local actors in general possess the information 
necessary to identify and sort target populations.”1093 
 
Mass Death 
 
Katz defines genocide and mass death as the “actualization 
of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in 
its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, 
                                                 
1089 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39-63. 
 
1090 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39-63. 
 
1091 De Swaan, Abram. 2015. The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, p. 119. 
 
1092 Bellamy, Alex. 2011. “Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the 
Responsibility to Protect.” Stanley Foundation, URL: http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources. 
cfm?ID=445. Ulfelder, Jay, and Benjamin Valentino. 2008. “Assessing the Risks of State-Sponsored Mass 
Killing.” Political Instability Task Force, Washington, DC.  
Straus, Scott. 2015. Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 17.  
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social, gender or economic group, as these groups are 
defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.”1094 
 
Mass Killing 
 
Defined “as the intentional killing of a massive number of 
noncombatants.” This definition has three characteristics: the 
mass killing must be intentional, there must be at least 
50,000 victims within a five-year period, and the victims 
must be civilians or non-combatants.1095 
 
Mass Murder 
 
“The indiscriminate killing of any person or people by a 
government.”1096 
 
Mass Political Murder 
 
Is episodes where “categories were used to target victims; 
the aim was political. That is, a certain group was deemed to 
pose a threat of some sort to those in control, and therefore it 
has to be eliminated.”1097 
 
Mass Violence 
 
“…means widespread physical violence against non-
combatants, that is, outside of immediate fighting between 
military or paramilitary personnel.”1098 
Massacre 
 
The term “massacre” has been overly used within the 
academic and popular discourse. However, this term carries 
a deep and complex meaning. Here are two understandings 
of the term from Jacques Semelin. “…a state or non-state 
power resorts to massacre in order to overcome its position 
of weakness, to ensure influence over the people and to 
extend its own power.”1099 
 
“The notion of “massacre” gives rise to various problems of 
definition. Etymologically, the word derives from the 
popular Latin “matteuca,” meaning “bludgeon.” The word 
contains the sense of “butchery,” designating both the 
                                                 
1094 See Steven Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death before the Modern 
Age, Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 131. 
 
1095 Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, p. 10-14. 
 
1096 Rummel, R.J. 1990. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 31. 
Chirot, Daniel and Clark McCauley. 2006. Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass 
Political Murder. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 14-15. 
 
1098 Gerlach, Christian. 2010. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.  
 
1099 Jacques Semelin, “Toward a vocabulary of massacre and genocide” Journal of Genocide Research 5:2 
(2003) 195.  
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abattoir and the butcher’s shop. From the eleventh century 
on “massacre” becomes synonymous with the putting to 
death of animals and human beings. Historically, therefore, 
massacre appears to suppose a relationship of proximity 
between the assassin and his victim, based as it is on a 
technique of murder that applies also to animals. In this way 
the practice of slitting the throat, emerging from peasant 
know-how, is found to be used, for example, in the 
massacres of civil wars whether in Algeria or Greece.10 If, 
therefore, massacre implies a type of “one on one,” must we 
then conclude that other technologies of murder, that imply 
distance between the killer and his victim, cannot be 
properly spoken of as “massacres”? […] Alain Corbin uses 
the term to describe the killing of a single individual! A 
careful reading of his text shows, nonetheless, that its author 
hesitates in employing this term, preferring often to resort to 
that of “sacrifice.” Or is it rather the case, following the 
“Guatemalan Commission of Human Rights,” that massacre 
begins with the death of at least three individuals? The 
proposition that massacre is determined by numbers also 
appears to be arguable. But how many victims constitute a 
massacre? Stathis Kalyvas proposes the figure of at least 10 
deaths while at the same time recognising that such an 
estimation is arbitrary.”1100 
 
Megamurders 
 
This category is one below dekamegamurders, where victim 
casualties reach millions (one to ten).1101 
 
Megapogroms 
 
“The role of the central state is much less visible. The 
initiators are local notables, politicians, gangsters, clerics. 
The perpetrators are not in the service of the regime, and 
they too, are local men. Because this is little organization 
and minimal logistic support, the killing episodes in any 
given location last only a few days or weeks at most.”1102 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1100 Jacques Semelin, “In consideration of massacres” Journal of Genocide Research 3:3 (2001) 378-379. 
 
1101 Rummel, R.J. 1990. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. xviii. 
 
1102 De Swaan, Abram. 2015. The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, p. 190.   
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Multicide  “Mass murder – the killing of four or more victims at one 
time and location – has become increasingly common of 
late… Mass murder is one of several forms of 
multicide…”1103 
 
Murderous Cleansing 
 
“Murderous cleansing is modern – it is “the dark side of 
democracy.” It results where the demos (democracy) is 
confused with the ethnos (the ethnic group). Danger arises 
where two rival ethnonational movements each claims “its 
own” state over the same territory.”1104 
 
Nuclear Omnicide 
 
Omnicide is meant to describe “the destruction of all life.” 
Omnes, meaning “towards all” or “everyone,” and –cide, 
meaning “to kill.”1105 
 
Pogrom 
 
Typically, small-scale mob violence directed at a group of 
individuals sharing similar social characteristics.1106  
 
Political Genocide 
 
Describes the murder of individuals for political reasons or 
membership in a group, that is, perceived to challenge status 
quo.1107 
 
Politicide 
 
“In politicides the victim groups are defined primarily in 
terms of their hierarchical position or political opposition to 
the regime and dominant groups.”1108 
 
                                                 
1103 Found in Lies Verlinden, The Aftermath of a Dark Past: Forensic archeology and memorialization of the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi (Dissertation, 2015-2016) cites Anil Aggrawal, “Mass Murder” in Payne-
James, J.J.; Byard, R.W.; Corey, T.S., and Henderson, C. (eds). Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine Vol. 3, pp. 216. 
 
1104 Mann, Michael. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
1105 Lifton, Robert Jay and Erik Markusen. 1991. The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear 
Threat. Basic Books, p. 3.  
 
1106 Stein lists “pogrom” in his article but does not provide a definition. Therefore, the generic definition is 
included above. Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal 
of Genocide Research 4:1 (2002) 39. 
 
1107 Beth Van Schaack uses this term as a synonym for politicide. Beth Van Schaack, “The Crime of Political 
Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot,” The Yale Law Journal 106:7 (May 1997): 
2259-2291. 
 
1108 Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 
359-371 on p. 360; Martin Shaw. 2007. What is Genocide? Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 69. 
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Population Cleansing 
 
Is “the planned, deliberate removal from a certain territory of 
an undesirable population distinguished by one or more 
characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, race, class, or 
sexual preference.”1109 
 
Proto-Genocide 
 
“This concept adds clarity to studies of cultural genocide by 
helping to distinguish between situations where a collective 
identity is under violent attack and situations of full-blown 
genocide.”1110 
State Crime 
 
Similar to communalism, state crime lacks a clear definition 
within political science. It has been employed to classify 
incidents of state-directed violence.1111 
 
Urbicide 
 
This is the destruction of urban centers and urban life. 
“Urban centers, originally fortified centres of power, have 
always been pivotal to warfare, and modern war has targeted 
industrial and capital cities with bombs and nuclear 
missiles.”1112 
 
Vigilantism  
 
Violence perpetrated by persons acting in an extra-judicial 
capacity against members of a group.1113  
 
Zones of Violence 
 
“This approach implies a geographical focus and aims to 
examine the violent exchange between several population 
groups in so-called borderlands in the longue durée. This 
framework’s innovative potential lies in its transnational 
orientation. The dynamics of mass violence can only be 
adequately understood if broader regional contexts are taken 
into account. Refugee flows, famines, epidemics, and 
environmental degradation are phenomena that cross 
                                                 
1109 Developed by Andrew Bell-Fialkoff quoted in Martin Shaw. 2007. What is Genocide? Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, p. 50.  
 
1110 Christopher Powell and Amarnath Amarasingam. 2017. “Atrocity and Proto-Genocide in Sri Lanka” in 
Scott W. Murray, ed., Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing, and Teaching Genocide. 
Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press, p. 19.  
 
1111 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39-63. 
 
1112 Martin Shaw. 2007. What is Genocide? Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 75. 
 
1113 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and other cides: a cautionary note on knowledge accumulation” Journal of Genocide 
Research 4:1 (2002) 39-63. 
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national borders and often contribute to political tensions and 
outbreaks of mass violence.”1114 
 
  
                                                 
1114 Quoted text from Dominik J. Schaller, “From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of 
Genocide Studies” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6:3 (2011) 252; also see the 
following: Mark Levene, ‘‘Creating a Modern ‘Zone of Genocide’: The Impact of Nation- and State-
Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878–1923,’’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12:3 (1998): 393–433. 
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